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Abstract 
Despite the growing research on policy lobbying in China, little is known about Chinese 
research universities’ perspectives, strategies and interactions with the government in their 
efforts to influence higher education policies and advance their individual and collective 
interests. Their lobbying practices have long been hidden from the public view and difficult to 
research. Yet, the elite Chinese research universities have accumulated capacity to exert 
influence, and their discreet lobbying of government institutions has in fact become prevalent 
and is one of the most significant parts of university–government relations. 
This study investigates how the leading Chinese research universities interact with the central 
government to influence policies of crucial importance to their operations. In particular, it 
explores the strategies and forms of agency the institutions develop to exploit the loopholes of 
a fragmented central bureaucracy, and identifies the key factors and ‘rules of the game’ that 
shape their lobbying behaviour and define their patterns of interaction with the state. It asks 
how successful they are vis-à-vis the authoritarian state in a tight regulatory environment, and 
the potential implications of their activism for the current political structure. 
My study relies on a unique set of empirical evidence which includes 48 personal interviews 
with university top leaders and executives from a range of leading research universities, as well 
as with government officials. An in-depth analysis of these interviews and other previously 
inaccessible materials yields remarkable findings. It reveals two salient factors framing the 
university–state interactions: the need and capacity to monitor, navigate and penetrate an 
opaque central power structure within the state bureaucracy and the regulatory environment 
of the higher education sector; and the contingencies that create strategic opportunities 
and/or major crises. When the central power structure and regulatory environment are rigid, 
taking advantage of or reacting to any contingencies becomes necessary for any effective 
actions. 
‘Lobbying authoritarianism’ is the result of the hybrid nature of universities in China’s political 
system: they need autonomy to modernise their operations and gain international and 
domestic prestige while at the same time remaining dependent on the government’s ideology, 
financial control, and political will. Their strategic and contingent activism is unlikely to lead, 
singlehandedly, to any significant structural changes. 
Yet, through lobbying, these institutions have pushed policy boundaries and engineered 
incremental modifications to the system demonstrating a remarkable capacity to produce 
specific opportunities and influence individual decisions. Their lobbying strategies may also 
8 
produce an enduring impact on policymaking, increasing officials’ reliance and acceptance of 
bottom-up inputs and facilitating a more inclusive and rational approach in the bureaucracy. 
These gradual steps may altogether lead to a more vibrant education sector, and ultimately, an 
evolution of the system and a more open society. 
This original work advances our understanding about the practices of lobbying 
authoritarianism and of university behaviour in this field. It also provides new insights and 
facilitates future research on the major phenomena of the changing role and nature of the 
central state and of the role and nature of the elite research universities in China. 
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The lobbying of Chinese elite 
universities 
Introduction 
Over four decades of economic reforms, education has become central to China’s national 
imaginary and development strategies. Universities, elite national research universities in 
particular, have been at the forefront of the government’s strategy to develop the nation and 
catch up with the rest of the world. Despite expanded opportunities in a rapidly changing 
policy, cultural and social environment, universities have continued to operate in confined 
spaces with regulatory constraints, while facing increasing competition and a proliferation of 
political and economic actors with interest in education. With a growing consciousness of their 
own long-term public and scholarly missions, and the ambition to perform both a national and 
global role, Chinese universities have engaged more actively in government processes to 
attract resources, seek greater autonomy and cash in on competitive advantage. Despite the 
increasing importance and policy demand on and from Chinese universities as social, moral 
and political organisations in the nation, the opaque nature of governmentuniversity 
interaction has so far made it difficult to study their lobbying practice in a systematic way. 
My research is based on original interviews with university leaders. Thanks to connections with 
Chinese universities established through my family and professional career, I have gained 
extensive and direct access to university leaders and key personnel, which has allowed me to 
fill the demand for knowledge in this underexplored space. 
This thesis aims to investigate how the leading Chinese research universities interact with the 
central government on the higher education and research policies of crucial importance to 
their operations. In particular, it explores the strategies put in place under different conditions 
and the forms of agency they develop to exploit the loopholes of a fragmented central 
bureaucracy, and identifies the key factors and ‘rules of the game’ that shape lobbying 
behaviour, strategies and patterns of interaction with the state. It asks to what extent 
universities can successfully influence the decisions of the authoritarian state in a tight 
regulatory environment, and the potential implications of their activism for the current 
political structure. 
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It is important to clarify that the focus of the research is not on probing or comparing the 
lobbying practices between different types of institutions in the vast Chinese tertiary 
education sector, or on distinguishing Chinese university lobbying from that of other countries 
which operate in different political systems and regulatory environments. They would require 
new, separate studies in the future. My main focus here is on the top research universities 
which have the best access to and the greatest interest in influencing government policy. 
As the education policymaking process is a large, complex area, universities are only one side 
in the multi-player game of policymaking. My perspective will allow us to understand such 
processes from the vantage point of important policy actors, but numerous other factors may 
intervene in decision-making processes, many of which remain unclear and non-transparent. 
Various governmental functional departments, other parts of the higher education sector, and 
society can interact with each other and exercise their influence on policymaking, either 
formally or informally. Through a range of examples in the thesis, I present various possible 
factors contributing to policy decisions in order to demonstrate the extent of universities’ 
influence and effectiveness in such matters. 
Although Chinese universities are appendages of government and party organisations, due to 
their close ties with sponsoring government agencies and their significant financial and 
regulatory dependence on the state, their motivations and proactive attempts to become 
involved directly in the education and research policymaking process through their networks 
and personnel are more similar to the behaviour of lobbyists than to that of a bureaucratic 
entity working within the state structure. Universities adopt a variety of strategies to interact 
with a broad spectrum of central actors, act upon their economic interests, seek greater 
institutional autonomy from the state, have clear perceptions of their roles and missions, and 
are embedded in society. Universities, hence, should be seen as organisations that operate in a 
complex environment where an academic role, a bureaucratic role and an economic role 
interact to define their lobbying behaviour. It makes more sense to view universities as non-
state organisations and social actors than as an extension or part of the government’s 
organisational complex, and their actions should be seen as lobbying in the same sense as the 
term has been applied to other sectors of economy. 
This Introduction first outlines the context, motivation, and significance of the study, and then 
explains the research scope, methods and structure of the thesis. 
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China’s changing landscape 
Changes in statesociety relations on policymaking 
During the country’s economic reform, social actors have progressively become, directly or 
indirectly, more involved in policy debates and yielded increasing influence. This constitutes a 
departure from the top-down, state-dominated model of previous eras (Harding, 1984; 
Rosario, 1989). Numerous studies have shown that under the changing socio-economic 
circumstances of recent years, individual actors and groups outside the traditional arenas of 
policymaking, such as social elites, media and journalists, individual citizens, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and netizens, have begun to make serious attempts to participate in the 
setting of particular aspects of the policy agenda and become more involved in government 
decisions through formal, institutionalised platforms and informal channels (J. Ma & Lin, 2012). 
Although the regime still lacks transparent and regulated forums for public participation in 
policymaking, a much greater variety of sources of actors is now capable of influencing the 
discussion.1 
The role of lobbying, or youshui (游说) in Chinese,2 has become more commonly recognised 
and valued by the public and media (Chang, 2009, pp. 23-24; M. Yu, Wang, Fang, Yong, & Zhao, 
2003, pp. 24-25; C. Zhang, 2011; Zhenghua Zhou, Liu, & Sun, 2009, pp. 20-22). The rise of a 
market economy in which the government still yields much financial and regulatory power has 
spurred lobbying activities across a number of industries. Despite a decrease in the 
government’s direct involvement in the micromanagement of enterprises, the Chinese 
economy is still heavily regulated and the state still owns the major companies in industries in 
strategic sectors. Nonetheless, these firms, as well as private and semi-private companies, 
have expanded efforts to influence public policy to ensure that the bureaucracy’s policy 
positions are in concert with the interests of businesses and industries on important issues 
(Deng & Kennedy, 2010, p. 101; Kennedy, 2008, p. 3; 2009, p. 198). 
                                                          
1 Examples from others’ scholarly writings include ways in which social organisations shaped national policies for 
family planning and protection of rural habitats (Saich, 2004, pp. 190-192), or how environmental non-
governmental organisations (ENGOs) challenged and influenced national decisions on hydropower policy (H. Han, 
2013; Mertha, 2008), or how individuals used the Internet to undertake collective actions and force policymakers to 
incorporate societal concerns into the public policy agenda regarding discriminatory policies toward citizens testing 
positive for the hepatitis B virus (Yue Wang, 2008, pp. 46-48; Y. Zhu, 2010, pp. 159-166). 
2 Similar to its definition in western countries (UKPAC, 2010; Zetter, 2011, p. 29), the term ‘lobbying’ (youshui 游说) 
in China broadly refers to activities undertaken to influence officials’ views, decisions and actions regarding 
government regulations and policies (Cheng, Huang, & Wang, 2003, p. 69; Deng & Kennedy, 2010, pp. 101-102; Z. 
Tian & Gao, 2006, pp. 560-568). 
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Lobbying attempts and the influence of companies and business associations have been 
studied over several decades in various industries. In the case of the telecommunication 
sector, for instance, internet services provider entrepreneurs lobbied the state through face-
to-face meetings and collective activities, and successfully pushed for the institutionalisation of 
government hearings on pricing (K. G. Huang, 2002, pp. 227-228). In the air transport sector, 
the airlines affiliated with the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC)—the most 
powerful players in the field—lobbied the policymakers to push the sector towards an 
oligopoly model, to avoid the path of open competition that was favoured by smaller players 
(Eaton, 2013, p. 71). Private entrepreneurs sought benefits by integrating into the party-state 
system (Dickson, 1997, 2010). Liu also described how industry interest groups of the eastern 
regions attempted to influence policies and sought competitive advantages by paying frequent 
visits to ministries, making proactive and persistent policy requests, and even ‘crying and 
begging’ for attention and support (H. Liu, 2006, pp. 53-54). 
The pluralisation and proliferation of policy actors in various arenas can reveal much about the 
changes in statesociety relations. For Kennedy, for example, economic reform has made 
society far more interested in public policy than during the days of the planned economy. 
Companies, in particular large ones, became interested in politics when the issues under 
discussion related to their interests. Despite an uneven presence and capacity amongst social 
actors and the greater participation and access of large players, external influences on the 
government have increased across all the sectors. Kennedy finds that over the past decade, 
the policy areas allowing for proactive public lobbying have expanded and the space of 
clientelism and limited consultation retracted as a consequence (Kennedy, 2008, pp. 175-179). 
If the marketisation of China’s economy and the need for a reformed regulatory framework 
have resulted in growing interest, consciousness, activism and advocacy in the policy process 
of numerous arenas, have similar developments taken place in the university sector? 
The university sector 
Over the last few decades, the Chinese higher education sector has undergone a significant 
transformation. Greater ambition, new economic opportunities, rapidly growing capacity, 
fierce competition, and a highly restrictive regulatory framework have provided abundant 
reasons for Chinese national research universities3 to advocate for a greater role in discussing 
                                                          
3 National research universities are publicly funded, research-intensive universities sponsored and supervised by a 
central government ministry or agency. I will further define ‘leading national research universities’ later in the 
Introduction. Other types of higher education institutions, such as local public universities that are managed by local 
authorities, private universities and vocational colleges, are beyond the scope of this research thesis. 
19 
higher education policy, both to seek competitive advantages in resources and to gain more 
autonomy.4 
Education has traditionally remained under considerable control from the government and is 
deeply embedded in national politics (S. Liu, 2006, p. 87). In the Maoist period, as party leaders 
fought over different approaches to national development and shifted their attitude towards 
education policy, the education system served merely as a passive vehicle and auxiliary tool for 
realising the party’s political objectives and the leaders’ interest, rather than as an 
autonomous institution for the development of knowledge and social change (Tsang, 2000). 
Since the PRC was established in 1949, radicals and moderates in the Communist Party of 
China differed fundamentally in their goals and approaches to national development, and 
consequently on the role of education in national development. 
In the reconstruction provided by Tsang (2000, p. 582), party leaders were sharply divided over 
three enduring education policy dilemmas: ‘the economic versus political/ideological functions 
of education (expertise versus redness), education for efficiency versus education for social 
equity (stratified education system preparing well-trained meritocrats, leaders and diversified 
workforce versus anti-elitism education for the masses); and the proper role of intellectuals 
(enlisting intellectuals and high-skilled personnel in socialist development versus treating them 
as antagonists and suppressing them)’. During the swings between these positions, ‘education 
was caught in cycles of heart-wrenching dislocations and adjustments’ (Tsang, 2000, p. 601), 
and major educational policies and reversals were undertaken to tackle these enduring 
dilemmas. As a result, the wildly oscillating and erratic policies severely damaged the 
education sector and neglected universities’ legal status, roles, growth, and academic nature. 
Nevertheless, the development trajectory of education took a turn in the late 1970s when 
China started its reforms and opened up its economy. Chinese leaders formed a lasting 
consensus about the important role of education in national economic and human capital 
development (Tsang, 2000). Since the beginning of the 1980s, with the persistent goal of 
building a stronger nation, the government announced a series of significant national 
development strategies and funding policies to strengthen the role and function of education 
and science in China, accompanied by slogans such as ‘Invigorating the nation through science 
and education’ (kejiao xingguo 科教兴国) and ‘Developing a knowledge economy’ (fazhan 
                                                          
4 In this thesis, higher education policy broadly refers to a wide range of macro and micro level policies on how 
universities are organised, funded, operated and developed in policy areas including finance, personnel, education, 
science and research. It includes the making process of the code of conduct, institutions, regulations, and guidelines 
to address higher education-related public issues (X. Chen & Gao, 2008, p. 120). 
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zhishi jingji 发展知识经济). Chinese Research and Development (R&D) funds increased 
drastically from 7.4 billion yuan (about USD 1.2 billion) in 1987 to 1,184.66 billion (about USD 
190 billion) in 2013 (NBS, MoST, & MoF, 2014). Chinese Education funding in 2012 reached 4% 
of the GDP at 378.155 billion yuan (USD 60 billion). In 2013, it reached 388.393 billion yuan 
(USD 62.4 billion), 142 times the 2.732 billion yuan (USD 0.44 billion) of 1999 (MoF, 2013a). 
With such enormous investments in national education and research, national research 
universities have become crucial contributors to the state’s objectives and are required to 
perform a global and national role. The Chinese central government’s R&D funding for 
universities, for example, rose sharply from 5.73 billion yuan (USD 0.92 billion) in 1998 to 
85.67 billion yuan (USD 13.77 billion) in 2013. A number of university development programs 
were established explicitly to fund elite research universities, under such rubrics as ‘Building 
world-class universities’ and ‘Building new-type think tanks’ (xinxing zhiku 新型智库) (see 
Chapter 1). A healthy funding environment strengthened leading research universities’ long-
term ambitions, accelerated their growth and expanded their influence.5 
Universities’ involvement as expert advisors in developing public policies also increased 
because of their role as repositories of technical expertise and knowledge, now in high 
demand by national policymakers (Min & Wen, 2010, pp. 37, 94; Xinjingbao, 2011; T. Xu & 
Zhang, 2011; Zha, 2011a, p. 56).6 Employing the ‘experts’ became a crucial advantage for these 
universities. A critical endowment of scientific knowledge, intellectual prestige, historical 
reputation, and proximity to the central bureaucracy contributed to placing these elite players 
in an expedient and strategic position. 
Marketisation and ongoing education reforms have also led to a diversification of interest in 
education policies (Bao, 2009, p. 20; X. Zhou & Wang, 2006, p. 10). Liberal ideas of competition 
and efficiency have become an integral part of universities’ core organisational philosophy (J. 
Xu, 2003, p. 15). Yet national research universities lack financial alternatives and remain 
                                                          
5 According to the 2007 statistics published by the Chinese Ministry of Education, for instance, among over 2,300 
higher education institutions in China, the first nine universities which received concentrated funding from project 
‘985’ (see Chapter 1) accounted for 30.6% of total national key programs/disciplines, 43.6% of total university-based 
key research laboratories, and nearly 30% total university-based national engineering research centres. They had a 
significant level of technology commercialisation and patent applications (Jinchun Li, 2007), and they were also 
ranked highly for China’s national Science and Technology (S&T) awards, education expenditure, and research 
incomes (Jie Zhang, 2012). Collectively, the nine accounted for about 10% of China’s R&D expenditures and 
generate more than 20% of the nation’s output of journal articles as in 2009 (Maslen, 2013). 
6 One notable example is Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2014 strategy on ‘developing think tanks’ aimed at getting 
the best possible advice for technocratic policymaking from academic and professional experts (see Chapter 1). 
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dependent on access to state funding. In the face of new economic opportunities, they thus 
compete fiercely for the distribution of government resources and try to influence policies that 
affect their capacity to tap the market (for example, in terms of student recruitment). 
Consequently, rivalries and interest conflicts amongst universities have increased sharply in 
recent decades (S. He, 2009, p. 8; Song & Liao, 2004, pp. 26, 28-29). 
Opportunities also remain framed by significant regulatory constraints that universities feel 
threaten academic life and their perceived long-term missions (see Chapter 2). Autonomy and 
academic freedom are now understood as intrinsic values of a modern university, and a 
precondition for a university to fulfil its role and responsibilities toward society (Thorens, 2006; 
Junzong Zhang, 2004) and to compete internationally. However, Chinese universities are still 
strictly controlled by the state and are not autonomous entities (Jianhua Hu, 2002; H. Jiang, 
Lin, & Li, 2005; S. Liu, 2006).7 
Structurally, universities operate under the leadership and supervision of the government, and 
develop within the regulatory boundaries defined by the education authority. To some extent, 
universities are embedded in the national central bureaucracy, and appear as an extension of 
government or as quasi-government agencies. Education policymaking mechanics have been 
top-down and highly controlled processes.8 Areas like political education, sensitive areas of 
research, and the appointment of the university executives by the central government suggest 
that the state maintains considerable control over tertiary education (Pan, 2007; R. Yang, 
Vidovich, & Currie, 2007). Several university personnel whom I interviewed referred to the 
education sector as ‘the last, enduring fort of the planned economy’ (jihua jingji zuihou yige 
baolei 计划经济最后一个堡垒). The government also imposes a utilitarian and 
instrumentalist ideology, defines the roles, priorities and tasks of universities based on 
national strategies, and guides university activities through the structure and goals of its 
funding programs. As education is regarded as important to economic growth, the utilitarian 
                                                          
7 Despite the decentralisation and restructure of the higher education sector in the late 1990s, as well as the Higher 
Education Law that took effect on 1 January 1999, the state still intervenes in, controls and dominates many areas 
of the sector where the law says universities should enjoy autonomy and independence (Geng, 2010; Jianhua Hu, 
2002; B. Yang, 2011). The rules of Higher Education Law, for instance, define the boundaries of university autonomy 
and restrict universities’ operational activities and behaviours but do not regulate or limit the government’s 
interventions into universities’ business (Jupeng Yang & Su, 2012). 
8 There seems to be a pervasive view and common discourse amongst scholars that the education policymaking 
mechanics of the regime have been top-down, unpredictable, and highly controlled processes. Research and 
empirical studies on the process for forming important educational decisions are limited. Key policy decisions still 
heavily rely on the view and directives of the state leadership (H. Kang, 2006, pp. 11, 13; X. Lu, 2008, p. 39; Tsang, 
2000; Q. Wang, 2014, pp. 150-151).  
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needs of national economic development clearly trump the needs of universities or the idea of 
education for education’s sake (Tsang, 2000; Y. Wan, 2006, pp. 22-23; Q. Wang, 2014, pp. 146, 
150-151).9 As a result, universities’ political, social and economic functions for nation building 
are over-emphasised, yet their own academic nature, scholarly character and mission are 
neglected and restrained in service of political or economic interests (T. Jiang, 2012, p. 69). 
With their ambition on a global stage and inherent needs for scholarly autonomy, it becomes 
increasingly vital for universities to free themselves from the shackles of state control (Ren, 
2008, p. 3) by voicing their needs and increasing their influence, or by collaborating with peer 
institutions to protect themselves from detrimental government interference (H. Jiang et al., 
2005, p. 94; Y. Wang, 2014, pp. 69-70; J. Xu, 2012, pp. 23-24). 
As John Douglass suggests, Chinese universities have been largely ‘followers’ on a global 
playing field, constrained and shaped by a state-driven political culture. Yet there are 
indications that this may change. The globalisation of higher education and increased 
international collaborations are creating a consensus among Chinese university leaders and 
faculty that excessive government control has become a hindrance and that increased 
institutional independence will be necessary to fully mature and develop world-class 
universities (Douglass, 2012, pp. 642,664-645). The C9, a university group composed of the 
nine leading Chinese national research universities, has become part of the global network 
that discusses how to tackle the challenges facing research universities around the world 
(Rhoads & Shi, 2014, p. 179).10 
The success of universities still largely depends on their capacity to influence the state, to 
obtain competitive advantages and reduce regulatory constraints.11 So is a noticeable increase 
in universities’ involvement in policymaking only a strategic reaction to new constraints, or is it 
a sign of a more structural transformation? 
                                                          
9 Economic growth played a central role in the policymaking of the Chinese government in the 1990s. For instance, 
Premier Li Lanqing offered an official explanation as to why the government decided to expand higher education in 
1999. The top reason he provided was the national economy (Lanqing Li, 2003). 
10 The C9, Consortium of China Nine Research Universities, started to operate in 2003 as an informal network, and 
was formally established in October 2008 as China’s equivalent to the US Ivy League. In Chinese society, the group is 
also often called as ‘the coalition of nine schools’ (jiuxiao lianmeng 九校联盟).  Its membership includes Peking 
University, Tsinghua University, Fudan University, Nanjing University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Zhejiang 
University, Harbin Institute of Technology, University of Science and Technology China, and Xi’an Jiaotong 
University. I provide more details about C9 in Chapter 3. 
11 For example, in the sense of international recognition and reputation, the success and excellence of universities 
are still measured by the quality of their academic outputs. Universities depend on government policies and 
resources to support and strengthen their academic activities and performance. 
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To investigate this question, this study places its emphasis on the lobbying behaviour of a 
range of leading Chinese national research universities—arguably some of the most active 
players in the sector—and its political implications and consequences. For the purpose of this 
study, I broadly define ‘elite’ or ‘leading research universities’ as the first national research 
institutions which the Chinese government has selected to receive special funding under a 
national elite university program named ‘Project 985’ (MoE, 2011a). These leading universities 
have been central to the government’s efforts to develop tertiary education ever since they 
were drafted into Project 985 in 1998–1999. They also are some of the most prestigious and 
research-intensive universities in the country. 
These leaders of the higher education sector possess a number of characteristics that make 
them the ideal subjects for this research. 
First, their early inclusion in Project 985 makes them the officially recognised elite institutions 
in China and suggests that they hold a central role in the government’s objective of national 
development. Although this elite 985 program has been expanded and transformed several 
times and now includes 39 universities (Xinhuanet, 2011), the early entrants in the program 
still lead the higher education sector in various metrics including size, share of central funding, 
research facilities, quality of students (highest entrance scores), internationalisation, academic 
performance, research revenues, research output and commercialisation (Jinchun Li, 2007, p. 
49; M. Wan, 2014). 
Second, these institutions all carry the label of ‘national university’, are sponsored, supervised 
and funded by various central agencies, and have important connections and proximity to the 
state. With the state’s substantial investments and expectation for them to perform a national 
and global role, these universities have developed significantly in terms of ambition, academic 
prestige and public influence, which may provide them with political leverage and advantages. 
Third, they are all located in provincial capital cities, geographically distributed across China’s 
north, south, east and west. They represent various economic, historical, and regional 
circumstances and diverse research strengths. 
Fourth, as a consequence of the previous points, they have stronger motivations and visions to 
engage government policies. They tend to be more sensitive to, and affected by, policy 
constraints and the lack of autonomy, and are highly competitive and demanding about 
government funding and resources. They are also more capable of interacting with different 
organs of the state to address their concerns and support their interests. Together with their 
leverage, strengths and connections, they are also more likely to produce policy input and 
influence, either individually or collaboratively. Therefore they provide a good opportunity to 
observe university–government interactions on a number of different levels. 
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Fifth, these elite universities have been involved in a university lobby network called ‘C9’ since 
2003. By dint of their considerable experience over a decade, they have articulated their views 
more confidently with regard to the operations and challenges of a lobby group, peer 
competition and conflicts, and the collective and individual lobbying strategies they have 
employed (see Chapter 3). Both individually and through the activities of the C9, they have also 
been involved in significant international collaborations. 
Chinese universities as policy advocates 
In their interactions with the government, the research universities play two concurrent, 
distinct roles in the national policy process, namely as policy advisor (informing policy) and 
policy advocate (influencing policy). 
Universities and individuals within a university are commonly involved in government-led 
policy consultations as authoritative expert advisors on broad policies across numerous fields, 
not only on education and research policies. This role is often defined and designated by the 
state and is expected to be disinterested, neutral and objective, providing intellectual 
legitimacy and services to assist the government’s decision-making through formal or informal 
channels. 
As mentioned earlier, the state is increasingly seeking and relying on experts’ advice for more 
‘rational’ policymaking. Zhang suggests that such a ‘scientific’ policymaking approach by the 
government has enabled university policy experts to gain some ‘power’, become a part of the 
education policymaking process, implant their views and provide inputs (Guobing Zhang, 2010, 
p. 185). There is currently an increasing recognition of the intellectual authority and social 
capital of academic experts, scholars and research centres (think tanks) in shaping various 
government public policies directly and indirectly (Min & Wen, 2010, pp. 37, 94; Xinjingbao, 
2011; T. Xu & Zhang, 2011; Zha, 2011a, p. 56; X. Zhu, 2008, pp. 69-93; 2009).12 This broad 
knowledge and expertise in a wide range of policy areas often provide them with significant 
clout to also influence education policies that are close to and affect their interests.  
                                                          
12 Examples also include telecommunications policies (K. G. Huang, 2002, pp. 258-259), and social, environmental 
and international policies (Sharma, 2014; Tang, 2014). A common theme of these episodes is the fact that the state 
is increasingly aware that stronger critical thinking is needed to support the leadership as it faces complex social, 
economic and environmental challenges. Nevertheless, their provision of advice and their influence are still mostly 
within the confines of the system (Sharma, 2014), and are often indirect, gradual, or even frail, in front of 
government power and market forces in policymaking (Zha, 2011a, p. 56). 
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As policy advocates, universities and individuals within a university have vested interests and 
subjective positions, generally involving conflicts of interest. They pursue specific goals, often 
taking a proactive and bottom-up approach in influencing government policies and decisions. 
Here I should point out that in the context of institutional lobbying in China, each university 
can be largely seen as a unified and monolithic entity with collective institutional interests, 
coherent political strategies and advocacy approach. Within the hierarchical organisational 
system of an institution, the university senior management controls its internal processes, and 
guides its policy advocacy and government affairs. Members in the senior management, 
including president, party secretary and vice presidents, are not only active lobbyists 
themselves representing the university’s collective interests, but also advise and authorise key 
personnel of various administrative departments to directly negotiate with the officialdom in 
specific policy areas. Examples include directors of science and technology on research grant 
policies, heads of student recruitment on national admissions policies, and deans of graduate 
studies on postgraduate admissions and funding policies. There are unavoidably internal 
differences within an institution, such as divergent opinions and behaviours of individuals. 
However, they usually produce limited impact on the overall political strategies and operations 
of the organisation, hence are largely negligible in this context. 
As I will illustrate later in the thesis, the boundaries between research universities’ advisor and 
advocate roles can become unclear and overlap in practice, especially for higher education and 
research policies which impact on their institutional interests. Such a ‘double role’ is partially 
the result of universities being repositories of knowledge, which makes their position different 
from other lobbying actors in other industries, and is also partially due to the lack of legitimate 
channels and formal institutions for them to participate in the government process as policy 
advocates and lobbyists (see Chapter 1). 
Universities’ advisor role complements their advocate role: acting as an advisor helps enhance 
a university’s credibility, capacity, understanding of the internal workings of the system, and 
connections with officials, as well as helping to demonstrate the importance of universities in 
meeting the objectives of the government. All of these enable universities to operate more 
effectively as policy advocates. 
This growing policy advisory role and ‘expert’ credentials also create more opportunities and 
leverage for universities to become involved in the government and promote their agenda and 
policy advocacy to officials. This often results in direct lobbying of central ministries and the 
National People's Congress to attract more funding to support universities (Guobing Zhang, 
2010, p. 55). However, the prevalent assumption that such an advocacy role is limited and that 
the state holds all the power (Zhongjing Huang, 2010; H. Kang, 2006; X. Lu, 2008; Y. Wang, 
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2014),13 as well as the difficulties for researchers to collect qualitative data on university 
lobbying due to the covert nature of university–government interaction (S. He, 2009, p. 8; 
Guobing Zhang, 2010, pp. 115-116) has limited in-depth research to support it.14  
The Chinese government seeks policy advisors but feels threatened by policy advocates. 
‘Higher education lobbying’ is common but not regulated or legitimised (S. He, 2009, p. 8). 
Significant anecdotal evidence shows that leaders and faculty from universities have acted as 
policy advocates and made efforts to influence the government and public opinion on specific 
education policies to pursue special or collective interests.15 I have witnessed firsthand such 
interactions in my personal and professional experience over the years. As the thesis will later 
                                                          
13 Many Chinese scholars describe Chinese universities as playing a rather ‘limited’, ‘weak’, ‘indirect’ and 
‘submissive’ role in policymaking process due to the regulatory dominance of the state (H. Kang, 2006, pp. 12-13; J. 
Lin, 2004, p. 23; X. Lu, 2008, pp. 38-40; Y. Wang, 2014, p. 70). Wang, for instance, suggests that Chinese universities 
have played a passive role of compliance, and they have not explored or developed their self-consciousness, 
proactivity and ability to take initiatives (Y. Wang, 2014, p. 70). Lu argues that government leaders developed the 
new ideas of key national policies for building high-level universities, and universities played a minimal role in these 
policies (X. Lu, 2008, pp. 39-40). Such a presumption overlooks the advocacy role played by universities and their 
policy influence.  
14 My interviewees generally agree that it is challenging for researchers to study university–government interaction 
in China because their lobbying activities are often surreptitious and competitive in nature. Shu He, for instance, 
points out that many Chinese universities set up Beijing offices to lobby the government, but the terms ‘lobbyists’, 
‘lobbying’ or ‘higher education lobbying’ are not legitimised and rarely used (S. He, 2009, p. 8). Zhang suggests that 
the covert nature of the interactions between university leaders and government officials, and between 
government officials, especially at the elite level, makes it difficult to study how these informal elements have 
shaped policies (Guobing Zhang, 2010, pp. 115-116, 188). 
15 In December 1979, a number of top university leaders from Shanghai sent a joint letter to party-led newspaper 
People’s Daily in Beijing, publically appealing for greater autonomy for their universities (Xiao, 1979). This is the first 
official record of universities publically acting as policy advocates. In 1986, Chinese engineers Wang Ganchang, 
Wang Daheng, Yang Jiaxi, and Chen Fangyun lobbied the government on funding support for high-tech research, 
which received endorsement by Deng Xiaoping and soon led to a significant national research funding policy (MoST, 
2010b). In May 1983, then Chancellors of Nanjing University, Zhejiang University and others penned a handwritten 
letter to Deng Xiaoping and the State Council, suggesting a national policy for investing in a small number of elite 
national universities and key academic disciplines. This proposal soon received support from the leadership, 
marking the beginning of a series of national policies to fund key universities (MoE, 1983; People's Daily, 1983). In 
1998, China’s elite institutions Peking University and Tsinghua University jointly lobbied the government on a new 
university funding project named ‘985’, which was implemented in 1999 and changed the development trajectory 
of Chinese higher education (Min & Wen, 2010; Guobing Zhang, 2010). In more recent years, research universities 
made several attempts to establish associations to represent their interest and provide policy input, such as the 
‘Association of Chinese research universities’ (ACRU) (Juan Hu, Li, & Wang, 2007; Ji, 2008), which was initiated in 
2007 but later suspended, and the Consortium of China Nine Research Universities (C9) (Zhong Zhou, 2010), which 
was established in 2008 and still operates to date. 
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show, university executives admitted to me that lobbying is a highly common occurrence and 
has been beneficial to them when seeking competitive advantages on autonomy, funding 
resources and policy support. In the words of one interviewee, it has become ‘a most 
significant part of university–government interactions’. 
Some Chinese authors have captured specific episodes of universities’ involvement in 
government processes as proactive advocates. Guobing Zhang (2010, pp. 185-190, 183), for 
instance, finds that there was ‘an alliance of advocacy actors’ (zhichi lianmeng 支持联盟) 
behind each successful key national university funding project that favoured elite 
institutions.16 The alliance included leading national universities, officials from the Ministry of 
Education (MoE) and media. 
In Zhang’s story, the universities evidently acted as policy lobbyists: they played an active role, 
through both formal and informal means,17 in promoting their policy ideas and rationale to the 
top national leaders (the ultimate decision-makers) and in attracting central financial support 
from other key ministries such as the Ministry of Finance. Besides, many other institutions that 
were not selected by the state vigorously petitioned the MoE and their central sponsoring 
ministries trying to get themselves into these elite programs and gain a share of the special 
funding. As a consequence of this pressure, these programs were later expanded to include 
more recipients and the central funding was diluted to accommodate such expansion (Guobing 
Zhang, 2010, pp. 3, 171-180). This recurring pattern reveals how the active role and influence 
of universities in advancing their self-interests behind the scenes has shaped the trajectory of 
these policies. 
Zhang suggests that the shared vision and aligned interest between elite universities and the 
education bureaucracies was crucial to the successful establishment and development of these 
national programs, and that universities are not permitted to contest the policy views and 
decisions of their central supervisory institutions but can provide policy advice and support to 
them (Guobing Zhang, 2010, p. 190). His work, however, does not consider the numerous 
cases when the interests and priorities of universities and government clash, and that can 
provide a better insight into the actions and capacity of universities to change the course of a 
policy or a regulatory principle. 
                                                          
16 These elite programs include the 1985 policy to boost central support for seven key institutions, and Project 211 
and Project 985 which targeted funding at a small number of best universities. 
17 They included face-to-face, direct contact (p. 84), joint actions (p. 65), personal connections with senior officials 
(p. 84), alumni networks (pp. 65, 82), and raising proposals at National People’s Congress (p. 55) and workshops (p. 
55) (Guobing Zhang, 2010).  
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Another author, Suyan Pan, studied how Tsinghua University (Tsinghua) successfully influenced 
the government and gained relative freedom and greater decision-making power. In the 
process, close personal relations between Tsinghua’s leadership and state officials played a key 
role. Pan suggests that, ‘to gain more autonomy than the state initially granted, the university 
cannot simply fight with the government, but needs to adopt strategies to play safely’ (Pan, 
2007, p. 140). Pan’s conclusion illuminates an important aspect, but due to the uniqueness of 
Tsinghua’s political influence and extent of personal linkages, his study may have limited 
overall validity for the general practices of university lobbying. 
Zhong Zhou’s work (2010) chronicles the formation of the C9 as the result of a joint political 
approach to influence the university funding policies of Project 985, but provides limited 
empirical evidence or details of their interactions. 
Although each study addresses certain issues of interest, questions remain. In particular, 
beyond the isolated anecdotal evidence, no systematic attempt at an analysis of individual and 
collective lobbying behaviour in the university sector has been made. The set of unwritten 
‘rules of the game’ or principles that shape university lobbying behaviour is yet to be explored. 
Scholars have studied how such interactions happen in other sectors.18 Through the use of 
comparative case studies, Kennedy finds that economic circumstances (condition of the sector 
and the size of a firm)19 and political context (political institutions and official norms)20 are 
important factors that shape business–government interaction across economic sectors 
(Kennedy, 2008, pp. 163-174). He and Tian also observe that Chinese private enterprises’ 
strategies and behaviour are affected by political environmental factors (e.g., power conflicts 
between central and local institutions) and organisational factors (e.g., a firm’s size and its 
                                                          
18 Some NGOs and international entities lobby the government by employing tactics such as public campaign, legal 
persuasion, petition letters to the ministry and forming a loose collective network (H. Han, 2013, pp. 327-331). In 
economic industries, firms of various ownership and industries typically lobby through both formal institutions and 
informal practices, with information, public relations, and trust-building as underlying motivational mechanisms a 
company uses to persuade an official to accept their position. They routinely provide information in oral and written 
forms, host face-to-face, policy-related meetings with policymakers, and use public media in support of their policy 
goals. They also use trade associations for policy influencing (Deng & Kennedy, 2010, p. 114; K. G. Huang, 2002, pp. 
174-177; Kennedy & Deng, 2012, p. 155). 
19 Here, economic factors include the level of economic competition and market concentration, and the dominance 
of SOEs or smaller firms in the sector, and firms’ own size. For example, large, elite companies are particularly 
proactive, influential and effective with officials in the policy process on Chinese public policy, regardless of 
ownership or nationality, and more active over the range of lobbying tactics (Deng & Kennedy, 2010, p. 41). 
20 Political context includes the political system’s historical practice of compartmentalising information and semi-
transparent process, unproductive formal institutions for aggregation of industry interests, the importance of direct 
political ties, and state control over associations (Kennedy, 2008, pp. 163-164). 
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senior executives’ political ranks and personal ties with the government) (Y. He & Tian, 2007, 
p. 17). 
For Kennedy, businesses largely interact directly with the state on policy, with limited reliance 
on trade associations, and avoid challenging the government’s authority. Instead, deference to 
the state, and pursuit of a win-win position and mutually beneficial outcome remain the 
common strategies (Kennedy, 2008, p. 164). This is partially the result of the political control 
and restrictions over social groups and advocacy organisations (Kennedy, 2008, pp. 163, 171; 
Unger & Chan, 2008, pp. 66-68) and the lack of legitimacy of lobbying activity in China (Cheng, 
2006, pp. 44,47-48; Cheng et al., 2003, p. 63; Kennedy, 2009, pp. 213-214), as well as partially 
because some business actors, especially large firms, have direct ties with the state (Kennedy, 
2008, pp. 163-167).  
Different types of organisations lobby differently: for-profit actors (e.g., corporations or trade 
associations) typically choose lobbying techniques that differ from those of public interest 
groups21  and non-profit sectors (e.g., civil environmental groups). The nature of the policy 
issues influences a group’s lobbying strategy (Cook, 1998, pp. 139-140; Gais & Walker, 1991, 
pp. 117-119; Schlozman & Tierney, 1986, p. 431).22  
Unlike either enterprises (marketing private goods) or government institutions (providing 
public goods) (R. Zhang, 2011, pp. 104-105), universities are quasi-public organisations 
(providing quasi-public goods) with concentrated knowledge discovery and exploration, unique 
socio-economic attributes and functions, peculiar internal institutional structures, as well as 
independent and academic organisational values and cultures. This distinctive nature of 
universities guides their operation and behaviour and determines how they relate to and 
interact with the government and society (Zijie Huang & Cheng, 2010, pp. 190-192; Junzong 
Zhang, 2004, pp. 8-9). Higher education institutions are also particularly sensitive and reactive 
to any changes to the institutional environment where they operate (J. Lin, 2004, p. 23). 
Hence, when it comes to lobbying, universities have their own motivation, preferences and 
logic of actions, and extent of political influence. 
                                                          
21 Public interest groups refers to those whose primary purpose is to pursue collective goods that will not selectively 
and materially reward their members (Berry, 1977, p. 10). 
22 In the US, for instance, higher education associations are occupationally based non-profit associations and 
generally fall into the category of non-profit sector (Cook, 1998, p. 139). Cook, Gais and Walker suggest that such 
occupationally based non-profit associations are organised around an economic interest or livelihood and therefore 
appear to have more self-interest than citizen groups when lobbying, and they usually lobby much the same way 
that citizen groups do (Cook, 1998, pp. 139-140; Gais & Walker, 1991, pp. 117-119). 
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More importantly, their behaviour and the discourses they promote reveal much about the 
nature and potential implications of their interactions with the political system. When 
analysing business lobbying behaviours, Kennedy suggests that this growth in business’ policy 
influence has ambiguous implications for democratisation in the political future of China 
(Kennedy, 2008, p. 179). Some businesses believe democratisation is in their best interests, but 
‘those with relatively significant influence under the current political circumstances may not 
see a need for much further modification’ (Kennedy, 2008, p. 180). 
Some others also argue that despite the pluralisation of the political process and the recent 
rise of various non-state entities, these are not likely to exert independent policy influence or 
challenge the regime. In order to achieve their own goals, many non-traditional contributors to 
policymaking, such as NGOs, media and individual activists, have successfully entered the 
political process and shaped policy decisions by adopting the strategies necessary to work 
within the constraints of the ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’ (FA) framework (Lieberthal & 
Lampton, 1992, pp. 2-24; Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988)23 and by exploiting the fissures within 
the state and building alliances with like-minded officials without inviting suspicion or 
repression from the state (Mertha, 2008, pp. 151, 157-158; Zheng, 2010, pp. 147-148). 
In comparison, universities are potentially different. They host significant expertise and employ 
the intellectual elites of the country, but still face substantial constraints to their potential 
advocacy because of their organic position in the public administration, their social role, and 
their financial and regulatory dependence on the state. Does this place them in a position that 
is more or less likely to affect the ‘rules of the game’, and to produce a challenge to the 
existing practices of government that bear certain impact? 
As Qiang Zha suggests, as a critical source of regime legitimacy for the modern state and its 
political authority, the rising Chinese universities may be in an unprecedented position to 
negotiate university autonomy and academic freedom, which, in turn, should serve as the 
catalyst for a more open society (Zha, 2011b). They are not only agents of social change but 
also ‘the canary in the gold mine—the benchmark to gauge the nation’s progress toward a 
more open … society’ (Douglass, 2012, p. 665). 
                                                          
23 Fragmented authoritarianism or FA refers to a model for understanding the policy process in the Chinese polity, 
including the structural distribution of resources and authority; and processes of decision-making and policy 
implementation. The FA model argues that authority below the very peak of the Chinese political system is 
fragmented and disjointed. The fragmentation is structurally based and has been enhanced by reform policies 
regarding procedures. The fragmentation, moreover, grew increasingly pronounced under the reforms beginning in 
the late 1970s (Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992, p. 8; Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988). 
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Aim and significance of the study 
My study relies on a new and previously unavailable set of empirical evidence to understand 
the significance of universities’ actions for the broader context of Chinese politics. Empirically, 
this study investigates the strategies of universities towards central government bureaucracies 
on a broad range of education and research policies that relate to universities’ interests. It 
aims to advance our understanding of both the fragmentation of the central bureaucracy and 
the universities’ ability to exploit it to advance their interests and increase their influence. 
In particular, I intend to reassess earlier scholarly views that the Chinese system is becoming 
more institutionalised and the importance of guanxi (关系) has changed in government-
business relations (Deng & Kennedy, 2010, p. 124; Gold, Guthrie, & Wank, 2002; Guthrie, 1998, 
1999; Kennedy, 2008, p. 109; 2009, p. 207; USCBC, 2008), at least in so far as the higher 
education sector is concerned.24 This study continues a line of enquiry that tests the level of 
institutionalisation of the Chinese socialist state and its policymaking mechanisms, and clarifies 
the role of informal practices in the education policy arena. 
Conceptually, my research identifies and articulates what factors and principles guide and 
define universities’ lobbying behaviour and strategies, to what extent they can successfully 
influence the decisions of the authoritarian state within the confined space created by 
regulations and dependency, and what the limitations of such influence are. To achieve this 
goal and understand the boundaries of this arena of interaction, I focus on four areas: 
universities’ perception of their roles, missions and entitlements; understanding of the 
regulatory and bureaucratic system and strategies to manipulate it; constraints to universities’ 
collective action; and tactics to influence the government. 
By analysing universities’ discourses and how they perceive themselves and the bureaucracy, 
and by examining their contention, goals and motivations, what they actually do (interactions, 
                                                          
24 Various studies on economic policymaking have suggested that the system is more institutionalised, and the 
importance of guanxi has changed in direct business–government interactions (Deng & Kennedy, 2010, p. 124; Gold 
et al., 2002; Guthrie, 1998, 1999; Kennedy, 2008, p. 109; 2009, p. 207; USCBC, 2008). According to Kennedy and 
Deng (Deng & Kennedy, 2010, p. 124; Kennedy, 2009, p. 207), for instance, at the national level, where laws go 
through a complex evaluation process by many offices, guanxi serves more to help companies gain face time with 
officials than guarantee a decision will go in their favour; businesses do not depend primarily on guanxi to achieve 
their aims. Instead, companies and associations need to rely more on shaping the substantive views of officials: they 
attempt to influence policy by providing information and strengthening their public standing. Hiring former officials 
is common among companies and associations, but such staffers are more valued for their knowledge of the inner 
workings of the political system than their relationships with specific individuals in office (Deng & Kennedy, 2010, p. 
124; Kennedy, 2009, p. 207). 
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behaviour, actions and practices), and how they interpret what they have done, I intend to 
assess the potential implications of their activism—How should we understand the 
universities’ peculiar form of claims and tactics of interaction with the state? Have universities 
developed a consciousness such that their lobbying of the state is based on their rightful 
position in a modern society? Or is their action still mainly driven by the set of bureaucratic 
rules and state-defined roles that form their relationship with the state? Is their activism 
strategic and contingent, or can it potentially lead to long-term, structural change to the 
current political system? 
Research design and methods 
I used a qualitative research method. As Creswell suggests, one important reason for 
conducting a qualitative study is that the study is exploratory; not much has been written 
about the topic, and the researcher seeks to listen to informants and to build a picture based 
on their ideas (Creswell, 1998, p. 21). As explained earlier, this topic remains largely 
underexplored and there is a need for baseline research. My study relies on substantial new 
firsthand information from a large number of semi-structured in-depth interviews with 
authoritative and often behind-the-scenes players, as well as firsthand observation of lobbying 
activities and a comprehensive survey of the existing Chinese-language studies and other 
relevant documents. 
Importantly, my direct access to information sources has given me a unique advantage. 
Researchers, even those working within a Chinese university, may at times find this topic 
challenging due to potential conflicts of interest, while foreign researchers may lack access to 
the core players. I have established, over many years, close connections with leading Chinese 
universities, including presidents, party secretaries, vice presidents and other key personnel in 
major policy areas/departments. These university leaders have rich experience in dealing with 
the government, and are familiar with the government’s operations. Many of them have 
served in the government before and are expected to take senior official posts later. My 
interviewees have shared with me their experiences, personal insights and back stories. In 
addition, I have participated in some of their formal and informal meetings, including some 
joint meetings with government officials, which provided me with useful insights on their 
interactions.  
In 2013, during my fieldwork to China, I visited nine national research universities in Hangzhou, 
Nanjing, Beijing, Shanghai, Hefei, Harbin, and Xi’an. I selected a broad range of participants 
from these major research universities, including some high-profile figures in the sector based 
on their roles, policy expertise, professional experiences, strategic visions, and direct contacts 
with the government officialdom and other peer universities. Besides numerous university 
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leaders and personnel with professional roles (executives, directors and deans), I also 
interviewed a number of academics and government officials.25 
During personal interviews (conducted in Chinese), I made it clear to interviewees that my 
interest was in the university–government interaction on policies and university lobbying 
practices.26 Interviews tended to begin with broad generalisations about the lobbying process, 
but participants would invariably end up providing examples and explanations of the lobbying 
process and their interactions with the government (see Appendix A–Interviews). 
During 20132015, I also participated in a range of policy-related meetings and activities which 
universities and government officials attended. Those events were valuable opportunities for 
me to gain firsthand insights into universitygovernment and universityuniversity 
interactions, both formally and behind the scenes, and enabled me to capture some important 
elements of their direct interactions and behaviour, subtle changes and nuance in attitudes, 
tones and expressions, which are important indicators of their relationships but cannot be 
recorded and traced in meeting documents and minutes. 
I carefully organised and analysed my interview transcripts and research notes to extract the 
key issues, examples and findings. I selected some interviewees’ direct quotations and 
translated them from Chinese into English. According to the National Ethics Protocol in Human 
Research, the names of individuals and institutions I interviewed should remain anonymous. 
The details and identifying features of the participants and institutions in the interviews are 
not disclosed in any unpublished or published material resulting from this study. This 
anonymity not only protected their identity but also encouraged frank, open discussions. 
In this thesis, I cite my interviewees using general terms such as ‘interviewee’ and ‘university 
executive’. I also use random letters to refer to universities (in quotations and examples), and 
the same letter can refer to different universities. 
I also read numerous documents and articles collected through a number of sources: 
                                                          
25 My interviewees include: senior university executives (party secretaries, university presidents, vice presidents, 
and provosts); key personnel (directors for policy and planning, directors of party and government relations office 
(dangzhengban 党政办), directors of student admissions, directors of teaching affairs, deans of undergraduate 
studies, international directors, directors of president’s office, and deans of graduate studies); scholars and 
researchers on education policy and government administration; and former and present government officials from 
various central organs. 
26 My interview questions included their perceptions on universities’ role and autonomy, universitygovernment 
relations, current education policy issues, the political regime and government processes, their firsthand 
experiences and strategies as an individual lobbyist or part of a collective lobby group, as well as their self-reflection 
and evaluation about their influence and outcomes (see more information in Appendix A). 
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 official government documents on policies and statistics, including the MoE, Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MoST), and Ministry of Finance (MoF); 
 government officials’ speeches, including by national leaders and members of the State 
Council; 
 academic research papers, journals and books, in both English and Chinese languages; 
 newspapers, magazines and media reports, including People’s Daily and University World 
News; 
 websites of government agencies, Chinese universities and higher education associations; 
 publications of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
including the OECD Tertiary Review of China published in 2009; and 
 news and minutes of university meetings, provided by universities and interviewees or 
organised by myself. 
In addition, I include numerous examples of university lobbying practices as empirical 
evidence, which are selected according to their relevance, representativeness and significance. 
In particular, I investigated the elite university coalition of C9 (Chapter 3). I chose this case 
because the C9 is the first and most significant example of a lobby group in the higher 
education sector under the special Chinese political context that emerged in 2003. It is a model 
and first-of-its-kind experiment of collective lobbying by Chinese universities. The distinct 
characteristics, past behavioural patterns, and lobbying experience of the C9 group have shed 
light on how collective lobbying works in the system and its limitations. 
Structure overview of the thesis 
In order to explore the key issues and guide the enquiry in logical way, my thesis is divided into 
three parts and six chapters. 
Part 1 (Chapters 1 and 2) situates the study. In Chapter 1—The higher education policymaking 
arena: opportunities for agency in an authoritarian structure, I investigate the current formal 
governance and policymaking framework for the university sector in an authoritarian 
structure, establish the formal position and roles of universities in the government’s nation-
building strategies, and explore the formal mechanisms through which universities can 
participate in education policymaking. This chapter provides an overview of the political, policy 
and regulatory context within which Chinese universities operate. 
In Chapter 2—Deepening engagement in policies: universities as social, moral and political 
actors, I investigate how elite national research universities perceive their roles, missions, 
rights and influence, how they view the key constraints in the policy arena which hinder the 
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fulfilment of their roles; as well as how they perceive their capacity to negotiate different 
entitlements and influence policies. Their understanding of these issues is likely to determine 
the objectives, strategies and priorities in their policy interactions with the government. 
Part 2 (Chapters 35) investigates the practices of university lobbying, including occurrences 
when universities decide to act individually or in a coordinated fashion vis-à-vis various state 
actors. 
Chapter 3—C9: the alignment of interests amongst universities deals with situations where 
universities’ interests are aligned and therefore collective lobbying emerges. I discuss this 
interest alignment by focusing on the C9. This sheds light on how collective lobbying works in 
the university sector and on limitations it has faced in the Chinese political context that 
eventually led to its weakening. 
In contrast to the collective group of C9, the general practice of university lobbying is individual 
and self-focused in nature. Chapter 4—Going solo: universities pursuing individual interests 
presents the prevalent practices of universities lobbying individually (sometimes with 
coordination but not in a collective organisation). This chapter first outlines some general 
characteristics of university lobbying practices, including common perceptions, language, 
frequency, organisational form of agency, and targets for lobbying. I then provide examples of 
how universities identify and interact with their major lobbying targets (various state actors) 
within the fragmented, hierarchical and opaque central bureaucracy to seek opportunities to 
exert their influence. 
Chapter 5—Lobbying imperfect institutions: human factors, scientific persuasion and policy 
experiments examines the most significant aspects of the universities’ toolkit when lobbying 
government officials in various scenarios. In the university sector, informal and personal 
factors prevail in the higher education regulatory environment due to a range of political, 
institutional and economic factors. A major component in the capacity of universities to adapt 
to this complex and semi-institutionalised bureaucracy is their use of three specific forms of 
social and cultural capital: human factors (e.g. relationships), rational persuasion through 
knowledge and analysis, and involvement in policy innovation and experimentation. Chapter 5 
investigates these three aspects. 
Part 3 (Chapter 6): Chapter 6—Discussion and Conclusion presents a conceptual evaluation. I 
first summarise the characteristics of lobbying practices and discuss the key factors that shape 
universities’ decisions and behaviour. This is then discussed within the overarching framework 
of Chinese contentious politics and statesociety interactions, and I reflect and elaborate on 
the political nature and potential implications of university actors and their activism. 
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Chapter 1—The higher education policymaking 
arena: opportunities for agency in an authoritarian 
structure 
Introduction 
To understand why and how Chinese national research universities interact with the state on 
policies, one needs to first investigate the unique political, policy and regulatory context in 
which they operate. In this introductory chapter, I draw on the literature, government 
documents and personal interviews. My goal is to outline the current formal governance and 
policymaking framework for the university sector, establish the formal position and roles of 
universities in the government’s national development strategies, and then focus on exploring 
the formal channels through which universities can participate in higher education 
policymaking.27 Some questions will be examined, including: what roles do the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) leaders and various government organs play in higher education? How are 
universities being understood, governed, sponsored and funded by the state? What are their 
functional alignment, funding dependence and administrative affiliation with the central state? 
What formal mechanisms are there for universities to participate in the government processes 
and what formal policy roles do they play? 
In China, education is deeply embedded in national politics, and has received considerable 
control and intervention from the government (S. Liu, 2006, p. 87). In the Maoist period, 
different Chinese Party leaders used education to serve their political interests and national 
development objectives, with significantly different beliefs on how education should be 
developed and what goals it should deliver (Tsang, 2000). Since the economic reform, the 
leaders formed an unwavering consensus and development strategies that science and 
education should be strengthened and invested in, in order to build a ‘knowledge economy’ 
for future economic competitiveness and national pride. As a result, universities have gained a 
central place in China’s nation building. The state has promoted a series of significant higher 
education policies to assign national and global roles to a number of selected major research 
                                                          
27 As I mentioned earlier in Footnote 4 (see Introduction), in this thesis, higher education policy broadly refers to a 
wide range of macro and micro level policies on how universities are organised, funded, operated and developed in 
policy areas including finance, personnel, education, science and research. It includes the making process of the 
code of conduct, institutions, regulations, and guidelines to address higher education-related public issues (X. Chen 
& Gao, 2008, p. 120). 
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universities, and provides them with an unprecedented amount of funding to improve their 
quality, performance and international standing. The beneficiaries of government investment 
have since significantly developed their capabilities and influence. 
In the meantime, China’s governance and policymaking have also become more formalised (Q. 
Wang, 2014, p. 137), compared to the previous era when policy decisions were rarely based on 
research or deliberation and the making of education policies was generally a top-down, 
internal process relying on the view of the top leadership and informal politics (Lo, 1991, pp. 
706-708, 719-720; X. Lu, 2008, p. 39; Tsang, 2000). An example of such formalisation is 
demonstrated by some recent science policy. Li observed that a scientific attitude has made 
policymaking more open, including a complex process of repeated bargaining, negotiation, 
assessment, and consensus-seeking from different stakeholders and policy actors, such as 
government bodies, universities and science communities (Liu Li, 2009, p. 19). The state’s 
increase in procedures and in scientific attitude towards policies may provide new 
opportunities for universities to become involved in the higher education policymaking process 
and exert an influence as a main source of technical expertise and professional knowledge. 
Yet, the influence of universities does not flow naturally from their position. A rational 
approach to higher education policymaking requires both a stronger set of bureaucratic 
principles and institutions and a better knowledge of the education system and market that 
can only be provided by greater interactions between the government and tertiary institutions. 
This chapter finds that despite increased formal policy procedures, the system lacks legitimate 
and functional institutions for bottom-up initiatives. The formal mechanisms and channels 
through which universities can participate in education policymaking remain dominated by the 
state in a top-down manner. This has driven universities to explore alternative routes, operate 
near the boundary of authorised policy channels, and adopt informal, innovative strategies to 
intervene and influence policy. 
Defining the powers: the central governing institutions 
In the Chinese authoritarian structure, national universities are governed by the central 
bureaucracy, which defines national development priorities, shapes higher education policies, 
and regulates university practices. China’s central bureaucracy is a complex and opaque 
governance system, allowing a range of central organs and actors, such as party leaders and 
the State Council, to influence or determine policies that affect universities’ operation and 
development. 
This section is intended to help make sense of the central institutions of the national higher 
education governance and policymaking structure. It is important to clarify that the party and 
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the government (state) are often regarded as one analytical unit in facing social forces because 
of their negligible boundary and identical interests (Zheng, 2010, p. 123). In this thesis, I 
generally refer to this integrated central system as ‘the state’ or ‘the government’. 
Diagram 1.1. Central governance structure (People's Daily, 2013; State Council, 2013; Zheng, 
2010, p. 64) 
 
Party-state 
The Communist Party of China (CPC, or ‘party’ hereafter) is China’s predominant political 
force.28 While officially it has only a guiding role, it in fact dominates the government and its 
executive process (Zheng, 2010, p. 100). The leaders at the CPC have the paramount decision-
making power in authorising, approving and promoting significant national development 
guidelines and principles, including substantial education policies; and their personal policy 
views and directives often lead to new policies or reforms. The party exercises its domination 
and leadership over the state through establishing powerful mechanisms, including the Central 
Leading Small Groups (CLSGs).29 The CLSGs sit at the top of the hierarchy of specific policy 
                                                          
28 It is also often called CCP, the Chinese Communist Party. 
29 Such mechanisms also include the ‘nomenklatura’ system (Party management of cadres system), which will be 
explained later in the chapter. 
40 
portfolios and governance functions, and lead major policy domains, such as finance, 
economics, foreign affairs, as well as science, technology and education. The CLSGs often 
become instruments for individual leaders to enforce their personal policy preferences (Zheng, 
2010, p. 108). 
As power arms of the party that stretch into the state, these CLSGs are ad hoc supra-
ministerial coordinating bodies that build consensus on issues that cut across the party, the 
government and military system when the existing bureaucratic structure is unable to do so 
(Lampton, 2001, pp. 163-164 ; N. Lu, 2001, pp. 45-49). The CLSGs often focus on setting up 
guiding principles for concrete policies. Recommendations from leading groups are to be 
adopted in the policymaking process because they represent the consensus of the leading 
members of the party, the government, and military agencies. In some cases the policymaking 
bodies simply adopt CLSGs’ recommendations with little or no modifications (Zheng, 2010, pp. 
107-108). 
Amongst the CLSGs, the Leading Small Group on Science, Technology and Education (LSGST, 
guojia keji jiaoyu lingdao xiaozu 国家科技教育领导小组) is the platform through which the 
CPC leads China’s education, science and research agenda. Formally established on 25 June 
1998 by the State Council, the LSGST is tasked with special duties, including deliberations on 
major national science, technology and education strategies, programs and policies, and the 
coordination of major policy matters between central agencies and between central and local 
governments. Many crucial decisions and actions on education, science and research are 
reflections of the priorities set by the LSGST. The LSGST is chaired by premier of the State 
Council, who is a member of the CPC Politburo Standing Committee, and is formed by heads of 
central organs related to education, science and technology, including a vice premier of the 
State Council, finance minister, head of the National Development and Reform Commission 
(formerly State Development Planning Commission or ‘SDPC’), education minister, science and 
technology minister, head of Chinese Academy of Sciences, and minister of industry and 
information technology (State Council, 1998). 
China’s highest organ of legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC, quanguo renmin 
daibiao dahui 全国人民代表大会), has the authority to enact, amend and monitor science, 
technology and education laws. However, in reality, the NPC has a rather limited role and 
capacity in formalising education policies. Some suggest that the NPC is a ‘puppet legislative 
that essentially rubber-stamps party policies’ (Shambaugh, 2008a, p. 179). The NPC may 
intervene in education policies through both the NPC Standing Committee and the Committee 
of Science, Technology, Education and Health (jiao ke wen wei weiyuanhui 教科文卫委员会) 
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(NPC, 2004).30 However, it is uncommon to form an education-related decision through the 
NPC. Many proposals cannot be added to the NPC meeting agenda for discussion unless the 
NPC chair members and special committees have approved them. If approved, they may 
forward the education policy proposals to the State Council’s education departments and 
demand their response. Nonetheless, the NPC does not have direct binding or restraining 
authority over the State Council. The central bureaucratic departments only have an obligation 
to provide responses and explanations rather than act on or resolve proposals (Guobing Zhang, 
2010, p. 79). 
The State Council holds the executive power of the government, and is responsible for the 
analysis of education, science and research policies. With its control over information and 
financial resources, the State Council, rather than the legislative NPC, has the substantial 
power to initiate policy, draft regulations, and implement policy decisions. The bureaucracies 
within the highly fragmented State Council are assigned different roles to regulate various 
sectors and maintain official regulatory authority. The State Council also adjudicates disputes 
between different ministries and drafts regulations through its Legislative Affairs Office (State 
Council, 2013). 
The Ministry of Education (MoE, jiaoyubu 教育部) within the State Council is the primary 
executive organ for managing Chinese universities as well as for drafting, developing and 
implementing national education policies and regulations. For national universities (sponsored 
and funded by the central government), the MoE is their key central authority and supervisor 
(MoE, 2009). According to Tu (2006, p. 64), more than 75% of all higher education policies 
between 1985 and 2006 were developed and implemented by the State Council through the 
MoE. 
However, major national science, research and education policies often require joint 
deliberations involving many relevant central organs. For instance, the ‘central personnel work 
coordination group’ (zhongyang renshi gongzuo xietiao xiaozu 中央人士工作协调小组) and 
the Organization Department of CPCCC (ODCPCCC) managed a series of national schemes to 
attract high-level scholars and postdocs from overseas, including the ‘1000 Talents Plan’ and 
‘Young 1000 Talents Plan’ (1000Plan.org, 2009).31 The National Development and Reform 
                                                          
30 The NPC representatives may request the investigation of certain education issues and jointly submit policy 
agenda, proposals or recommendations. A formal policy proposal can be formed and submitted by a group of at 
least 30 NPC representatives. 
31 The ‘central personnel work coordination group’ was formed by the Organization Department of the CPC Central 
Committee, Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (Formerly Ministry of Personnel), MoE and nine other 
central ministries. 
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Commission (NDRC) and the MoF also worked with the MoE on the institutional reform and 
financial issues of national postgraduate education reform.32 Similarly, since 2009, a well-
funded ‘Pilot training program for outstanding students in basic sciences’ (jichu xueke bajian 
xuesheng peiyang shiyan jihua 基础学科拔尖学生培养试验计划) has been jointly managed 
and implemented by MoE, ODCPCCC, and MoF. In addition, many national science, education, 
research and innovation programs and policies that universities have participated in are led, 
developed, funded and administered by central agencies such as the MoST, the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (CAS), and the Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC). 
Here are a range of central party-state bodies that have roles and responsibilities that are 
closely relevant to universities and their activities. 
The Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee (ODCPCCC, zhonggong zhongyang 
zuzhibu 中共中央组织部) is the topmost authority and executive body over personnel 
management in the central party-state agencies and their affiliated organisations (CPC News, 
2013). It is the chief organ for the ‘party management of cadres’ (dang guan ganbu 党管干部) 
or nomenklatura system (Zheng, 2010, pp. 103-107). This nomenklatura system empowers 
party units to make appointments and dismissals, reserve candidates for positions, and control 
key personnel’s careers. It gives the CPC a dominant say over personnel decisions of all 
important positions, including university presidents and party secretaries. This is arguably one 
of the CPC’S most powerful and effective instruments of control over the key positions 
throughout the bureaucratic system, as well as throughout the party's own hierarchy. As 
McGregor (2010, p. 69) points out, the party’s control over personnel was also at the heart of 
its ability to overhaul state companies, without losing leverage over them at the same time. A 
similar mechanism is at work in the appointment of university executives: although the MoE 
can nominate and recommend candidates, all major national universities’ presidents and party 
secretaries are ultimately appointed by the ODCPCCC. As mentioned earlier, the ODCPCCC also 
leads major national and international schemes for high-level talents and expert personnel, 
including the ‘1000 Talents Plan’ (CPC News, 2013). 
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, guojia fazhan gaige weiyuanhui 国
家发展改革委员会) coordinates, formulates and implements strategic policies on national 
economic and social development (including education, science and technology), develops 
medium and long-term national development plans, and coordinates key development 
                                                          
32 In 2013, for example, representatives from the MoE, NDRC and MoF attended work meetings on this reform, and 
included Liu Yandong, vice premiere for education, deputy education ministers as well as an assistant finance 
minister. 
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projects that involve the central government’s investments. In particular, it approves, 
authorises and reviews key national innovation and research development and construction 
projects and their funds (NDRC, 2013). It is the top decision-making agency for a national key 
university funding program named ‘Project 211’, which funds around 100 major national 
universities to boost their academic quality and infrastructure. Although the MoE is also 
involved in the development and implementation of this program, the NDRC retains the final 
say over important matters and provides the program funding to universities. 
The Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST, kejibu 科技部) manages the national Science 
and Technology (S&T) budgets and develops and administers key national S&T projects, 
including the National Basic Research Program (also known as Project 973, named after its 
date of establishment—March 1997), and the National High-tech R&D Program (also known as 
Project 863, established in March 1986). Universities can apply for competitive research funds 
through the MoST-led programs to support their key national laboratories, innovative bases, 
and research infrastructures (MoST, 2013). In 2008, amongst 181 national key laboratories, 
114 were based at universities (M. Zhang, Zhang, & Yuan, 2008, p. 125). 
The Ministry of Finance (MoF, caizhengbu 财政部) is the primary central organ to develop 
fiscal policies, coordinate national financial distributions, and manage central financial 
revenues, budgets, and expenditures. It formulates the central government’s fiscal spending 
standards and quotas, approves and audits annual expenditures of other central departments, 
as well as transacts the central funds and supervises the uses for the central government’s 
investment projects, including specific reserved funds (zhuanxiang chubei zijin 专项储备资金) 
(MoF, 2013b). Due to its important financial responsibility and power, the MoF plays an 
important role in university funding policies. It is accountable for the financial management of 
the special university funding programs like Project 985 and Project 211, and provides annual 
budgetary funding to national universities. 
The Chinese Academy of Science (CAS, zhongguo kexueyuan 中国科学院) conducts research in 
basic and technological sciences, provides data and advice for governmental decision-making, 
builds scientific research centres, and undertakes government-assigned projects in regard to 
key S&T issues (e.g. S&T personnel training). The CAS manages the Knowledge Innovation 
Program (KIP), from which universities can receive research funding support (CAS, 2014). 
Similarly, the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC, guojia ziran kexue jijinwei 
国家自然科学基金委) selects and financially supports basic research and applied basic 
research through peer review and evaluation panels, and provides advice on major policy 
issues related to the national strategic development of basic and applied research. It manages 
three categories of grants and programs, including research development, talent fostering and 
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infrastructure construction for basic research, through which universities receive grants from 
the NSFC (NSFC, 2013).  
This landscape of institutions apparently works in coordination under the same master, the 
CPC. Nevertheless, the fragmentation and overlapping of institutional and financial 
responsibilities produce a rather complex central environment, one that universities need to 
navigate, interpret and at times exploit. I will discuss how their power relationships have 
shaped universities’ lobbying practices in Chapters 4 and 5. 
The Ministry of Education (MoE) 
As mentioned earlier, within the State Council, the MoE remains the core bureaucratic 
authority to govern the education sector, manage national universities, and develop higher 
education policies (MoE, 2009). National universities must report to the MoE and interact with 
its sub-departments routinely.  
Like other ministries in the Chinese central government, the MoE is characterised by ‘vertical 
and horizontal fragmentation’ (tiaokuai fenge 条块分割). It features over 20 sub-departments 
(or divisions) with different professional expertise and designated responsibilities (fenguan 分
管) for various education policies (MoE, 2013b). The responsibilities and functions of these 
departments range from the formulation of policies and plans (guihua 规划) to the budgeting 
and resource allocations for university education and research development programs (see 
Appendix B–Internal departments of the MoE). 
In order to facilitate communications between the MoE and national universities, the MoE 
requires universities to align their institutional organisational structure with that of the MoE 
bureaucracy. This is sometimes called ‘administrative and functional alignment’ (yewu duikou 
业务对口). Through this alignment system, the MoE sub-divisions can make easy, direct 
contacts with the university offices with corresponding roles and responsibilities. For example, 
the MoE Department of Postgraduate Education (doubles as the Office of the State Council 
Academic Degrees Committee) mostly works with universities’ graduate schools on 
postgraduate education policy development and implementation. The MoE Department of 
International Cooperation and Exchanges regularly speaks to universities’ international offices 
on international education policies. 
The lack of intermediary bodies and advocacy groups 
In many other countries, independent ‘buffer organisations’ or ‘intermediary bodies’ between 
the government and universities commonly exist. The goals of these bodies are often to 
coordinate and balance the relations and interests between various stakeholders in the higher 
education sector through policy deliberation, consultancy, assessment and appraisal. 
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Intermediary agencies are typically formed by higher education experts, who work to provide 
policy studies and policy advice to the government, present universities’ requests and 
concerns to policy decision-makers, and prevent the government’s direct interference into 
university affairs, all of which may help produce good education policies (D. Zhang, 1995, p. 41; 
G. Zhou, 2006, p. 11). 
The State Council acknowledged in 1994 that Chinese intermediary agencies should be 
developed to encourage wide social participation in education decision-making and education 
management (MoE, 1994).33 In a formal presentation to an OECD delegation in Beijing in May 
2008, an official from the MoE’s National Centre for Education Development Research (NCEDR) 
said that the Chinese central governance structure would be reduced in size and lead to more 
integrated and multi-skilled government departments, and an increased delegation of 
functions to the local levels. As a result, the higher education sector would experience some 
fundamental changes, such as the development of independent agencies including policy 
implementation agencies, policy supervision agencies, and policy research and consultancy 
agencies (X. Yang, 2008). 
Although intermediary organisations are emerging in China’s higher education sector, their 
development has been largely controlled by the state. Currently, the majority of the existing 
intermediary organisations are led and supervised by the state. They mostly operate as an 
extension of the government authority to help facilitate the government’s top-down policy 
communications with universities and to help the government conduct teaching and research 
assessments (Zhenyu Zhang, 2005, p. 15; G. Zhou, 2006, p. 146). This is similar to what many 
scholars have observed: Chinese social organisations in various sectors have very limited 
autonomy from the state (Unger & Chan, 2008); and many civil organisations perform as 
‘helping hands’ according to the party line and are hybrid organisations in which state and 
society are interwoven, thus do not meet the minimal definition of civil society, whose 
component organisations exist outside and independent of the state (Zheng, 2010, pp. 145-
147, 216). 
One example is the Association of Chinese Graduate Schools, or ACGS (ACGS, 2006). It was 
initiated and established by the government, with the aim to lead general consultations and 
seek information or data on university research training. Another example is the Chinese 
Society of Academic Degrees and Graduate Education (CSADGE), formed by a range of national 
institutions. Tsinghua initiated and hosts the society, but its operation is subject to the 
                                                          
33 It was stated in the state’s policy document on the implementation of 'China Education Reform and Development 
Guidelines' (zhongguo jiaoyu gaige he fazhan gangyao de shishi yijian 中国教育改革和发展刚要的实施意见). 
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government’s guidance and supervision. Although these agencies are involved in policy issues 
to a certain extent, their bottom-up advocacy functions remain limited. They mostly operate as 
service providers under the leadership of the government which confines their personnel 
appointments and work responsibilities. Zhang has observed that for many government-
affiliated intermediary organisations, the staff members appointed by the government are 
insufficiently qualified for their roles (Zhenyu Zhang, 2005, p. 15).  
Leading Chinese universities have also sought opportunities to establish autonomous policy-
oriented university groups. Examples include Renmin University’s failed proposal for the 
‘Association of Chinese Research Universities’ (Juan Hu et al., 2007, pp. 153-155; Ji, 2008, p. 
3),34 and an elite group of nine Chinese leading research universities called ‘C9’, which has 
operated since 2003 (see Chapter 3). Generally speaking, such policy groups in the sector are 
rare exceptions and subject to state scrutiny. The numerous regulatory restraints have 
encouraged universities to rely more on direct interactions with the government in the policy 
process. I will elaborate on universities’ collective actions in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Defining national universities: central sponsorship and supervision 
National universities are publicly funded, sponsored and supervised by a central government 
agency. Other types of higher education institutions, such as local public universities managed 
by the local authorities, private universities and vocational colleges, are beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Unless specified, in this thesis ‘university’ generally refers to a national university. 
According to the MoE officials, the governance system for Chinese higher education 
institutions (HEIs) has two main goals: ‘macro-level, nationwide administration’ and ‘micro-
level, individual administration’. The State Council and its subordinate MoE provide macro-
level policy, regulation and management of tertiary education, including national guidelines, 
policies and regulations, funding investment, development and planning. They also supervise 
other central agencies and the local governments on education policy issues, because many of 
them also sponsor universities. From the micro-level management perspective, the central 
                                                          
34 For example, Renmin University attempted to gather 1520 Chinese research universities and form an 
autonomous intermediary body and advocacy group named ‘Association of Chinese Research Universities’. 
According to Renmin, this association would represent the interests of leading research universities, submit joint 
proposals to the government, provide higher education policy advice and ideas, and help the government hear 
universities’ development needs and voices. It said that the group would represent the common interests of its 
members and build a ‘communication platform’ between top research universities and the government, which 
would lead to a reduction of the government’s micro-management and over-supervision. However, the initiative 
never really materialised partially due to the lack of consensus on certain issues amongst the potential ‘member 
universities’. 
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ministries (including MoE) and local governments administer and supervise their sponsored 
universities directly (C. Liu, 2008). The diagram below illustrates the overall governance 
structure for higher education and their administrative relationships between the central and 
local governments and HEIs. 
Diagram 1.2. The governing and administrative structure for Tertiary Education Institutions 
(TEIs)35 
 
After the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, China’s higher education was 
adapted to serve a highly centralised and planned economic system (L.-x. Li, 2001, pp. 106-
113), with a strong focus on industrial development and specialised, technical training. 
Between the 1950s and the start of the Cultural Revolution, the government began to 
establish special policy on developing national key universities. The operation of the higher 
education sector was severely disrupted during the ten-year Cultural Revolution during 
19661976. After 1978, China embraced a new national development route with the economy 
being its policy centre and focus, and education and research became priorities again for their 
important roles in national strategic development. Since the mid-1980s, and accelerating 
through the 1990s, this sector was subjected to successive reforms and decentralisation. 
Especially in 1998 when China faced economic challenges and a potential unemployment crisis 
(Y. Wan, 2006, p. 21), the state decided to immediately perform a ‘major operation’ on higher 
education in order to drive domestic consumption and reduce the unemployment rate. Radical 
changes in the sector included significant student enrolment expansion, marketisation of the 
                                                          
35 The diagram is reproduced from Figure 2.1 in the China Country Background Report prepared by the National 
Centre for Education Development Research (Gallagher et al., 2009, p. 44; NCEDR, 2007). 
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system (e.g., introducing tuition fees and allowing privatisation), diversification of funding and 
revenue sources, and decentralisation and reorganisation of tertiary institutions (e.g., 
localising universities and allowing institutional mergers) (Y. Wan, 2006, pp. 25-26; Zha, 2009, 
pp. 54-56). All of these added up to a highly complex sector. 
As the consequence of this drastic decentralisation and restructure, only 113 universities 
amongst over 2,000 HEIs (universities and colleges) in China remained affiliated with and 
sponsored by the central ministries (i.e., funded and managed) in 2013, in comparison to 367 
centrally funded universities in 1994.36 Amongst the centrally funded universities, 73 operated 
under the jurisdiction of the MoE and 40 were supervised by other central ministries or 
agencies (MoE, 2014e). While these national universities accounted for only a fraction of the 
total, they constitute an elite and are greatly privileged through national policy and funding.  
These centrally funded national universities remain the flagships of China’s higher education 
system, and are regarded as the key agents in the official goal of building a world-class tertiary 
education system. The expansion in student numbers also further strengthened their position. 
Chinese national statistics demonstrate that since the 1999 higher education expansion, 
leading, national universities have seen a more modest student expansion (from 1.36 million in 
1997 to 1.63 million in 2005) and in some cases have focused mostly on postgraduate 
enrolments, while local universities, private institutions, and other higher vocational colleges 
carried the major responsibility for expansion and accounted for 95.3% of all increased 
enrolments (from 1.79 million in 1997 to 11.89 million in 2005) (Zha, 2011a). The elite part has 
become an even smaller proportion in the sector. As the OECD Reviews of Tertiary Education—
China (2009, p. 43) describes the Chinese higher education system: 
While fragmentation and diseconomies of scale continue to represent a risk to the 
achievement of an integrated and holistic approach to policy, the Chinese higher 
education sector is characterised by diversity which is a considerable strength. In a 
rapidly developing economy, subject to massive social change, the sector possesses a 
range of institutions which can meet a wide range of social and economic needs and 
demands. 
National universities’ affiliation with the central state 
Central affiliation and sponsorship consolidate the direct central governance over universities. 
Each national university must have at least one sponsoring ministry or agency (zhuguan bumen 
                                                          
36 In 2013, amongst 2,491 regular higher education institutions in China, 1,661 operated under local authorities, 717 
were privately-run, non-government institutions, and only 113 were affiliated with the central government. 
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主管部门) in the central government. Universities’ central sponsors have the responsibility to 
provide a certain percentage of their regular block funding. A two-way personnel mobility 
often takes place between national universities and their sponsoring ministry. Notably, due to 
the central affiliation, the level of resources and central incomes available to national 
universities relates to the wealth and power of their central sponsoring organs. Universities 
sponsored by the MoF, the CAS, or the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), 
for example, are better funded than some universities with other sponsors. 
All national universities are required to report to the MoE regularly. This includes those 
national universities that are affiliated with other central agencies. It means that these 
universities are accountable to both their own sponsoring agency and the MoE. Some people 
jokingly describe this ‘dual supervision’ system as a ‘double-whammy situation’. 
There are significant direct policy interactions between national universities and the MoE, 
regardless of their official affiliation and sponsoring organs. This is especially true of the highly 
academic and technical education policies, such as research training, of which the other 
central organs lack the expertise and professional knowledge. National universities have also 
actively participated in policy consultations by the other agencies such as the MoST and CAS 
on the drafting of research policies and regulations. 
National universities’ dependence on central funding 
China’s funding for university education and research has increased significantly over the last 
several decades, thanks to a series of national strategies and policies that are epitomised by 
slogans such as ‘invigorating the nation through science and education’, which I will illustrate 
later in detail. Research funds provided to universities, for instance, nearly doubled from 
46.8 billion yuan (USD 7.49 billion) in 2009 (NBS, MoST, & MoF, 2010) to 85.77 billion yuan 
(USD 13.74 billion) in 2013 (NBS et al., 2014), presenting an average annual increase of 
16.5%.37 The figure was only 24.23 billion yuan (USD 3.88 billion) in 2005 (NBS, MoST, & MoF, 
2006). Investment in national education increased from 28.597 billion yuan (USD 4.58 billion) 
in 2000 (MoF, 2001) to 388.39 billion yuan (USD 62.2 billion) in 2013 (MoF, 2014a). In 2012 it 
reached 4% GDP at 378.155 billion yuan (USD 60.56 billion) (MoF, 2013a). Despite the exciting 
economic investments and rapid improvement of infrastructures, national universities have 
become significantly dependent on the central government and lacked alternative major 
sources of income. Statistics show that between 1999 and 2009, government funds accounted 
for 47.65%60% of total revenue of average universities, student fees accounted for 33.49%, 
                                                          
37 Data are sourced from the National S&T Funding Statistical Bulletins (quanguo keji jingfei touru tongji gongbao  
全国科技经费投入统计公报) from 2009 to 2013. 
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and less than 1% came from social sources and this continued to decrease each year (D. He, 
Yang, & Ouyang, 2013, p. 94; Jing Zhang & Qu, 2012, pp. 24-25). 
The university public funding system can be broadly described as a ‘quota formula-based block 
funding plus special subsidies’ (zonghe ding’e jia zhuangxiang buzhu 综合定额加专项补助). 
Routinely, universities receive regular block funding from the MoF based on the student 
enrolment numbers and funding rates. Funding per student rates and standards vary 
depending on the regions, levels and types of universities. As to special, temporary subsidies, 
various special funding programs are irregularly introduced by the central agencies, which 
reflect the broader national development priorities or aim to meet the special, urgent needs of 
universities (Qu & Zhang, 2011, p. 61). For example, the MoE implements tailored programs to 
fund selected universities in specific policy areas which provide significant investments, 
including a project called ‘undergraduate education quality and teaching reform project’ 
(benke jiaoyu zhiliang yu jiaoxue gaige gongcheng 本科教育质量与教学改革工程), and an 
‘elite training program for top basic science students’ (jichu xueke bajian xuesheng peiyang 
shiyan jihua 基础学科拔尖学生培养试验计划) (MoF, 2014b). Other schemes, such as Project 
985, Project 211 and the 2011 Scheme, are some of the most important special funding 
subsidies for research universities, which I will explain later in this chapter. These special 
schemes often include at least a proportion of financial contribution provided by a university 
recipient’s sponsoring ministry. 
China’s innovation and research funding system is complex, providing multiple funding streams 
for universities. The MoST, CAS, NSFC and some other central organs manage a wide range of 
research funding schemes that are open to universities’ applications and competitions. The 
central funding distribution model for universities is tightly planned. The government defines 
research priorities, and develops projects and programs (gongcheng xiangmu 工程项目) based 
on those priorities to channel universities’ activities towards meeting the state’s nation-
building objectives. A large proportion of research funding is supplied to universities through 
such short-term, temporary projects. Universities have to constantly readjust their focus to fit 
into these programs and secure more funding. 
National universities’ autonomy 
Besides deciding on funding priorities and allocations, the Chinese government dominates 
national universities in numerous ways. Individual universities and colleges in China possess 
rather limited institutional autonomy compared to the standards of OECD countries (Gallagher 
et al., 2009, pp. 44-45). For a long period after 1949, universities were mostly part of the 
government’s administration system, and their legal status was unclear. Despite significant 
socio-economic changes and a Higher Education Law approved in 1998, Chinese universities 
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still appear to be quasi-government institutions (Jianhua Hu, 2002, pp. 64-66; H. Jiang et al., 
2005, pp. 92-93). The party remains the highest authority in the universities. The central 
government appoints university leaders and intervenes in university operations excessively. 
Mok (2001, p. 123) argues that the state has actually strengthened, rather than relaxed, its 
regulation and coordination role in the education sector since the decentralisation. The 
government’s policy rhetoric suggests a ‘loosening’ of centralised government control to 
ensure universities’ autonomy is far from the reality (R. Yang et al., 2007, pp. 588-589). 
Academic and operational aspects of universities, such as the conferrals of academic degrees, 
academic quality assessments and audits, national student admissions, university entrance 
examinations, and the use of government funds, are all centrally regulated by the MoE. I will 
elaborate on university autonomy by drawing on numerous personal interviews in the next 
chapter. 
National universities and their local governments 
National universities are directly governed and funded by the central government, but they 
still need to seek support from their local authorities for a range of regional policy and 
operational matters, such as campus infrastructure construction and expansion of students 
and staff housing. One typical case is the need to deal with the human resources departments 
within their local governments for matters including personnel employment contracts, staff 
transfer and retirement, as these personnel and residential policies are subject to the local 
rules.38 
National universities have significant incentives to cultivate good relationships with the local 
governments, including fiscal benefits and favourable nomination of national awards. For 
example, when the central government confers nationwide education awards, it often asks 
provincial governments to nominate a few universities located in their regions. Only the 
nominees qualify for the next stage. Some of my interviewees suggested that a good 
relationship between a university and its local government often helped secure favourable 
decisions and opportunities. 
Many national universities have established regular communication channels with their 
provincial and municipal governments and their key officials. Their engagement is enhanced 
through participating in joint council meetings and submitting special reports on the 
                                                          
38 Similar to the administrative alignment with the central bureaucracy, national universities work with the different 
local government departments for various policy issues. For example, universities’ finance offices and S&T offices 
interact with the local finance departments and S&T departments respectively on specific funding and policy 
matters. 
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development of local industries and socio-economic policymaking issues. Over recent years, 
the role and responsibility of local governments in education have increased. Local 
governments have promoted partnerships with leading universities to drive regional 
economies and social development through research commercialisation, knowledge sharing, 
and talent training. Some national university funding programs, such as Project 985, require 
local governments to share the costs and adopt a ‘central-local joint development’ model 
(gongjian 共建) to co-fund the ‘985’ universities. For example, in 2010, the wealthy Shanghai 
government (Department of Education) paid Fudan University and Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University 1.3 billion yuan each under the Project 985 to ‘match the central fund’ (MoE, 
2012a). Generous support sometimes comes with strings attached. According to my 
interviews, some local administrations have become keen to intervene in the development of 
these centrally-managed universities, and ask universities to prioritise and advance their 
regional development ideas.39 
Notably, the affluence of the regions and the local governments where universities are located 
affects the funding available to them. Coastal provinces are generally wealthier than the inland 
provinces, hence universities on the eastern seaboard, such as Shanghai, are able to enjoy the 
advantages and additional resources emanating from the robust economy and have better 
access to other revenue streams including commercialisation and donations. 
Defining national priorities: science and education policies in the 
nation-building strategies 
How can we understand Chinese universities’ role and opportunities in the nation? Since the 
beginning of the 1980s, the Chinese government has announced and promoted a series of 
significant national strategies and policies to strengthen the role of science and education in 
nation building. They placed higher education at a central place to accomplishing the state’s 
plans and goals. Universities, especially a relatively small number of major national research 
universities, were assigned important national and global roles, and have so far received huge 
investments for improving their performance and functions. The capabilities and influence of 
these elite, leading players have grown significantly over the last few decades. According to 
Shanghai Jiao Tong Academic Ranking World of Universities (ARWU), 19 Chinese universities 
                                                          
39 For example, a local government provided a large amount of funding to several 985 universities in its region. To 
seek quick return from its investment, it proposed a ‘60:40’ system, which meant 60% of the 985 fund they put in 
should be used and decided by the universities autonomously, but the other 40% should be used for delivering the 
local government-led programs. These programs were relevant to the regional development priorities. This 
suggestion received resistance and disagreement from the national universities it funded. 
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entered the top 300 in 2014, three times more than in 2004 (six). Nine Chinese universities 
have become top 200 universities compared to only one in 2004 (ARWU, 2004a, 2014a). Some 
of the best Chinese universities, such as Peking University (PKU) and Tsinghua University, have 
climbed over 100 places between 2003 and 2014 from the 201-300 range to the 101-150 range 
(ARWU, 2014b, 2014c). This section of the chapter describes these substantial government 
strategies and policies that have had far-reaching impact on the university sector’s 
development trajectory, and changed many universities’ destinies.  
‘Invigorating the nation through science and education’ and ‘knowledge 
economy’ 
In 1995, the Chinese government issued a significant document on ‘accelerating the 
advancement of science and technology’ (zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu jiasu 
kexue jishu jinbu de jueding 中共中央国务院关于加速科学技术进步的决定) (MoST, 1996). 
This was the first time that the CPC and State Council established a long-term national strategy 
of ‘invigorating the nation through science and education’ (kejiao xingguo 科教兴国). The 
document emphasised that science and technology were the primary driving factors for the 
country’ productivity, and education was a national foundation, hence it was central for China 
to strengthen its capabilities in both science and education to raise citizens’ personal 
cultivation and refinement (suzhi 素质 or ‘quality’), accelerate national economic productivity 
and to revitalise the country (X. Shi, 2006). 
To implement this decision, the government first held a national science and technology 
conference in May 1995, at which President Jiang Zemin made a speech on education 
(Xinhuanet, 2003). He pointed out that this significant, new national strategy should be carried 
out attentively, and the country should strive to boost education and the commercialisation of 
scientific research. In this context, the CAS submitted a timely report to the Central Committee 
of CPC and the State Council in December 1997, entitled ‘Embracing the age of knowledge 
economy and developing a national innovation system’ (yingjie zhishi jingji shidai, jianshe 
guojia chuangxin tixi 迎接知识经济时代, 建设国家创新体系). It was the first time where the 
term ‘knowledge economy’ was formally used by the Chinese state. Here, the CAS defined it as 
one that relied on the generation, dissemination and application of knowledge and 
information. The CAS suggested that the knowledge economy would play a dominant and 
leading role in the international economy of the 21st century. Hence it offered a vision of 
building a national knowledge innovation system for the new century, and advocated that 
China should concentrate its support and funding on the key leading players, so that ‘by 
around 2005, 10 national research universities, 100 national research institutes, and 20 cross-
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disciplinary and trans-regional comprehensive national research centres could become 
internationally competitive’ (CAS, 1998a). 
This proposal was endorsed and approved by the State Council (CAS, 1998b), and resulted in 
the national ‘Knowledge Innovation Project’ (KIP, or zhishi chuangxin gongcheng 知识创新工
程) led by the CAS (CAS, 2012). ‘Knowledge innovation’ and ‘knowledge economy’ became the 
new buzzwords in the education sector and beyond. As a part of the policy, several new 
research funding schemes were developed and introduced, such as Programme 973 (or the 
National Key Basic Research Development Programme) (MoST, 2010a). 
More importantly, these national strategies and polices have had significant implications for 
higher education, because national research universities became included in the policy 
framework of the national knowledge innovation system (Guobing Zhang, 2010, p. 63), and 
placed at the core of the national plans for knowledge economy. 
‘Prioritising key institutions’ and ‘Project 211’ 
The designation of key national universities began in the 1980s. The leading universities were 
often identified and selected, and given special responsibilities and national missions and 
provided with extra support to strengthen their ability and roles. 
In May 1983, the then Chancellors of Nanjing University, Zhejiang University, Tianjin University, 
and Dalian Institute of Technology penned a handwritten letter to Deng Xiaoping and the State 
Council. The letter suggested a national policy for investing in a small number of elite national 
universities and key academic disciplines. This proposal soon received great attention and 
support from the leadership as the beginning of national policies for key universities (MoE, 
1983; People's Daily, 1983). As a result, in 1985, a national education policy ‘prioritising key 
institutions’ (zhong zhong zhi zhong 重中之重) was implemented, which provided special 
financial subsidies to a number of leading institutions and later became the foundation for 
future university funding models, such as special university funding projects (Guobing Zhang, 
2010, p. 30). 
The 1993 (MoE, 1993) and 1998 (MoE, 1998a) National Education Development Guidelines not 
only enabled the institutionalisation of a two-tier university system (central and local), but also 
recognised that a small, elite part of the higher education system will serve as models. The 
new Higher Education Law passed in 1998 (MoE, 1998b). In June 2002, the 10th Five-year Plan 
for Education Development (MoE, 2002) stated that Chinese key institutions lacked maturity 
and strength to lead the national knowledge economy, and could not compete with 
institutions in developed countries. Improving China’s global competitiveness should be the 
role of national research universities, while local universities and vocational colleges would 
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meet domestic social demand. These guidelines and policies recognised and supported the 
important role and special mission of these leading research universities in driving China’s 
global competiveness, socio-economic growth and human capital development. 
The national and global role assigned to these elite universities materialised in some concrete 
policies allocating concentrated resources to key national universities and key disciplines. In 
1993, the MoE announced Project 211, an abbreviation of the 21st century and 100 
(approximate number of participating universities), to strengthen and stimulate the academic 
excellence of some 100 universities and key disciplinary areas as a national priority for the 21st 
century. It was put into operation in 1994. Around 100 universities and a group of key 
academic programs were selected for funding to improve their quality of teaching (e.g., 
curricular development and teaching facilities), key disciplinary research, and institutional 
management and efficiency (MoE, 2008). The number of Project 211 institutions (hereafter 
‘211 universities’) increased from 100 in 1993 to 112 in 2011, and the government indicated 
that it would not expand any further (Xinhuanet, 2011). Broadly speaking, Project 211 has a 
strong focus on funding key national academic programs at universities rather than on 
university research. ‘211 universities’ are usually comprehensive in teaching, but not all of 
them are research-intensive (see Appendix C–Project 211 universities). 
‘Building world-class universities’ and ‘Project 985’ 
Project 211 and the KIP program, together with the national strategies of ‘developing the 
country through science and education’ and the rising concept of ‘knowledge innovation’ and 
‘knowledge economy’, have not only strengthened the elitism policy framework for the 
university sector, but also laid an important foundation for a forthcoming, new national 
strategy, which would provide concentrated support to the best research-intensive universities 
and build them leading global players. 
During 19851996, several Chinese leading research universities conducted international 
comparative studies on what it would mean to be a ‘world-class university’. ‘Building world-
class universities’ became a development goal and slogan for a number of universities, 
including PKU and Tsinghua. In 1998, through drafting an official speech for then Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin at the PKU centenary celebration, PKU successfully persuaded the 
national leader to endorse ‘building globally competitive, world-class universities in China’ as 
part of a larger notion that they are a key component of future economic competitiveness and 
national pride. As a result, the slogan of ‘building Chinese world-class universities’ was 
drummed up and transformed into the Chinese paramount leader’s directive as a national 
development strategy (Min & Wen, 2010, pp. 114-116; Guobing Zhang, 2010, pp. 65-67). 
Following this development, in order to operationalise the national strategy, PKU and 
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Tsinghua, with the backing of the MoE, jointly submitted a university funding policy proposal 
to the state in 1998, which was approved and formally commenced in 1999. This was how a 
new significant national program Project 985 (as in the fifth month of 1998) was born. 
The goal of the program was to build globally competitive, world-class research institutions in 
the 21st century by concentrating a considerable amount of funding on a very small number of 
the best research universities (MoE, 2011a). Project 985 recipients were carefully chosen for 
their capacity and potential to fulfil the national mission and become influential global players 
in research and innovation. Leaders of these university were encouraged to develop visions 
and strategic plans that built upon their historic strengths. The National Outline for Medium 
and Long-term Educational Reform and Development (20102020) announced in 2010 by the 
government (CPCCC & State Council, 2010) reiterated the importance of supporting these 
selected universities, including offers of greater autonomy and funds for improving academic 
management. 
Since its inception, the number of research universities selected for Project 985 (hereafter ‘985 
universities’) increased from two (PKU and Tsinghua), to nine universities (which later formed 
a university coalition of nine called ‘C9’) in 1999, and to 39 in 2011 (see Appendix D–Project 
985 universities). In December 2011, Education Minister Yuan Guiren confirmed that after a 
few rounds of project expansion earlier in the previous decade no additional universities 
would be added to the Project 985 (Xinhuanet, 2011). Within the ‘985’ structure, PKU and 
Tsinghua, have remained the champions and were seen as ‘the elite of the elite’. 
In comparison to Project 211, ‘985 universities’ receive much larger funds to boost their 
research capacity. In the diversified higher education sector which accommodates over 2,200 
regular tertiary institutions (including 782 public degree-offering institutions in 2014), the 112 
‘211 universities’ account for the top 5% of all HEIs, and less than 15% of all public degree-
offering institutions. The 39 ‘985 universities’ are even more rare and exceptional in number—
5% of all public degree-offering institutions. 
The brand effects of ‘211’ and ‘985’: university barriers 
The official branding of ‘211’ and ‘985’ have truly become gold-lettered symbols for the elite 
status of universities. It is common for major universities to use these brands to justify and 
legitimise their prestige and prominence in the hierarchical pyramid of the higher education 
sector. However, the government attempts to maintain an image of equity and fairness, hence 
remains reluctant to use these labels to differentiate universities. In reality, the ‘211’ and ‘985’ 
define various ‘grades’ and ‘ranks’ of institutions, as well as drawing the lines between rich and 
poor. ‘985’ and ‘211’ universities attract significant government funding resources and enjoy 
the greatest portion of the total share. According to MoE data, during 20092013, for instance, 
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around 264.8 billion yuan or 72% of the total government funds for scientific research in the 
higher education sector went to ‘211’ and ‘985’ universities in China (MoE, 2014c; M. Wan, 
2014). ‘985’ and ‘211’ universities received over 60 percent of their research funds from 
financial allocations while non-participating colleges received less than 40 percent. Tsinghua 
received 3.93 billion yuan (USD 641.1 million) of research funds in 2013. By comparison, 
Southwest Petroleum University, the top-grossing university not participating in either project, 
only received 460 million yuan (M. Wan, 2014). In particular, the 39 ‘985 universities’ received 
the largest share of government research funding of all. ‘Thirty years of financial support to 
Guizhou University still falls short of one year of that allocated to Tsinghua and PKU,’ said 
Zheng Qiang, President of Guizhou University, a ‘211’ but not a ‘985 university’. Zheng was a 
former deputy party chief of Zhejiang University, both a ‘985’ and ‘211 university’ (Xinhuanet, 
2014b). High investment led to high yields. During 20092013, two thirds of all published 
research papers came from ‘211’ and ‘985’ universities and a large number on national S&T 
achievements awards (M. Wan, 2014). 
In addition to the serious imbalance in funding, ‘985’ and ‘211’ have also widened gaps 
amongst university graduates for their employment prospects and exacerbated competition 
for admission into elite universities. A general awareness in society that ‘only graduates from 
key universities count’ has emerged. University brand is now an important determinant in 
parents’ and employers’ decisions. For college students, a degree from a ‘985’or ‘211’ 
university means more than just an honour; it also means a better chance at landing a job after 
graduation. Although the MoE has banned employment discrimination against students 
graduating from non-’985’ or ‘211’ universities, many job-seekers still see this situation as ‘an 
invisible threshold’. 
The issues created by these programs became hot topics and public controversies in late 2014 
after rumours and speculations that ‘211’ and ‘985’ would be abolished. In November 2014, 
the MoE publicly denied this rumour at a university conference in Shanghai, affirming that the 
two projects have effectively promoted the overall quality of the country's higher education so 
there is no plan to abandon them but rather to improve them (Xinhuanet, 2014b). The MoE 
also stressed that the government does not discriminate against non-participating universities 
and intends to break the ‘985’ and ‘211’ barriers for all universities (L. Xu, 2014b). In late 2014, 
the MoE requested all ‘985’ and ‘211’ universities submit a comprehensive strategic plan and 
detailed self-evaluation review papers by March 2015. According to my interviewees, although 
the ‘985’ and ‘211’ are extended in spirit, they are likely to transform into a new form and 
funding system. A critical review of these programs will be undertaken in 2020 to evaluate the 
actual improvements achieved by the program members. The universities have also been 
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advised by the government that they are no longer allowed to name or promote themselves 
using ‘211’ and ‘985’ brands. A rumour is that ‘985’ will be renamed and rebranded as 
‘program for building world-class universities’ (yiliu daxue jianshe 一流大学建设) and ‘211’ as 
‘program for building world-class academic disciplines’ (yiliu xueke jianshe 一流学科建设). 
Despite the unknown fate, undoubtedly, the ‘211’ and ‘985’ have already created an enduring, 
deep-seated impact on the hierarchy within the sector.  
‘2011 Scheme’ (Collaborative Innovation Plan) 
Similar to Project 985, the significant 2011 Scheme was also established in light of then 
Chinese President Hu Jintao’s official speech on April 24 of 2011 at Tsinghua University’s 
centenary ceremony. Many interviewees acknowledged the direct involvement of Tsinghua in 
this new national policy. In that speech, Hu stated that China needed to actively promote 
collaborative innovation, hence universities, scientific research institutes and enterprises 
should be encouraged to establish strategic alliances, cooperate in selected key fields, share 
resources and apply their research outcomes. Building on the leader’s directive, the MoE and 
MoF developed the ‘2011 Scheme’ or ‘Plan 2011’ (or ‘Collaborative Innovation Plan’, xietong 
chuangxin jihua 协同创新计划) in mid-2012, which offers significant government funding for 
the successful applicants. The program is open to universities as primary project team leaders 
and implementers. They are required to explore creative ways to establish ‘collaborative 
innovation centres’ with other universities, scientific research institutes, industrial enterprises, 
local governments and international research teams and organisations. The cycle of the 2011 
Scheme is four years, divided into three phases including initial development, assessment and 
approval, and the performance evaluation. If approved, the ‘collaborative innovation centres’ 
will receive special supporting funds from the central government (MoE, 2012b). Unlike 
Project 211 and Project 985 that are based on the government’s funding pre-allocation, the 
2011 Scheme runs merit-based, competitive selections for joint research applications.  
The 2011 Scheme is often seen as an extension of Project 211 and Project 985 in a different 
form and with varied focuses, reflecting the changing needs of different development periods 
of China's higher education. Project 211 and Project 985 focus on comprehensive investment 
and development at a university level, such as the academic disciplines and research fields, 
talent training, and internal development of universities. The 2011 Scheme focuses on specific, 
theme-based collaborative innovation centres (xietong chuangxin pingtai 协同创新平台) on a 
much smaller scale (L. Xu, 2014a). 
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‘Building new-type think tanks’ at research universities 
In April and November 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping stressed the importance of ‘building 
modern think tanks (xinxing zhiku 新型智库) with Chinese characteristics’ as a national 
strategy at the CPC meetings (CPC News, 2014). His message signals that stronger critical 
thinking and a rational, scientific approach is needed to support the leadership as it has faced 
complex social, economic and environmental challenges; Beijing’s needs for policy support 
from think tanks will increase. As a result of his directive, the MoE released a new plan in 
February 2014 (MoE, 2014d) to boost the role of universities in advising the government on 
public policies, including setting up special university-based policy centres and think tanks to 
carry out research for the policymaking of the central organs. This means that university 
research departments, particularly in the social sciences, could gear some research more 
closely to the government’s decision-making processes. The state has increased its support to 
build its think tanks at Chinese research universities, and valued their strengths in human 
resources, strong research capacity across disciplines, and active international collaboration 
(MoE, 2014a). 
Since Xi's April 2013 statement, more new think tanks based at research universities have 
emerged. Tsinghua, for instance, established a think tank and research institute of national 
governance in September 2014 to study China’s future development policies. Similarly, Nanjing 
University set up a national think tank on South China Sea Studies, and Fudan University 
established the Centre for China Development Model Research, which focuses on social and 
economic policies. 
Government officials and decision-makers have increasingly consulted with think tanks and 
become more open to their research and suggestions. According to Beijing Review (Tang, 
2014), faculty members of the National School of Development at PKU are invited to 
participate in policy discussions before almost every major reform on topics including state-
owned enterprises, the stock market, the land system and the medical care system, as well as 
having been consulted on issues concerning rural development. Similarly, since the beginning 
of 2002, consultants of the School of Economics and Management of Tsinghua University have 
been received by several state leaders. Many of their suggestions have been adopted by the 
government. Professor Hu Angang, Director of the Center for China Studies of Tsinghua 
University, was invited to participate in the drafting of China's five-year plans for socio-
economic development several times. He said (Tang, 2014): 
As think tanks, higher learning institutions could exert significant impacts on decision-
makers and society in general through unique ideas and opinions. They are in greater 
60 
demand than ever before and embracing this historic opportunity to make a bigger 
contribution to society. 
He revealed that during the drafting of the 12th Five-year Plan (20112015), higher learning 
institutions undertook more than half of the 80 strategic research programs. Besides 
conducting research projects and writing papers delivered to top leaders, research fellows of 
these think tanks are invited to give lectures at learning sessions of the members of Political 
Bureau of the CPC Central Committee (Tang, 2014). I will further discuss university-based think 
tanks later in the chapter. 
Unequal dialogue: formal mechanism for universities to 
participate in government policymaking 
So far we have seen that Chinese elite universities were privileged and developed through 
robust government patronage and funding, and the state seemed to have developed a growing 
rational approach and desire for universities’ knowledge input. But do universities have a say 
in China’s education policy? If so, to what extent and through what channels can they get 
involved in the formal policy settings? 
Based on extensive interviews, this section outlines a range of the formal top-down and 
bottom-up channels that enable universities to interact with the government and to 
participate in education policy processes. My research finds that most of the formal policy 
communication channels are led by the state in a top-down, dominating manner where 
universities mainly serve as policy expert advisors. Bottom-up initiatives and policy advocacy 
remain largely restricted and non-institutionalised in the system. 
Top-down channels led by the MoE 
Increasingly, the MoE undertakes regular information collection and consultations, especially 
when a major policy or reform is to be introduced. This process may provide opportunities for 
universities to intervene in the policy process. 
First, each year, the MoE routinely conducts general or themed formal meetings with 
universities, such as annual higher education forums on international education, or workshops 
on graduate training. The most important one is perhaps the annual university consultation 
meetings (gaoxiao gongzuo zixunhui 高校工作咨询会) hosted by the MoE at the end of each 
calendar year. This meeting is attended by senior officials (e.g., state councillor, and 
government executives from the MoE and other ministries), and a large number of university 
presidents and party secretaries from national universities and a few local universities. The 
meeting discussions form part of the planning project of the MoE for the following year. Many 
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university executives I spoke to described this type of government-led university consultation 
meetings as ‘top-down’, ‘bureaucratic’, ‘empty talks’ and ‘with limited impact’. 
Take this annual university consultation meeting for example. In fact, it was initially 
established by universities as a ‘bottom-up’ policy communication platform, where they 
invited the MoE to join their discussions on higher education issues so that they could raise 
policy views and concerns with the officials. However, the MoE soon ‘took it over’, and started 
to convene and chair it. The purpose, nature and practice of the annual ‘consultation’ 
meetings were completely changed ever since. Each year, the Education Minister and his 
deputies address the plenary meeting, followed by a number of smaller, separate sessions 
where the MoE sub-departments and divisions deliver formal speeches and government 
reports. According to my interviewees, despite some time allocated for questions, the 
meetings have become a one-way, top-down ‘convey of directives’ (yizhi chuanda 意志传达) 
with rigid official proceedings and constrained participation by universities. The meeting 
agendas defined by the government often involve ideas and plans that seem to have already 
been decided. A university president told me that the conference now only serves one 
purpose, and it is for the government to ask universities—‘Do you see major flaws in the plans 
before we formalise and launch them tomorrow?’ 
Second, the MoE selects certain university executives and academics to form ‘expert panels’ 
(zhuanjiazu 专家组) to provide their input into specific policies. This is especially true of highly 
technical policy issues. This process enables selected universities to participate in policy 
discussion and drafting as policy advisors, however with the government’s guidance and 
control. Compared to the annual university consultation meetings I mentioned earlier, my 
interviewees have described the ‘expert advisory panels’ as ‘carrying more weight’ and 
‘playing a relatively more substantial and meaningful role’ in the policymaking process. 
However, their discussions are often chaired and dominated by government officials. The 
panels are often formed after the MoE has already decided an agenda, and the members are 
commonly selected through existing relationships (see Chapter 5). Notably, there is an over-
representation of elite research universities in the policy process. 
In terms of the highly technical and professional policies, such as the national energy scheme 
and academic disciplinary reviews, the government also invites panel members based on a 
database of experts for various academic areas. Some well-known, established policy advisory 
panels include ‘academic discipline review groups’ (xueke pingyizu 学科评议组) under the 
State Council and the ‘innovation engineering expert group’ (chuangxin gongcheng zhuanjiazu 
创新工程专家组) under the MoST. 
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Yet, universities still believe that they can exercise influence in this process. As a university vice 
president who is frequently invited by the MoE to participate in education policy consultations 
as an expert advisor said: 
On behalf of Chinese high-level research universities, I honestly and objectively report 
to the MoE about the practical and operational challenges that our universities are 
facing. This is to ensure that the new government policy will consider our needs and 
facilitate our practices. The MoE is led and run by bureaucrats. However, if we [policy 
advisors from universities] have good views and ideas, they are still willing to listen to 
the suggestions. 
Individual divisions within the MoE also regularly collect information from and interact with 
universities in order to keep their ‘expert’ status on the specific policy matters of their 
jurisdiction. Each MoE sub-division has developed its own small networks of experts and 
informants from selected universities, and routinely invites them to attend small workshops 
and draft new policies. For instance, the MoE Department of International Cooperation and 
Exchanges involved a range of international directors from certain leading national universities 
in its development and review of Chinese international education polices. It also invited these 
advisors to participate in expert panels for the quality assessment of the academic programs 
jointly conducted by Chinese and foreign institutions. Potentially, these leading universities 
may take advantage of this ‘access’ to the government process and seize opportunities to 
shape policies and advance their interests. 
A deputy dean of a graduate school from a leading Beijing university suggested that she was 
frequently invited by two MoE departments to participate in the writing of numerous policies 
in recent years. She said:  
Before major polices are introduced, the MoE officials generally phone a few of us 
[deans of graduate schools from several leading universities] to come over, meet up 
and help them. A few years ago, we worked closely on the new policy on the reform of 
postgraduate professional degrees, which was eventually approved on the basis of our 
research findings and policy recommendations. In recent years, we worked with the 
MoE Department of Postgraduate Education [also the Office of the State Council 
Academic Degrees Committee] on the reform of the national research training model, 
and with the MoE Department of College Student Affairs on national postgraduate 
recruitment reform. All led to a similarly successful outcome. Just last week, I attended 
a postgraduate recruitment reform meeting chaired by a deputy education minister. 
The MoE intends to reform the national postgraduate recruitment in the coming years, 
but it is a sensitive issue, so the MoE is moving very slowly and gradually to play it safely 
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and avoid any potential negative consequences, especially social instability. In such 
context, the MoE is keen to seek external support and policy input from professional 
experts like us. 
Third, the MoE routinely conducts fieldwork to national universities on specific topics (zhuanti 
diaoyan 专题调研) before it drafts and introduces new policies. Various central organs, 
including the MoST, CAS, MIIT and other ministries also conduct regular visits to the 
universities they sponsor.  
For example, when the MoE intended to develop a policy to ‘improve the financial 
management of research funds at universities’, it first sent a MoE work team (typically led by a 
senior official) to conduct a fact-finding mission and visit selected universities. The team 
reviewed the universities’ practices, challenges and recent developments in relation to the 
administration of research funds, and met university staff to gather ideas or suggestions. Once 
completed, the MoE team formulated a report based on the findings and then drafted the new 
policy. A university vice president suggested that such a form of policy communication is useful 
for universities in both formal and informal aspects. He said: 
Through face-to-face interactions, the government visiting teams often capture a lot of 
information and feedback from universities beyond the designated policy topics of their 
visits. It also enables universities to network with the MoE officials informally, seek 
policy updates, and build personal relationships. 
Fourth, the government also seeks direct input and policy recommendations from universities 
in the form of commissioned research projects (keti xiangmu 课题项目). A MoE report 
released on 7 March 2014 suggests that Chinese universities participated in about 600 projects 
for national ministries and provided 1,600 consulting reports for the government between 
2008 and 2013 (Sharma, 2014). The MoE commonly employs one or multiple institutions to 
conduct objective, evidence-based research analysis and submit policy recommendations to 
the government. If it is a major nationwide policy, such as national university scholarships and 
fees, the MoE is likely to distribute the final report of the commissioned research project to a 
broader range of institutions for feedback. 
For instance, the MoE commissioned a team of national universities led by Tsinghua to study 
China’s international postgraduate education.40 This research project aimed to investigate the 
current forms of international postgraduate programs in China, collect data and examples, and 
                                                          
40 Under commissioned research, a team of experts is typically formed by a few universities but led by one major 
institution; and the team members undertake regular joint workshops and analysis before complete a report and 
submit to the MoE. 
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forecast the future needs and policy development in this area. The MoE requested the 
research team to make concrete and specific policy recommendations and solutions as the 
basis for a new government policy. Similarly, two MoE-commissioned national research 
projects, ‘China’s postgraduate education in the next 20 years’ and ‘China’s postgraduate 
education in the last 20 years’, were led by Tsinghua and PKU respectively.41 The MoE asked 
them to develop concrete policy recommendations that were easy to operationalise and 
implement. 
Fifth, the government funds and leads university-based research centres as its think tanks, 
such as the Research Institute of National Governance at Tsinghua University and the Research 
Centre for Science, Technology and Education Policy (RCSTEP) at Zhejiang University. Take the 
MoE-sponsored RCSTEP as an example. It acts as a permanent policy consultant, providing 
interdisciplinary research services and expert advice (policy evaluations and 
recommendations) to various national organs on their research and education programs and 
funds, including the China Academy of Engineering (CAE), CAS, MoST, NDRC, and NSFC 
(RCSTEP, 2009). An interviewee from another university-based research centre told me that his 
centre provided a lot of expert advice and services to the government on the evaluations of 
the funding of the China Scholarship Council (CSC) scholarship programs. He said, ‘We are the 
government’s think tank, because we are at the forefront of program administration and policy 
execution; and we have extensive experience and strength in applied and theoretical analysis.’ 
A head of a university-based research centre and think tank on South China Sea studies said his 
centre had built up a new think tank model devoted to basic research but would also ‘respond 
to the country's emergency strategic demands’. 
In addition, these research centres produce regular publications and bulletins on policies, 
which are often provided to government officials for consideration. This may have an indirect 
influence on broad policy issues, such as drawing the government’s attention to certain policy 
issues and proposing new policy agenda. For instance, a MoE-affiliated research centre located 
at PKU conducted extensive research on the practices and future development of Massive 
Online Open Courses (MOOCS) in China. Through its publications, the university was able to 
bring some MOOCS-related issues to the attention of MoE officials who read their journals 
regularly. 
                                                          
41 The two projects were formally contracted through the Chinese Society of Academic Degrees and Graduate 
Education (CSADGE, zhongguo xuewei yu yanjiusheng jiaoyu xuehui 中国学位与研究生教育学会). The academic 
society is initiated by and based at Tsinghua University, formed by a range of national institutions, and supervised 
and guided by the government. 
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While the Chinese government invests increasingly in think tanks in order to obtain the best 
possible advice for technocratic policymaking, it also requests their loyalty to the party. Most 
of the think tanks are led by a party member, including former politicians or military chiefs but 
also by top academics aligned with the party. Most of their research is not published openly so 
as to channel all the policy advice internally within the system (Sharma, 2014). According to 
China Business Review, most Chinese think tanks research social, economic and international 
relations issues, but only a few engage in sensitive domestic political and military issues 
(Anonymous, 2009). 
Sixth, the MoE bureaucracy established a staff secondment system (jiediao 借调) to seek 
policy support from universities, through which universities may participate in the education 
policymaking process. Over recent years, the MoE has reduced its size and cut its operational 
budgets. To save costs and deal with a heavy workload, it regularly ‘borrows’ staff from 
universities for various lengths of time. Currently, such secondment positions account for a 
considerable proportion of the MoE bureaucracy. Some of my interviewees from Beijing told 
me that about half of the people working at various administrative departments of the MoE 
were on secondment from universities. 
The cost for universities (especially those outside of Beijing) to send their staff to work at the 
MoE is high. These personnel remain employed and paid by their own universities while on 
secondment, and their original positions at the universities need to be filled by others. Yet, 
most universities are keen to participate. This secondment system provides professional 
development for university staff in a government environment, and improves their 
understanding of the government policy process. Most importantly, it enables them to 
network and cultivate personal relationships with the MoE officials, gather intelligence on 
policy opportunities and influence government decisions. As a university executive suggested: 
For many universities, seconding staff to the MoE is a process of intelligence gathering 
and policy participation ‘from the inside’. It facilitates a university to obtain inside 
knowledge on policy and act on it ahead of other institutions.  
Mr Z, a deputy director of the president’s office at a Chinese western university H was 
seconded to the MoE Department of Higher Education. He currently manages the 
implementation of a range of national university policies and funding programs. At the same 
time, he conveniently serves as H’s liaison manager for its government relations in Beijing. One 
of my interviewees who previously worked at the MoE under secondment knows Mr Z very 
well. He told me: 
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[Z]’s responsibility of managing national programs at the MoE is very important for his 
university. [Z] knows more than anyone else about the national policies and special 
schemes, especially the new development projects for funding universities in the 
western regions. His university has gained significant advantage from [Z]’s secondment 
position. I can guarantee you that his university has never missed an opportunity to 
participate in these funding programs and policy. Undoubtedly, the secondment puts 
[H] in an advantageous and privileged position, and maximises its involvement and 
success in the government policies. 
Notably, MoE officials commonly choose their potential secondment staff through their 
professional and personal networks, especially from the universities with which they are well 
connected, or by personal recommendations. 
Seventh, through formal written correspondence (fawen 发文), the MoE contacts universities 
directly to introduce and distribute policy documentations and regulations, as well as to collect 
formal submissions and proposals on draft policy. For example, the MoE contacted universities 
for feedback on their management and planning of the state-owned assets during its drafting 
of relevant policy. 
In addition, MoE officials often initiate visits and meetings with a small number of universities 
to discuss specific policy issues. This is especially common for the institutions located in 
Beijing. This channel enables the participating universities to intervene and shape policy 
development, however, it is often based on existing relationships and involves informal, 
private interactions. I will discuss this topic further in Chapter 5. 
Bottom-up channels initiated and driven by universities 
There are limited formal channels for bottom-up initiatives. Open policy advocacy remains 
largely restricted and non-institutionalised in the system. University presidents, for example, 
may formally request the investigation of certain education issues or propose new education 
policy agenda at the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), as many university leaders are also NPC and CPPCC 
representatives. Former Zhejiang University President Yang Wei, for instance, at a NPC 
meeting raised a policy suggestion with a number of other NPC members, calling for new 
policies to facilitate greater social support, resources and donations for HEIs. However, neither 
the NPC nor the CPPCC has direct binding or restraining force for the central bureaucratic 
departments to follow through and take concrete actions. University executives suggest that 
such formal bottom-up channels are generally ineffective and insignificant in their interactions 
with the government. 
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As a result, universities are driven to informal and alternative means for policy advocacy, and 
to explore non-normative paths that are near the boundary of authorised channels. For 
example, university executives or professors submit special petitions to senior officials and 
national leaders when there is an urgent, critical matter requiring immediate high-level 
attention and decision-making shortcuts in the complex bureaucratic procedures. Top 
executives and prestigious professors of Tsinghua and PKU have adopted this strategy 
numerous times. They jointly submitted private letters and reports to state leaders (e.g., vice 
premier and state councillor for education, and finance and education ministers) to raise policy 
concerns and recommendations, or to seek special permission for new policy reform trials. This 
direct, bottom-up policy approach is described by many interviewees as extremely effective, 
especially when the petitioners are influential figures with personal access to the high-level 
decision-makers. However, submitting joint letters with group signatures (jiti qianming 集体签
名) is commonly considered politically sensitive and ‘near the boundary’ of what the state 
would tolerate. Officials may interpret this gesture as a collective challenge and confrontation, 
which can cause backfires. Universities use this risky approach with great caution.  
Other bottom-up initiatives include sponsoring government visits, hosting government policy 
workshops or forums on campus and inviting officials to attend. These means increase 
universities’ influence and face time with officials for direct policy discussions, as well as 
facilitating personal relationships. A good example is when PKU invited Jiang to its campus 
several times to promote the university and the ‘building world-class universities’ strategy, 
which later resulted in Project 985 (Min & Wen, 2010, p. 115). 
A vice president of a leading national university commented on its bottom-up advocacy 
strategies: 
Informal lobbying channels, such as through personal connections, typically play a more 
significant role in influencing policies and government decision-making [than formal 
channels]. However, it is hard to trace, record or verify, because such informal 
interactions between universities and the government are implicit, random and covert 
in nature. 
Concluding remarks 
Over the past three decades, the government has launched a range of science and education 
policies to sustain national socio-economic growth, which have provided significant 
opportunities to universities, especially a small number of elite research institutions. Assigned 
a strategic role in driving China’s global competitiveness, the leading universities have received 
large investments and strengthened their capabilities and influence. They have also increased 
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their involvement as policy advisors in the government’s technocratic policymaking processes. 
This is partially thanks to the increasing bureaucratisation and scientific approach of central 
policymaking, since these universities are seen as a main source of technical expertise and 
intellectual legitimacy. Yet, the influence of universities does not flow naturally from their 
position. A rational approach to higher education policymaking requires both a stronger set of 
bureaucratic principles and institutions, and a better knowledge of the education system and 
market that can only be provided by greater interactions between the government and tertiary 
institutions. 
When we look more deeply at the system, we notice some fundamental flaws. Higher 
education policymaking continues to feature a top-down, authoritarian approach, with the 
ultimate goal to drive high efficiency and speed in GDP growth. It largely reflects Deng 
Xiaoping’s famous words: ‘no debates, just do it’ (Zha, 2011b). Major higher education policy 
decisions remain justified by an appeal to, or thinking of, a paramount leader whose directives 
are translated into national development strategies and education priorities through various 
fragmented central bodies, especially the MoE. In the meantime, in the political and regulatory 
space, Chinese national universities are considerably dependent on government funding, and 
are subject to direct leadership and intervention from the central bureaucracy in nearly every 
aspect of their operations, from central appointments of university leaders to student 
admissions. 
In particular, despite the increasing government consultations, most of the formal policy 
participation and communication channels remain dominated by the government in a top-
down manner where universities serve mainly as expert policy advisors. University executives 
and academics explained that in the formal policy processes, they have ‘a highly hierarchical, 
bureaucratic and dysfunctional’ relationship with the government. The government is the 
superior authority and universities are the subordinate. This does not accommodate equal 
dialogue. As Zheng (2010, p. 143) suggests, the Chinese government has ‘an aversion to 
bottom-up initiatives’ and is more comfortable with the top-down approach, through which it 
is able to ‘keep developments in check’. Although the state has made moves, in response to 
China’s socio-economic change, to broaden its social base by engaging different social forces 
that have emerged, universities’ bottom-up initiatives and policy advocacy role remain largely 
restricted and non-institutionalised in the system. As a result, for higher education and 
research policies which impact on their institutional interests, the universities’ attempts to 
influence policy have been driven to take other unauthorised and informal paths, and their 
advisor and advocate roles become merged in practice. Their growing policy expert advisory 
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role creates more opportunities and leverage for direct lobbying, and strengthens their 
credibility and capacity to operate more effectively as policy advocates. 
As in most nations that strive for both socio-economic mobility and economic competitiveness, 
universities hold a unique role in society as places for innovation and reflection, of tolerance 
and dissent. Yet their full maturation takes time, reflective of the societies that give them life 
and the need for consistent and long-term financial and political support (Douglass, 2012, p. 
664). Facing opportunities and constraints, Chinese universities have developed rising 
ambitions and demands for government policies that underpin their growth and maturity. 
Having gained an important place at the policy table, they need to speak out and play an active 
role in the policy domain to promote their interests and address concerns (H. Jiang et al., 2005; 
J. Xu, 2012). Later in the thesis, I will show that the leading Chinese universities have indeed 
become proactive and creative in utilising both formal and informal channels to mobilise their 
social and cultural capital to shape policy. This may include taking advantage of their 
credentials as experts and policy advisor role in the formal process, as well as deploying 
informal strategies that are near the boundary of authorised channels. 
The next chapter will investigate how Chinese research universities perceive their missions, 
roles, rights and constraints in the changing social, economic and political environment, and 
how their understanding of these issues shapes their objectives and priorities in their policy 
interactions with the state.  
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Chapter 2—Deepening engagement in policies: 
universities as social, moral and political actors 
A university stands for humanism, for tolerance, for progress, for the adventure of ideas 
and the search for truth. It stands for the onward march of the human race towards 
ever higher objectives. If universities discharge their duties adequately, then all is well 
with the nation and the people. 
Jawaharlal Nehru addressing the graduates of Allahabad University in 1947 
Introduction 
Despite the impacts of the political, policy and regulatory context on universities’ operations 
and strategies, how Chinese research universities perceive their roles and missions in the 
changing social, economic and political environment remains at the core of their motivations 
and actions. One question that is not openly discussed by ministerial or academic leaders in 
China is whether research universities are ‘simply reflections of their own society, subject to its 
local cultural and political norms, or are universities societal leaders, places for cutting-edge 
thought and debate?’ (Douglass, 2012, pp. 642, 659). 
The truly great universities of today and tomorrow have strong traditions of academic freedom 
that allow faculty and students to openly critique society and national leaders, and provide for 
wide latitude in the kinds of research that academics may pursue and the courses they teach 
(Douglass, 2012, pp. 658-659). China’s national research universities, even the most influential 
ones, endure inadequate institutional autonomy and academic freedom, and are subject to 
tight state controls. 
Drawing on numerous interviews with university leaders and administrators, this chapter 
investigates how the elite Chinese national research universities perceive, reflect and interpret 
their roles, missions, rights and influence; how they view the key constraints in the policy 
environment that hinder their operations, scholarly nature and long-term development; as 
well as how they perceive their capacity to negotiate different entitlements and to influence 
these policies. Their understanding of these issues is likely to determine their objectives, 
strategies and priorities in their policy interactions with the government. 
Universities as social actors: pursuing public interests 
How do Chinese research universities perceive themselves in this rapidly changing nation? My 
interviewees from leading research institutions have demonstrated strong views and beliefs in 
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their universities’ missions to pursue the public interests and in serving critical roles in Chinese 
society.42 
Long-term missions 
My interviewees define research universities’ long-term missions and contributions to society 
as based on academic striving for knowledge discovery and free exploration. Like their 
counterparts in other countries, Chinese research universities are distinguished by the quality, 
breadth and depth of their commitment to knowledge. They see themselves as repositories of 
the wisdom of past generations and centres for the ongoing development of new ideas, 
technologies and talents and, very importantly, a space of exploration. They recognise that 
their inherent nature is to constantly explore the basic truth and unknowns, and their role is to 
advance, integrate and transmit human knowledge that drives socio-economic developments. 
They strive to broaden their capabilities, foresee the future, improve every aspect of society, 
and help governments and businesses deal with unexpected challenges. 
In particular, my interviewees share a common ideal that freedom of inquiry is essential if 
research is to realise the benefits of which it is capable. To fulfil their long-term missions and 
roles successfully, Chinese research universities need to operate in a supportive policy 
environment that provides consistent funding resources, and sufficient autonomy and space 
for development, with minimal external interference and pressure for short-term concerns.  
Despite increasing investment in higher education, the Chinese state has pressured universities 
to deliver short-term nation-building projects and to be more accountable for the results they 
achieve with the resources available to them. It assesses and rewards university performance 
by focusing on just some of the direct services or outputs that universities provide, or on 
narrow aspects of their individual services. In university executives’ minds, these measures 
seriously underestimate the contributions that universities make, and hinder their long-term 
development. In the words of one university executive: 
Research universities produce far-reaching benefits and substantial values to almost 
every aspect of the nation and world … It is important for government leaders to 
understand that universities are critical national assets and deserve long-term 
                                                          
42 Compared to their strong awareness of national identity, roles and duties, Chinese national research universities 
have not demonstrated a strong sense of their global identity or responsibilities. This is partially due to their current 
development phase. The Chinese government has assigned important roles to a number of research universities to 
improve China’s global competiveness and advance its tertiary education sector to a world-class level, so in the last 
two decades they have primarily focused on catching up with the rest of the world and competing on the 
international stage rather than serving the global communities and addressing global issues. 
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investment and policy support. The contributions and achievements of our research 
universities should not be evaluated and measured in purely technical terms or 
immediate results … The government should not expect or pressure research 
universities to only address its present concerns. 
Another senior university director shared a similar view and related it to his university C:  
[C] is famous for its basic science research and discoveries. But [C] neither trains the 
‘applied’ type of talents, nor undertakes much commercialisation. It may take a very 
long time to show the actual results or visible benefits of its fundamental research. 
However, China really needs to have universities like [C], for its long-term contributions 
and in-depth values to the nation and society. Universities like [C] should be supported 
and encouraged to explore and research freely … One should not expect them to 
generate output or profits in the short term. 
A joint international declaration on contemporary research universities signed by a group of 
Chinese research universities echoes and advocates such a view. In October 2013, the 
Consortium of China Nine Research Universities (also known as the C9, a Chinese research 
university group formed by the first nine Project 985 institutions) jointly issued a Hefei 
Statement with the American Association of Universities (AAU), League of European Research 
Universities (LERU), and the Group of Eight Australia (Go8). The document outlines the 
characteristics and values of research universities, and in particular, the policy environment 
that is needed to support them (Go8, AAU, C9, & LERU, 2013; Yuefang Wang, 2010).43 It was 
the very first time that Chinese elite research universities publically defined their roles and 
values as well as aligning themselves with their international partners’ policy advocacy. 
Serving the government and society 
Senior university executives I interviewed recognise their universities’ ongoing responsibilities 
and duties to serve the nation and society through producing, disseminating and applying 
knowledge. They have also highlighted in their discourses that their institutions are well 
aligned to the central government’s development goals and needs. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Chinese research universities are expected to perform a national 
and global role and accomplish the government’s objectives of building the nation, including 
developing the knowledge economy, training and attracting high quality human capital, and 
strengthening China’s global reputation and competiveness. The Chinese research universities 
                                                          
43 Hefei Statement’s formal title is ‘Hefei Statement on the Ten Characteristics of Contemporary Research 
Universities’. 
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have strived to improve their quality and capabilities so that they can better fulfil these 
assigned responsibilities in the nation and society. Their university leaders have become more 
mindful, strategic, accountable and proactive in this respect. 
A university president told me: 
As national research universities, we are funded and led by the government. We are at 
the service of the government, nation and society, and we pursue the public 
interests … I often meet with other Chinese university presidents. The common 
questions we ask ourselves include ‘how should our universities train talents that fit 
China’s needs through our research and teaching activities?’, and ‘how can we better 
serve our society and local communities, and drive our national competiveness during 
China’s economic transformation?’ 
In his book on business lobbying in China, Scott Kennedy suggests that the larger an enterprise, 
the greater its input is into policy (Kennedy, 2008, p. 170). This seems also true with 
universities. The leading research universities have strengthened their involvement and 
contribution into government policymaking by utilising their knowledge and expertise. They 
have been playing an active role in providing expert services and advising the national and 
local governments on a wide range of complex policies that go beyond education. Examples 
include the national medical reform, economic policies, and energy efficiency and carbon 
reduction schemes which involve large state investments.  
As a university executive pointed out to me, in order to seek direct policy support from 
university advisors, the Chinese central government has made special arrangements with a list 
of top research universities. It set up ‘direct information points’ (xinxi zhibaodian 信息直报点) 
through special phone lines and other communication channels with some university experts 
and specialists (zhuanjia zhitong zhuanxian 专家直通专线) for various policy areas. University-
based research centres and think tanks, which I illustrated in Chapter 1, are also common 
platforms for universities to provide policy services to the government. By contributing their 
knowledge and insights, research universities help improve the quality and rationality of 
national socio-economic policies and can have far-reaching impact on social wellbeing. 
In addition, many executives from research universities believe that they have a ‘historical 
mission and responsibility’ to strengthen China’s international profile and influence through 
research and education. For example, a president from a top humanities-focused university 
stressed to me that his university strives to advance China’s humanities, cultural and social 
research. The goal is to ‘better serve the nation and promote Chinese language, philosophy 
and culture to the world, so that China will be better understood internationally’. 
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According to interviewees at the research universities I visited, building themselves to be 
world-class players in higher education, talent training and innovation is a key to strengthening 
China’s global reputation and competiveness. An interviewee explained: 
High quality research universities are strategic resources for national development in 
every aspect, such as economies, human capital, and national defence technologies. 
Especially, it becomes increasingly evident that talents play an unprecedentedly 
important role in the global competition. World-class research universities not only 
foster and train talent within the country, but also are centres for attracting and 
retaining high-end talent from other countries… It will provide long-term benefits to 
China and the government if we have world-class research universities. It should be our 
strategic priority to build world-class universities. 
Leading the sector 
My interviewees hold a strong view that leading research universities advance the interests of 
the Chinese university community, and act as the driving engine and policy reform pioneers in 
the development of the Chinese higher education sector. As a university president said: ‘the 
higher one stands, the further one can see’, suggesting that the leading institutions stand in 
the forefront of the sector and are most visionary and proactive actors. For instance, they lead 
the way in institutional management innovation and academic performance, set high 
benchmarks in the sector, inspire other institutions and advise the government on new 
practices and policy ideas. A university executive from an elite institution said: 
A university’s vision, quality, positioning, and development status are all closely related. 
Institutions of different qualities and visions have different thinking patterns and 
concerns. The ideas of leading research universities are more developed and advanced 
than those of second-tier and third-tier institutions. Such gaps were very obvious at our 
joint, sector-wide meetings, where the second and third-tier universities discussed 
issues that we [leading research universities] dealt with five, ten years ago. They can 
learn from us … They also want to influence government policies, but their efficacy is 
limited. Most government officials are well aware of the significant gaps in capacity and 
viewpoint between different levels of institutions in the sector, so they [government 
officials] work much more closely with us [leading research universities] on policies than 
with others. 
Numerous anecdotes recounted by my interviewees support such observations that the 
government relies more on elite universities on education and research policy issues than on 
other institutions. In 2012, for instance, the government held a formal consultation meeting 
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with over 30 institutions on the ‘reform of the professional qualification examinations’ 
(tongdeng xueli kaoshi gaige 同等学力考试改革). After the formal meeting procedures 
ended, the government convenor sent text messages to only six people from a few leading 
research universities and organised a separate, private meeting for more concrete policy 
discussion and detailed suggestions. Such episodes happen regularly.  
Furthermore, the leading research universities play a proactive role in innovating university 
practices and proposing higher education policy ideas, which benefit the development of the 
entire sector. The two most prestigious Chinese universities, PKU and Tsinghua, for example, 
often develop and experiment with new policies in various operational and academic areas, 
such as research training models, university staff salary and welfare packages, management of 
high-end academic personnel, university fund raising, facilities development, performance 
evaluation and review indicators, as well as academic disciplinary development and quality 
assurance systems. Many of their innovative policy ideas and trials have inspired other 
universities and the government, later being expanded and introduced to the rest of the 
university sector. 
Universities as moral actors: values and people 
Historically, education has been highly valued and respected in China (Kipnis, 2011, pp. 90-94, 
173, 181). Glory and praise have been attached to education success, and higher learning 
institutions possess significant influence in Chinese society (Kipnis, 2011, pp. 36-39). Despite a 
series of university misconduct scandals brought to light by the media in the recent years,44 
educational institutions, especially the prestigious research universities, remain generally 
highly regarded. These academic organisations are commonly perceived as respectable, ethical 
oases in China’s corrupt political system, embodying traditional values, intellectual superiority, 
as well as public goods and accountability. Chinese political leaders have often used elite 
universities as a platform for making political pronouncements and conveying political 
messages. Visiting or speaking at a university is seen as a much more respectable activity than 
visiting a large corporation for the same purpose, where people might see collusion or conflict 
of interest (C. Chen, 2009, pp. 43,47; Sharma, 2011). 
                                                          
44 For example, in 2009, an associate professor in journalism from Fudan University was sued for academic 
plagiarism (Wen, 2009). In 2013, a leading professor from Zhejiang University was charged for embezzlement of 
research grants (Larson, 2013). In 2013, two leading professors from Nanjing University were accused for data 
falsification in their papers (Y. Jin, 2013). 
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University leaders and academics 
‘Universities are protected and respected places. University leaders and academics are also 
well respected and have social influence,’ a university vice president from a leading institution 
pointed out to me. University academics are generally considered creditable, authoritative and 
unbiased with intellectual superiority. Chinese authors have reported numerous cases where 
prominent academics gained the national leaders’ trust and influenced their personal views on 
education and research policies. For example, an ‘expert consultation group’, consisting of 
some 20 senior scientists, including Zhou Guanzhao (physicist and chairman of CAS) and Wang 
Xuan (a professor at PKU and founder of the Laser Typing System), shaped the overall 
government strategy for the significant Medium and Long-term Development Plan for Science 
and Technology (Liu Li, 2009, p. 21). Chinese engineers Wang Ganchang, Wang Daheng, Yang 
Jiaxi, and Chen Fangyun lobbied the government on funding support for hi-tech research, a 
proposal which received endorsement by Deng Xiaoping and became a significant national 
research funding policy (MoST, 2010b). Academics’ credibility, expertise and knowledge are 
increasingly valued and demanded by the national policymakers.45 Their involvement in public 
policies as policy advisors has grown over recent years (Min & Wen, 2010, pp. 37, 94; 
Xinjingbao, 2011; T. Xu & Zhang, 2011; Zha, 2011a, p. 56). 
In China, leaders of research universities are typically senior academics. Their executive 
positions at universities further enhance their personal status and influence in society as well 
as supporting their university–government interactions.46 As a university vice president said, ‘If 
you are a professor, people will treat you with respect, but if you are a university president, 
people will take you more seriously.’ Some interviewees observed that in recent years, many 
well-known retired university presidents from top research universities have acted as 
‘education counsellors’ of the State Council. One university executive explained that the MoE 
                                                          
45 One notable example is Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2014 strategy on ‘developing think tanks’ aimed at getting 
the best possible advice for technocratic policymaking from academic and professional experts (see Chapter 1). 
46 Important to note that when university leaders are involved in national and local education policy processes, they 
often have a dual role: advising the government as an expert advisor, as well as a policy advocate advancing their 
institutions’ interests. For example, in May 1983, academic leaders and then Chancellors of Nanjing University, 
Zhejiang University and others penned a handwritten letter to Deng Xiaoping and the State Council, suggesting a 
national policy for investing in a small number of elite national universities and key academic disciplines. This 
proposal soon received support from the leadership marking the beginning of a series of national policies to fund 
key universities (MoE, 1983; People's Daily, 1983). In 1998, the leaders (and also education experts) of China’s elite 
institutions Peking University and Tsinghua University jointly lobbied the government on a new university funding 
Project 985, which was implemented in 1999 and changed the development trajectory of Chinese higher education 
(Min & Wen, 2010; Guobing Zhang, 2010). 
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officials show a lot of respect to universities presidents’ policy views and suggestions. He said, 
‘Many officials are aware that the weight of their own vision and knowledge cannot compare 
with the university leaders’, so they cannot take their opinions lightly.’ A university president 
also shared with me his personal experience, ‘We [university presidents] are respected by the 
government and by the public. Every time I visit the MoE, the heads of divisions would be keen 
to meet me.’ 
University leaders’ high status is partially a result of universities being functionally aligned and 
integrated with the national government bureaucracy. Such alignment includes the 
hierarchical organisational structure and the administrative ranks for their personnel. For 
instance, university party secretaries, presidents, vice presidents, directors and deans are all 
assigned an administrative rank (xingzheng jibie 行政级别) in line with the bureaucratic 
personnel system of the central government. University presidents from a range of elite 
national research institutions, such as C9 universities, are officially ranked as an equivalent of 
governmental deputy minister-level (fubuji 副部级).47 They do not possess the same level of 
administrative power in the government, but receive the same welfare benefits and conditions 
(daiyu 待遇) as a deputy minister, and can interact with other actors from a position of 
strength. 
Furthermore, the university executives of leading institutions are regularly sent to the 
government to fill important positions in the political arena. According to a Beijing newspaper, 
for instance, since 2000, amongst the 116 Project 211 universities, 49 of their university 
presidents have taken a senior role in the party and government offices, military, academies 
for science and technology, the NPC, and the CPPCC after their tenure as university presidents. 
In some cases, they were promoted by the state to serve top executive roles in central 
ministries, such as ministers (Xinjingbao, 2014, 2015).48 This career prospect seems to impact 
on the attitude and psychology of current government officials with whom university 
                                                          
47 The national government’s system of personnel hierarchy and administration ranks is extended to the personnel 
structure of universities. Presidents of China’s top universities have formal ranks in the party-state hierarchy 
equivalent to vice-minister (vice-ministerial rank, fubuji ganbu 副部级干部). Presidents from the majority of other 
universities have a lower official administrative rank as an equivalence to governmental bureau-level (tingji 厅级). 
48 Some examples: In 2007, Professor Wan Gang, then President of Tongji University, was promoted to Minister of 
Science and Technology. Former leader of Beijing Aerospace University Du Yubo and former vice president of Beijing 
Normal University Liu Limin, for instance, were both appointed Deputy Ministers of Education in December 2010. In 
January 2015, Professor Hou Jianguo, President of University of Science and Technology China (USTC), was moved 
to the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) as its new Deputy Minister. In the same month, Professor Chen 
Jining, President of Tsinghua University, was promoted to Party Secretary of the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP). 
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executives interact (and also to affect university executives’ behaviour in front of officials, 
which I will discuss later in the chapter). Government officials are known to show attention 
and respect to these university leaders who may become their superiors in the government in 
the future. This expedites the relationship building between universities and officials. 
University leaders are well aware of the social status and personal influence attached to their 
academic, professional and bureaucratic roles. They take advantage of their capacity to 
influence officials and society to promote their universities’ interests (I will discuss this in 
Chapters 4 and 5). A university vice president told me: 
Although my official administrative rank as a vice president at my university is only 
equivalent to the governmental bureau-level (zhengtingji 正厅级), I am often treated 
as a much higher ranking official outside of the university, including at work and social 
settings … This [respect and status for university executives] is very common in our 
Chinese culture … This also explains why university leaders have easy access to high-
level officials and policy decision-makers, and often gain their trust and support more 
easily. 
Social networks 
In addition to university leaders and academics, alumni networks also provide universities with 
significant social and political influence. Alumni networks are typically formed by university 
graduates, students and staff members, who share common identities and ties. As in many 
other countries, Chinese universities, especially the leading institutions, are cradles for the 
leaders of nearly every sector in the nation, including academia, business industries and the 
government. These alumni members construct a powerful social support base for their 
universities, and enhance their public relations, cultural and social power, and financial 
benefits (endowments) (W. Huang, Xie, & Qian, 2005, pp. 32-33; Wei, 2008, pp. 148-153; Xie, 
2010, pp. 27-29; X. Yan, 2011, p. 312). 
For example, Tsinghua is described by many interviewees as ‘the most influential university in 
Chinese society’ due to its alumni networks. The institution maintains strong relationships and 
bonds with its former students and staff through regular contacts and activities, and has 
developed a strong loyalty amongst them (S. Kang & Liu, 2005; C. Li, 1994; W. Lin, Zhang, Li, 
Liu, & Wang, 2005; Pan, 2007, p. 130). A vice president commented: 
Tsinghua University is very influential and powerful in Chinese society thanks to its 
strong links with the successful alumni members. It has produced many graduates who 
became the elite from all walks of life and leaders of almost every sector in the nation. 
These graduates became Tsinghua University’s stepping-stone to success, because it is 
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so easy for Tsinghua to receive support and get something done due to its great 
connections. The university has also paid a lot of attention to fostering Tsinghua culture 
and loyalty, strengthening these social networks, and maintaining close ‘family ties’ 
with its students and staff members. 
Alumni networks play an important role in universitygovernment relations, strengthening 
universities’ political influence and providing strategic advantages. Many government officials, 
for instance, actively foster their alumni ties in their professional roles at the central 
bureaucracy and continuously advance the interests of their alma maters through the policies 
they develop and support. This may result in political patronage of officials once they move to 
high-level positions. Even Chinese President Xi Jinping has maintained close ties with his alma 
mater Tsinghua University throughout his political career. During 20022003 when he was the 
governor of Zhejiang province, Xi actively included Tsinghua in Zhejiang’s regional 
development and investment initiatives. In October 2002, Xi signed a collaboration 
Memorandum of Understanding with Tsinghua on behalf of the Zhejiang government to 
strengthen their joint activities in economic industrial innovation and talents. In MarchApril 
2003, Xi made a special visit to Tsinghua campus, and invested in a ZhejiangTsinghua research 
institute in Jiaxing city. As an alumnus, Xi provided government resources and policy support 
to Tsinghua, furthering its development and social influence. (I will further elaborate on 
university alumni networks in Chapter 5.) 
Public activities 
Meanwhile, some university leaders recognise the need for their institutions to increasingly 
integrate and engage with society and be publically accessible and valued. A university 
president stressed that there is still a lot to do in this regard: 
Our main ties with society are through education and research, and through our daily 
interactions with students. The interactions between universities and communities are 
however far from sufficient. As a result, the media have carried negative reports and 
produced misunderstandings about universities’ roles, development goals and long-
term values. There is much for universities to do to communicate with society, and 
improve public understanding, support and recognition of how universities advance the 
public interests and produce public goods.  
In recent years, through the numerous university meetings I attended in China, I have noticed 
a growing engagement between universities and the media. Journalists and photographers are 
regularly invited to participate in university events and conferences, which are then followed 
by newspaper or online reports. Universities are keen to increase their public profile and 
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visibility, and to publicise their activities in the media. It has also become more common for 
journalists to interview university leaders and report on education-related issues, as a result of 
continuous public interest in education issues. A vice president told me that a good 
relationship with the media may support universities’ interests and facilitate their influence 
and reputation in society. 
It is worth noting that despite their growing media engagement and their community and 
social bases, Chinese universities carefully avoid involving media (as well as students and 
parents) in their policy advocacy activities and political interactions with the government. This 
is largely due to strict political constraints and possible negative consequences. Instead, 
universities devote particular attention and extensive efforts to building alliances with 
congenial officials behind the scenes, on which I will elaborate further in the following 
chapters. 
Universities as political actors: feeling the ‘policy zones’ 
So far in this chapter, I have shown how the leading research universities perceive their long-
term missions and national roles, and how their social position is enhanced by various factors 
and strategies, ranging from cultural and historical influence, to the peculiar alignment of their 
own administrative structure with that of the central bureaucracy. Autonomy and academic 
freedom are understood as intrinsic values and principles of a modern university, and a 
precondition for a university to fulfil its role and responsibilities toward society (Thorens, 2006; 
Junzong Zhang, 2004). China’s national research universities, even the most influential ones, 
still endure inadequate institutional autonomy and academic freedom, and are subject to strict 
state controls. How does university leadership understand the crucial constraints in the policy 
environment that hinder their institutions’ long-term development and scholarly nature, and 
how do they perceive their capacity to negotiate various entitlements and influence different 
policies? 
I have had the opportunity to attend a large number of meetings between Australian and 
Chinese universities. Discussion about academic and research collaborations often led to 
comparisons of national education policies, particularly on university autonomy, between the 
two countries. At one meeting in December 2014, for example, a Chinese university 
representative pointed out that the Chinese government had the discretion to alter or abolish 
any academic program offered by a university at any time. Australian universities’ 
representatives suggested that this would be unthinkable in Australia as their universities had 
the right to select and determine subjects without the government’s interferences. In such 
settings, executives from Chinese national universities often openly express their frustration 
about the over-regulation of the education sector by the Chinese government. 
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Before detailing the key policy challenges, it is important for me to point out one salient 
governance strategy of the Chinese government in the higher education sector. The state 
manages universities of different tiers with a so-called ‘stratified’ or ‘hierarchical approach’ 
(fenceng duidai 分层对待). This means that, comparatively, the elite national research 
universities enjoy greater institutional autonomy and a higher level of funding than lower-
ranking tertiary institutions (Jupeng Yang & Su, 2012). Such a differentiated approach is 
documented in the National Outline for Medium and Long-term Educational Reform and 
Development (20102020) announced in 2010 (CPCCC & State Council, 2010). Under the 
government guidelines, a small number of selected leading universities are offered a greater 
autonomy and additional funding for improving their academic management. 
There are a range of reasons for this approach. These prestigious universities are generally 
considered by the state as low-risk, reliable and mature. They are also highly proactive in 
lobbying the government and seeking more autonomy and policy flexibility. Additionally, the 
government becomes aware that the top-tier players should be given a greater autonomy in 
certain areas, so that they can strengthen their growth and capacities, and better serve their 
role assigned by the Chinese leaders in the nation-building projects. A university vice president 
suggested: 
Building world-class universities in China has been a national development strategy, 
reflecting Chinese leaders’ directives and guiding the government’s actions. Therefore, 
the central government has decided to provide special support to a small number of 
leading national universities, including some Project 985 recipients, in various policy 
areas, because they are in the best position to become world-class … Such support 
includes more generous funding and some more flexible regulations. 
The elite Project 985 universities, for example, enjoy more autonomy for independent 
institutional reforms and local policy experiments within the campus than the non-985 
universities, such as establishing new research departments and undergraduate programs,49 
                                                          
49 Many universities are required to go through an evaluation and approval process with the government to set up 
and establish new undergraduate programs, but the leading institutions can now establish them independently 
(xueweidian ziwo shenpi 学位点自我审批) as long as they notify the MoE and register them for the record (bei’an 
备案). 
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the self-awarding of senior professional titles,50 and undertaking research training reforms.51 
As mentioned earlier, the leading universities’ executives also receive higher official ranks. In 
contrast, the non-985 universities’ applications for new academic programs and local reforms 
are subject to strict regulation and scrutiny by the state. This is largely because the state 
attempts to control their quality and practices to reduce the risks of mishaps and chaos in the 
sector. 
Despite such a ‘stratified approach’ that can guarantee some privileged access to funding and 
more flexible regulations, not all policy areas are the same. Even the most innovative Chinese 
universities remain heavily influenced by the MoE policies and edicts. Institutional operational 
and academic areas, such as the appointment of university leaderships, the conferral of 
academic degrees and student admissions, are still centrally controlled and involve minimal 
consultations. 
What issues do universities contest? How do they know what issues they are allowed to 
challenge and what remain off limits? Through interviews, I have identified three ‘policy zones’ 
characterised by different levels of autonomy, including a ‘no-go zone’, a ‘contention zone’ and 
an ‘autonomous zone’. It has become apparent to me that certain ‘policy zones’ allow for more 
autonomy and universities’ intervention than others depending on the level of political risks 
and potential for social chaos and instability. Universities’ interactions with the government 
are shaped by a clear perception of what is allowed and what is not, by the urgency of the 
issues and the potential threat of action. The leading research universities feel that the 
‘contention zone’ requires intense negotiation and proactive actions with the government, if it 
is not to endanger their operational activities and long-term missions. 
‘No-go zone’: unchallengeable principles 
A set of policies and principles that relate to the leadership, ideology and the legitimacy of 
party authority are not up for discussion. I include these policy issues in the ‘no-go zone’. They 
include the central appointment of university executives, the ‘cadres under party supervision’ 
system, and political education. They are the principles that affirm the ultimate leadership and 
control of the party-state over universities. University executives and staff unanimously avoid 
                                                          
50 At regular universities, senior professional titles of academic staff, such as professors and associate professors, 
have to be officially assessed and granted by the government, but a small number of leading universities are 
authorised to decide and award the titles for their own staff within their institutions. 
51 Doctoral supervisorship at most universities, for instance, needs to be approved by the government through 
central examination and assessment, but the elite institutions can approve it ‘in house’. 
84 
challenging these structural rules, admitting that these are too sensitive and difficult to 
change. 
Appointment and removal of university leaders 
University presidents and party secretaries of national research universities are decided upon 
and appointed by the Central Organization Department of the CPC Committee. Other senior 
executives, such as vice presidents, are also centrally managed and supervised by the MoE 
and/or the sponsoring ministries. University leaders are regularly audited on personal income 
and overseas travel, and are subject to performance reviews and a promotion process by the 
government. As Richard McGregor points out, ‘the party’s control over personnel was at the 
heart of its ability to overhaul state companies, without losing leverage over them at the same 
time’ (McGregor, 2010, p. 69). In the higher education sector, the party strengthens its control 
over universities through its control over university leaders’ careers (Pan, 2007, p. 140). 
As a result of the government’s discretion and opaqueness on the appointment and removal 
process, the turnovers and tenures of presidents and party secretaries are unpredictable and 
irregular, often linked to the power struggle within the party rather than proper standards and 
rules (Leung & Sharma, 2015). In 20132015, for instance, several leading Chinese universities’ 
presidents were changed or transferred, following the change in national leadership and the 
Communist Party’s directives to crack down on corruption. In October 2014, the government 
removed Fudan President Yang Yuliang in response to public criticism about a research fund 
scandal in which Yang was however not directly involved. Yang was a highly popular and 
respected public figure who was likely to serve a second term, yet the government claimed 
that he needed to ‘retire’. In January 2015, Tsinghua President Chen Jining who headed the 
university for only three years was appointed as a party head of a central ministry. In February 
2015, the government removed PKU President Wang Enge after serving only two years, and 
transferred Zhejiang University (ZJU) President Lin Jianhua to lead PKU. Lin had only started his 
position as ZJU President in 2013. Other key universities such as Xi’an Jiaotong University 
(XJTU), Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT), and University of Science and Technology China 
(USTC) all experienced similar movements of university leaderships during the same period. 
Sudden announcements and swift changes in the university leaderships have often taken 
university faculty by surprise, causing disruptions to universities’ operations. In early 2013, for 
example, ZJU President Yang Wei was promoted to Director of the Chinese National Science 
Foundation, but the government could not decide on his replacement until several months 
later. According to ZJU staff, the university was left in a state of near chaos, with no leadership 
or direction.  
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Notably, in 2011, the MoE initiated a minor reform on the university presidential appointment 
system and conducted an experiment in several universities that openly recruited their 
presidents. Since then, five institutions have used an ‘open’ recruitment process to select 
presidents, where a committee was formed to choose candidates, and the candidates were 
evaluated using a number of criteria, including interviews and public opinion polls. However, 
none of the top universities in China has been involved in this experiment (T. Sun, 2013). Many 
interviewees sneered at this ‘reform’ and suggested that the central appointment of university 
leaderships will remain without any substantial modifications, as this policy is ‘a critical tool for 
the party-state to lead and control universities’. 
Party leadership 
‘Party leadership’ is a fundamental principle, not an option, in the operations of universities 
(Fan 2008). Universities in receipt of government funds must follow the fundamental principles 
of ‘president accountability system under the leadership of the party committee’ and ‘cadres 
under party supervision’.52 The first principle refers to a university governance and 
management system (see Diagram 2.1) that is led by a party committee to whom the president 
reports. This party committee has a party secretary who generally doubles as chairman of the 
university council and supervises the university president on significant matters as the de facto 
leader of the university. The second principle is closely related to the first one, meaning that all 
university cadres (e.g., senior executives and mid-level personnel) are subject to the party 
committee’s guidance and supervision. No anti-party, anti-government behaviour is tolerated. 
The aim of these principles is to ensure that the party leads universities effectively, and that 
universities remain loyal to the party and the socialist system. 
Diagram 2.1. Governance within a Chinese national university (Xi, Li, & Guo, 2005)  
                                                          
52 As noted in Chapter 1, the ‘party management of cadres’ (dang guan ganbu 党管干部) or nomenklatura system is 
one of the CPC’S most powerful and effective instruments of control over the key positions throughout the 
bureaucratic system, as well as throughout the party’s own hierarchy, and the Organization Department of the 
CPCCC is its very top organ. This system consists of lists of leading positions, over which party units exercise the 
power to make appointments and dismissals; lists of reserves or candidates for these positions; and institutions and 
processes for making the appropriate personnel changes. It gives the CPC a dominant say over personnel decisions 
of all important positions, including university presidents and party secretaries. 
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        Direct leadership 
        Direct supervision 
        Service provision 
        Information provision 
The two principles facilitate the party, through its powerful party committee, to monitor and 
intervene in universities’ operations at multi-dimensional levels. The university executives 
explained to me that the party committee manages ‘anything related to the political ideology 
and political institution’ within a university, and has the authority to approve operational and 
personnel matters such as the appointment of the heads of university administrative divisions 
(chuzhang 处长). The only exceptions are some major academic issues, such as the 
management of academic programs, colleges and professorships. These issues may be 
discussed and decided at the President’s Office Meetings (xiaozhang bangonghui 校长办公会) 
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or the University Academic Committee (xueshu weiyuanhui 学术委员会) without seeking the 
party’s approval.53 
Party education and political studies 
The state also dictates compulsory courses on the ideology of the socialist system, and controls 
the political education components of universities’ curriculum. Such courses are intended to 
safeguard the political loyalty of the university staff and students to the Communist Party. 
Within a three-year academic program, a total of four such political education courses are 
required, or about 9.3 percent of a normal three-year bachelor’s degree program. This is still 
an improvement over pre-2005 requirements that dictated eight mandatory courses 
(Douglass, 2012, p. 656).  
In addition, my interviewees observed that certain sensitive areas of political research, such as 
Chinese politics, still remain monitored and restricted by the government and cannot be freely 
discussed. This presents an ironic contrast to the fact that the government is pouring 
increasing funding resources into developing social sciences, because they provide valuable 
analysis and solutions to social problems. 
In December 2014, President Xi Jinping, the State Council and the General Office of the CPCCC 
issued a directive to further reinforce the propaganda and teaching of Marxism, Leninism and 
Chinese socialism in universities for stronger ‘party leadership and ideological guidance’ (Jing 
Li, 2015). In March 2015, Liu Yunshan, a Standing Committee member of the Political Bureau of 
the CPCCC, addressed a meeting with party chiefs and the presidents of 12 universities, where 
he urged universities to strengthen the education of socialism with Chinese characteristics on 
campus (S. Tian, 2015). It indicates that the Communist Party leadership is further tightening 
the political education policy to ensure that universities promote the party’s ideology. 
Universities treading lightly in the no-go zone 
When discussing the ‘no-go zone’, university executives I interviewed have generally displayed 
two different attitudes. The first one is ‘complete understanding and deference’. A university 
president, for instance, explained to me that in his view the party leadership did not conflict 
with his university’s autonomy. He said: 
                                                          
53 Another policy relating to the party leadership is the drafting of individual university constitutions (daxue 
zhangcheng 大学章程). It serves as a customised compact that lists the operational guidelines and autonomy of a 
university, and is drafted by individual universities but strictly scrutinised by the government for approval. Some 
university executives I spoke to perceive it as a way for the government to ensure that a university complies with 
the ruling of the party and the government. 
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Some people are critical about the party leadership over universities, especially the 
‘president accountability system under the leadership of the party committee’. They 
describe the system as ‘the person in charge [party secretary] is not accountable, and 
the accountable person [university president] is not in charge (lingdaode bu fuze, fuzede 
bu lingdao 领导的不负责，负责的不领导)’. They claim that the party interferes with 
universities’ business too much, and that the party leadership should be removed from 
universities for the sake of ‘protecting academic autonomy’ … Their analysis is based on 
a misunderstanding and confusion about the Chinese political context and the 
relationship between the party and universities. To begin with, China is a socialist 
country led by the Communist Party. Party leadership is a fundamental principle of 
university administrations, which should not be confused with the institutional 
autonomy of universities. In terms of a university’s operations and management, we 
[universities] can still decide on some important matters at the University Council 
(xiaodonghui 校董会) like American private universities. China can develop world-class 
universities without having to adopt the university governance system of foreign 
countries. Evidently, Chinese universities have developed rapidly in recent years.  
University leaderships’ political orientation and discourses are influenced and monitored by 
the state, and their careers are determined by the state too, so it is no surprise that university 
leaders align closely with party priorities. They are required to maintain deference and loyalty 
when discussing the party or their political positions. As Pan points out, to pave the way for 
their future political careers, university presidents need to accommodate political trends and 
ideologies and perform well in implementing the university’s political tasks (Pan, 2007, p. 137). 
Yet, the majority of university leaders hold, at least privately, a different view. The second 
attitude—‘discontent, compromise and avoidance’—was more common amongst my 
university interviewees. During our private conversations, they frowned, expressed scepticism 
and frustration about these rigid political rules. They agreed that ‘party leadership’ restricts 
institutional autonomy and academic freedom in numerous ways. Yet, they also seemed to 
have accustomed themselves to the reality and understood the negative consequences if they 
challenge the rules. They have generally adopted a compromising and avoidance approach, 
burying their personal scepticism in public, at work and at official settings. They share a 
common view that in order to survive and grow, national universities have no other options 
but to ‘build a tacit understanding and agreement and develop a positive relationship with the 
central government’. 
89 
In particular, university leaders have maintained a clear perception of what is allowed and 
what is not, and adapted to policy issues carrying different levels of political risk. A university 
executive pointed out: 
We [universities] know what subjects are open for discussion—we know what can be 
discussed, and what cannot. Universities can always interact with the government on 
policies, as long as the fundamental party leadership and political issues, such as the 
central appointment of university leaders, remain untouched, because they are not up 
for negotiation or consultation. Many other policy issues related to university 
operations or government process are open for intervention and are subject to 
influence. 
Despite different private attitudes and convictions, the outcome is the same: universities 
surrender to the absolute leadership and authority of the party, abide by its fundamental 
political principles, and do not contest in the ‘no-go zone’. 
Interestingly, there is also an informal element to the university–government interactions in 
the rigid and sensitive ‘no-go zone’. Instead of challenging these rules, some elite university 
executives take advantage of them and play their cards to advance their institutions’ interests. 
For example, university leaders employ the ‘central appointment of university leadership’ to 
facilitate flows of policy information with Beijing and enhance their universities’ political 
influence and personal connections with the state powers (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
‘Contention zone’: key constraints and conflicts 
The ‘contention zone’ refers to a range of rigid central policies that are applied to all national 
universities in various key academic and operational areas. Examples include student 
admissions and the conferral of academic degrees. Decisions in these areas are regarded as 
prerogatives and entitlements of autonomous universities, but are subject, in China, to 
intrusive intervention and strict central regulation. Essentially, policies in the ‘contention zone’ 
are intended to strengthen the state’s political control over education, maintain social stability, 
and force universities to deliver on nation-building priorities and goals. The ‘contention zone’ 
policies inevitably clash with the scholarly nature, interests and strategies of national research 
universities, and threaten their academic activities, institutional operations and long-term 
missions. The universities envisage that intense negotiations with the state on these issues are 
required to seek practical solutions, protect their rights, and advance their interests. 
Student admissions 
University student admissions are tightly regulated by the state. The central student 
admissions policy is widely regarded as ‘highly political’ and ‘socially sensitive’ in nature, 
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because it affects a large number of Chinese citizens,54 and has significant implications for 
social equity and political stability. The policy contains two major aspects: student admission 
quotas (zhaosheng jihua bianzhi 招生计划编制) and student selection methods (kaoshi luqu 
fangshi 考试录取方式). 
Firstly, each year the MoE determines the student admission quotas and numbers for 
individual national universities and defines their student recruitment ratios for different 
geographical regions and provinces. This is especially true of undergraduate recruitments. For 
instance, the MoE specifies the ‘geographic priorities’ from where a university has to recruit 
more undergraduate students each year, and provides detailed instructions on the percentage 
increase for middle and western regions in China and the percentage reduction for coastal 
provinces. Universities must comply with these rules precisely. In recent years, the national 
recruitment policy for postgraduate students has been increasingly relaxed, however, research 
universities remain subject to tight central regulation over postgraduate admission numbers, 
including PhD students.  
The government claims that such a central mechanism ‘improves China’s social and economic 
equity’, ‘ensures an equal access of disadvantaged, remote regions to universities’, and 
‘regulates universities’ practices, sizes and quality’.55 In early 2013, for example, Chinese 
Premier Li Keqiang issued a new directive and commanded national universities to recruit 
additional 30,000 undergraduate students from the less-developed middle and western 
regions in the same year. The rationale was to ‘help improve social equity and regional 
economic development’. Following Li’s decision, the government immediately altered the 
details of universities’ 2013 admission quotas only a few months prior to the national 
university entrance exam. Such episodes reoccur regularly. 
My interviewees were clearly disgruntled about their lack of autonomy in student admissions. 
They consistently argued that this policy has hindered their selection of quality candidates, 
                                                          
54 Due to the large scale of the Chinese higher education system, this policy involves a huge number of Chinese 
citizens. Based on the MoE statistics in December 2014, for example, China had 1,793,953 postgraduate students 
and 24,680,726 undergraduates enrolled at a regular higher education institution in 2013 (MoE, 2014f). 
55 According to some officials I spoke to, by regulating university admissions and manipulating student numbers and 
ratios, the state aims to ‘optimise mobility flows within the country’, ‘narrow gaps in wealthy and poor regions’, 
‘look after the people from poor regions and with disadvantaged low socio-economic backgrounds’, and ensure ‘an 
equal access to top level universities’. In addition, national universities receive regular funding from the MoE 
partially based on their student enrolments, so some institutions may recruit a large number of students beyond 
their capacity for the sake of financial revenue. Therefore, it is necessary for the government to regulate their 
student numbers and ensure their academic quality. 
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limited student numbers and affected their sustainable growth. A senior university executive 
commented: 
The quality and quantity of undergraduate and postgraduate students are vital for the 
development of research universities with world-class vision and mission, especially 
PhD students. An important task for research universities is to select and train talents. 
Due to the tight restrictions on student recruitment quotas and capped funding for each 
student place, the number of our quality PhD students is woefully inadequate. This will 
have significant impact on our long-term growth. The government does not understand 
or care how much research universities depend on their talents and young students. It 
cares more about political stability and savings [of university student funding]. 
Secondly, the MoE defines student selection methods and conducts unified national exams for 
university admissions, especially at the undergraduate level, despite the substantial disparities 
in education quality and capacity between different regions and institutions. For 
undergraduate student selection, the MoE mandates gaokao (高考), the national university 
entrance examination system. For postgraduate recruitments, student candidates must sit the 
national entrance exams before taking individual universities’ oral and written tests. Leading 
research universities have gradually gained more autonomy to handpick their PhD candidates, 
but they are still subject to the state allocations of student enrolment quotas, as mentioned 
previously. 
In particular, gaokao has become a focal point in Chinese society and in the education sector 
due to its unique social role and its one-size-fits-all approach. It is not only a unified, standard 
exam for universities to select and recruit students. It is also a symbol for equal, open access to 
opportunities and fairness for all socio-economic backgrounds, which is similar to the role of 
the Chinese imperial examination system. As it affects the interests of a large number of 
citizens and families, it is commonly understood that any major changes related to gaokao can 
potentially lead to widespread public discontent and social instability.56 Hence, the 
government tightly controls this policy area to prevent risks and negative consequences. 
Notably, since 2003, the MoE has conducted a small reform trial for some leading universities 
to select and admit undergraduate students more autonomously (zizhu xuanba luqu gaige 
shidian 自主选拔录取改革试点) (MoE, 2013a). Students still need to sit the gaokao but are 
                                                          
56 For example, one university director in charge of student admissions shared with me his understanding. He 
explained that Chinese society is full of various guanxi factors. A few universities ‘went a little too far’, and made 
some unethical decisions (nepotism and corruption) on student admissions that caused a big stir. Following this, the 
MoE decided to strengthen its regulatory power and specifications about student selection. 
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also tested by individual universities. Some of these universities started to collaborate on joint 
student testing and selection. However, students selected and recruited under the 
‘autonomous selection’ policy cannot exceed 5% of each university’s total student recruitment 
quota. Most university students are still admitted through gaokao. In addition, since late 
September 2014, the State Council has tightened up the rules regarding the autonomous 
student recruitment trial and suspended all self-initiated university coalitions for joint student 
testing and admissions (State Council, 2014; Guo Zhang, 2014; Zhe Zhang, Zheng, Wang, & 
Xing, 2010),57 because their collective policy ideas and activities have allegedly undermined the 
order of national student admissions and led to conflicts and chaos in the sector. 
The leading research universities I interviewed have strongly criticised the various student 
recruitment policy constraints and the state’s political motives and pressures. They have 
maintained the view that it is in the universities’ right to follow academic principles, values and 
priorities, and choose their own quality students for education and research (independent of 
where they are from), and that this practice ultimately supports their world-class development 
and long-term missions. A university director for student recruitment explained how gaokao 
has failed the Chinese research universities: 
The centralised gaokao contains fundamental flaws and limitations. It has constantly 
failed in judging students’ true potential, motivation and talent … The Chinese higher 
education sector is highly diverse, with various types and different levels of institutions, 
from a few first-class research universities to many specialised and professional training 
institutions. One single unified exam paper is extremely inadequate, ineffective and 
unscientific in distinguishing the different levels, qualities, skillsets and types of 
students. The universal, one-size-fits-all approach goes against our academic values and 
principles. It does not work for our leading research universities. It is damaging our 
development. 
Another university vice president commented: 
As a leading research university, we aim to train our students to become leaders in 
various fields and play important roles in society. However, currently, many students 
selected solely based on the national unified exams are ‘exam machines’ who lack 
personal drive, desirable qualities, and general skills. We should be allowed to select 
real talents who can truly meet our own criteria and can be trained as future leaders. 
                                                          
57 These coalitions include ‘Beiyue’ (北约), ‘Huayue’ (华约) and ‘Zhuoyue’ (卓越) (Zhe Zhang et al., 2010). For their 
latest development, see China Youth Daily, 29 November 2014 (Guo Zhang, 2014). 
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Funding 
Despite increased economic opportunities and financial investment in the higher education 
sector, many university leaders I interviewed have described university funding policy as a ‘key 
constraint’ and ‘the topmost autonomy issue’. National research universities are heavily 
dependent on government funding. For example, a vice president from a science-intensive 
university told me that 90% of his university’s annual research funding comes from the 
government. He added, ‘So to speak, government funding policies determine our life and 
death. No money, no development. Funding policy is vital for our universities’ growth and 
competiveness.’ However, a flawed central university funding system is seen as having 
severely restrained autonomy and development. 
Worthwhile research requires long-term support. Although some central departments have 
become increasingly aware that investment in universities requires a long-term, 
comprehensive strategy, the Chinese government in general maintains a ‘planned economy’ 
approach. Instead of emphasising consistent, sustainable block funding (baozhangxing jingfei 
保障性经费) for universities to use with reasonable autonomy,58 the state channels its large 
funding through short-term, temporary ‘special projects’ or ‘programs’ (zhuanxiang 专项), 
which have specific deliverables and deadlines. The goal is to direct universities’ activities to 
carry out nation-building priorities and tasks.59 Examples of such special projects include 
Project 985, Program 86360 and the 2011 Scheme.61 
Special programs have a temporary and unstable nature. The discontinuity or a major 
adjustment to funding programs and policies can lead to significant consequences for 
universities which heavily depend on these revenues. Universities feel financially insecure 
about their future directions. For example, Project 985 has become one of the most important 
funding sources for leading national research universities, and is regarded as their ‘source of 
basic living allowance’. A number of university presidents I spoke to were deeply worried 
                                                          
58 Regular block funding is a type of recurring funds calculated by a formula based on enrolments and staff (Wang C. 
2000; Hua 2002) with budgetary allocations from the Ministry of Finance through the Ministry of Education and 
other sponsoring Ministries. 
59 For some national universities, the programme funding has accounted for over 50% of budgetary allocation. 
60 With the endorsement of Deng Xiaoping, a ‘High technology research and development plan’ or ‘Program 863’ 
(gaojishu yanjiu fazhan jihua 高技术研究发展计划) was launched in November 1986 (MoST, 2010b). See more 
information on the official website of the Project 863: http://www.863.gov.cn/1/1/index.htm. 
61 For example, the design of the 2011 program to a large extent reflected the government’s instrumentalism and 
top-down approach. The government framed some themes and prioritised areas, and with the control power of 
funding, it channelled universities and their research into national short/mid-term socio-economic development 
needs rather than encouraging them to undertake free knowledge exploration and discoveries. 
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about the uncertainty of the future development of Project 985. They suggested that if the 
government cancels or overhauls the special program, it will severely affect their universities’ 
current operations and future development plans. A university executive commented: 
The government wants to see investment returns as soon as possible, so it likes project-
based funding. However, these type of government projects exist today, and may not 
exist tomorrow, especially when the state leaders and the directives change. Instability 
and insecurity have a huge impact on our universities. 
In addition, university activities are required to meet the government’s development priorities. 
Government bodies specify the scope of research they intend to support and monitor the 
quality and timeline of the work. This puts research universities in danger of losing sight of 
their deep mission, scholarly nature and capabilities, which make them unique participants in 
national innovation systems and major contributors to national wellbeing (Brodhead, 2014). To 
be allocated funding from these special programs, many research universities have to divert 
energy from more productive and sustainable strategies. They pay more attention to 
competing for such resources than to their scholarly works, and constantly adjust their 
research priorities and orientations to meet the official selection criteria.62 For example, as Ma 
observed, the government expects their invested research projects to have immediate 
outputs, which has resulted in increased pressure on basic science researchers (W. Ma, 2003, 
p. 17). 
A university president explained the conflicting priorities between the research universities 
and the government on such funding policy:  
The government manipulates our universities to follow its ideas and plans through its 
funding policy. We have spent too much time meeting their needs, chasing their money, 
adapting ourselves to those government programs. We do need the money. I have to 
visit the central ministries every week to lobby for such funding … In my view, the 
government should distribute most of the funding in a consistent, sustainable manner 
that allows universities to develop more freely towards our own goals and priorities. 
Last but not least, Chinese universities are subject to rigid spending rules and financial audits 
for government funds. In particular, the lack of financial discretion has created a significant gap 
between need and supply (Y. Kang, 2013). For example, Project 985 provides significant 
university development funds, but universities are only allowed to spend the money on 
                                                          
62 Furthermore, the overly frequent quality assessments and financial audits of those special projects also become a 
big administrative burden for universities, which are not only repetitive and time-consuming, but also intrusive, 
interfering and forceful. Universities feel overwhelmed but still have to take a part in them. 
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specified areas such as laboratory equipment.63 Similarly, many government research funds 
adopt a ‘partial funding system’, which does not cover overheads and staffing costs. It is often 
the case that the more research projects a university receives, the more money it must find 
from somewhere else to cross-subsidise.  
With special programs quickly accumulating over time, the universities find it is increasingly 
challenging to sustain their academic activities and ongoing operations. A university research 
executive concluded: 
As research universities, we have the original, ultimate roles and missions of free 
exploration, fundamental research and innovation, and talent training. We should be 
allowed and supported for undertaking these beneficial activities autonomously. 
However, our government controls the university funding and commands where the 
money can be used. This is very unhealthy, damaging the academic nature of research 
universities. It is time to return to the original point and allow research universities to 
fulfil their roles. 
Facing funding constraints, the research universities have increasingly engaged in negotiation 
with the government. They have filed complaints and petitions to the government, and 
advocated a sustainable funding system, a long-term investment commitment, and a greater 
autonomy in financial matters. For instance, C9 universities persistently lobbied the state on 
the continuation of Project 985 and on the improvement of its spending rules. The government 
later extended the funding rounds of the project and lifted some of the spending restrictions 
(see Chapter 3). As a C9 university president claimed, ‘The strength and wellbeing of Chinese 
research universities is critical to national innovation. We [universities] should be allowed to 
develop more freely. We need to have sufficient space and resources to focus on our long-
term efforts without the current policy constraints and interferences.’ 
Academic degrees and assessments 
The central bureaucracy is directly involved in university academic activities. It tightly controls 
the accreditation and awarding of academic degrees, regulates university academic programs, 
and conducts frequent academic audits and reviews. The official justification of such 
involvement is to maintain order and prevent misconduct such as counterfeit degrees, 
academic corruption and fraud that may be causes of ‘social chaos’ (luan 乱). The most 
prestigious research universities are not shielded from these rigid regulations and mandatory 
                                                          
63 This is called ‘zhiding yongtu, zhuankuan zhuanyong’ (指定用途，专款专用). 
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procedures, despite their highest standards of practice in the sector and their reputation. Here 
below, I will focus on the awarding of degrees and the system of quality evaluation. 
To begin with, Chinese universities are not self-accrediting institutions. The MoE centrally 
accredits all university academic degrees, regulates student enrolments and registrations, and 
determines the national academic qualifications framework. Under this rigid system, 
universities are subject to the MoE’s approval for any major degree-related matters. There is 
very little flexibility.  
A top research university E, for instance, lodged a formal application to the MoE, seeking 
permission to offer its undergraduate students a ‘diploma certificate’. This certificate would 
only be issued when students had completed a certain amount of credits but could not 
complete their full bachelor degrees due to special circumstances. The MoE bluntly objected to 
E’s proposal. It claimed that according to the national policy, research universities like E were 
only allowed to offer academic degrees equivalent to or above a four-year bachelor degree 
(benke zhidao yuanxiao 本科指导院校). The ministry concluded that it was unable to ‘break 
the rule’ just for E. Despite repeated negotiation, E was unable to change the MoE’s decision. 
As a result, E issued a symbolic, ‘self-recognised’ diploma certificate to its students as an 
alternative solution. 
In addition, the state imposes a ‘one person—one degree—one certificate—one stamp’ policy 
which applies to all university academic degrees. The MoE issues each qualified student one 
academic degree certificate at a time; each Chinese degree certificate has to be authenticated 
by the state with an official MoE stamp; and the format and content of the degree certificates 
are decided by the MoE, which accommodates only one stamp. This creates problems when 
Chinese universities intend to offer students double degrees (two degrees validated by one 
stamp on a single certificate), or develop combined degrees with other institutions (one 
degree with two or more stamps on a single certificate).  
For instance, a research university N successfully reformed its teaching curriculum and sought 
to offer double degrees to its undergraduate students who had successfully completed all 
academic credits for both degree programs. The MoE objected to N’s proposal saying that the 
government would only approve one degree with one stamp for each student on graduation. 
The MoE reminded N that ‘this is the rule that everyone has to abide by’. In the end, N decided 
to design and ‘self-accredit’ its own double degree certificate to award its qualified students, 
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which was only recognised by N. A number of universities have taken a similar approach and 
counter-measures within their institutions.64 
Furthermore, the central bureaucracy conducts regular academic quality audits, assessments 
and performance rankings on national universities, with a goal to ‘ensure quality’, and to make 
them more accountable for the results they achieve with the resources allocated to them. As 
‘an outsider of academia’, it measures university performance and quality ‘based merely on 
the number of articles they have published and the number of times the articles get cited’ 
(Gan, 2015). The MoE has also instituted specific guidelines on the evaluation of faculty, 
attempting to install a merit-based process of faculty advancement that takes into account 
research productivity, which is tied to the numerical counting of articles, for example, in MoE-
selected journals. My interviewees explained to me that the central government recently 
adjusted some of the evaluation indicators based on universities’ policy suggestions, but it was 
only a superficial improvement, and did not change the nature of the exercise. This has driven 
universities to focus more on boosting their results in specific government measurements than 
on other academic activities.  
The frequent audits and assessments by the MoE and their central sponsoring agencies also 
create significant administrative burdens in the national research universities’ operations and 
resources. A university director pointed out: 
Tens of academic fields and disciplines. A round after another … They require a lot of 
labour, money, effort and time from each university to prepare, organise and receive 
the inspections of the government’s evaluation teams. It is very time-consuming, 
energy draining, and counterproductive. 
The government’s enduring administrative interference has also been displayed in other 
university academic affairs. For instance, research universities are still required to submit their 
education and research training reform plans to the MoE for individual assessment and 
approval,65 which should be universities’ own academic decision. The MoE can exercise its 
                                                          
64 Besides, this academic degree policy also restricts Chinese universities from collaborating with their foreign 
partners for combined degrees. There are only two exceptions in China: Tsinghua and PKU successfully sought 
special policy exemptions from the State Council (as a pilot trial) to validate some of their combined degrees with 
their international partners (i.e. one degree with two or more stamps on each certificate). The two universities told 
me that their negotiation with the government for this special permission was a ‘rather lengthy and complex 
process’. 
65 For example, according to a number of deans of graduate school at a university meeting in 2014, the MoE 
requested first-class universities to submit comprehensive plans for their own postgraduate education reform plan 
and self-evaluation review papers by March 2015, with detailed information including student recruitment, 
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administrative power to suspend or abolish any university academic programs in the country. 
Many university courses must also use a single approved textbook that heavily influences 
course content—an intrusion of control over the curriculum not tolerated in universities 
elsewhere in the world (Douglass, 2012, p. 657). 
My interviewees shared their grievances and frustration with me, and outlined how these 
policies have severely constrained the research universities’ academic freedom and 
operations, created administrative burdens, and hindered their international academic 
collaboration. A university executive commented: 
Even at key Project 985 universities, institutional operations are largely controlled by 
the MoE, including student recruitment, academic programs, and even graduation 
[degree awarding] … In reality, China has only one ‘university’ and that is the ‘MoE 
University’. All Chinese universities are a de facto branch or sub-campus of the ‘MoE 
University’, as we all have to abide by its rules. If the MoE did not exist, China would 
have already had world-class universities! 
Another lamented: 
The central government should leave these academic matters to our own business and 
decisions, as we will do everything possible to ensure our quality and 
competiveness … Those policy rules are designed for third-tier or ‘high-risk’ institutions 
which do require close monitoring, effective regulation and quality control. Yet they 
[rules] are redundant and restrictive for the leading national research universities, 
which strive to excel and perform at world-class level and have sound self-discipline and 
quality assurance mechanisms in place … Our universities are so constrained and 
suffocated. We deserve more autonomy on these matters. 
It becomes clear that the ‘contention zone’ is where the different interests and priorities of 
national research universities and the state compete. On student recruitment polices, for 
example, universities’ priority is ‘meritocracy’, while the government’s priority is ‘social equity 
and political stability’. The government uses universities to achieve its own priorities but 
ignores universities’ needs. As Tsang suggests, conflicts in perspective for national 
development and for education will likely persist in China, as they will in other countries. What 
is really at issue is whether or not there are institutionalised structures and processes for 
                                                          
academic disciplines, programs, quality measures, degree conferring, and international experience for students. The 
MoE claimed that the aim of this exercise was to ‘evaluate, approve and ensure high quality of their degree 
programs’. This attracted criticism from universities. 
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managing such conflicts in ways that appropriately balance and accommodate legitimate 
diverse interests (Tsang, 2000, pp. 610-618).  
To resolve these issues and seek more autonomy in the contention zone, the leading research 
universities have deepened their interactions with the government on policies and developed 
a range of lobbying strategies, such as testing the water by breaking rules, coordinating 
actions, mobilising personal connections, and undertaking policy innovation and experiments. 
(I will elaborate on such strategies in the later chapters of the thesis.) 
‘Autonomous zone’: low-risk local affairs 
The Chinese government has opened up a range of national policy areas, allowing leading 
research institutions to manage their internal affairs with reasonable autonomy. I call this 
open policy space as the ‘autonomous zone’. In contrast to the rigid ‘no-go zone’ and 
‘contention zone’ policies, which are associated with political risks and social instability, the 
‘autonomous zone’ generally contains localised and soft-natured issues that are technical, non-
political, and only affect small numbers of people. 
As explained earlier, the state manages universities of different tiers with a so-called ‘stratified 
approach’ in a range of policy areas where elite national universities receive a greater 
institutional autonomy and preferential treatment than institutions of lower ranking. These 
policy matters largely belong to the ‘autonomous zone’. Examples include the restructuring of 
university schools, the development of a university’s general curriculums, the establishment of 
new science research departments, the self-awarding of senior professional titles, and the 
institutional teaching and research training methods. 
Research training, for instance, is a relatively flexible and autonomous area with a high level of 
academic and technical details. In the past, universities had to go through a complex 
application process with many bureaucratic procedures if they intended to establish a new 
university postgraduate program. The bureaucratic procedures included government 
assessment, authorisation, and reporting. In recent years, the government has gradually 
simplified and decentralised the program approval system. Especially, the prestigious research 
universities have begun to enjoy a streamlined self-approval process for establishing new 
academic degree programs within their institutions, and a greater autonomy to decide on how 
to train their research students effectively. 
In the ‘autonomous zone’, university executives are in high spirits and feel encouraged and 
energised to innovate their practices and experiment new initiatives. Their efforts often inspire 
other institutions and government officials. Such a development of the ‘autonomous zone’ is 
partially a result of the government’s awareness of the elite institutions’ existing capacity and 
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their development needs for a more supportive policy environment. It is also partially due to 
these universities’ persistent negotiations and lobbying on these policy issues. 
Concluding remarks 
Chinese research universities’ self-perception remains at the core of their motivations and 
actions. They see themselves as leaders, places for cutting-edge thought and debate, but 
subject to local cultural and political norms. The leading research universities have developed 
mixed perceptions of their identity, roles and rights: one defined and driven by their academic 
work, long-term missions for knowledge discovery, the public interest of education, and their 
international partnerships; the other shaped and framed by their organic relationship with the 
government, on which they remain dependent. 
Sitting on the fence between the state and society, closely involved in both, Chinese research 
universities are a unique type of agent in the nation. Being repositories of knowledge, they are 
significant and influential organisations with a special set of social, cultural, economic and 
political attributes and functions, and increasingly insert themselves in the global imaginary 
about research and education. The academic nature of universities guides their operations, 
strategies and behaviour and determines how they relate to and interact with the government 
and society (Zijie Huang & Cheng, 2010, pp. 190-192; Junzong Zhang, 2004, pp. 8-9).  
As operators and members of a community of higher learning, the universities perceive their 
activities, including knowledge exploration, promotion of education, and the advancement and 
application of technology, as the provision of public goods, in the service of the public interest, 
and as long-term contributions to society. University leaders, despite being appointed by the 
government, generally maintain principled views of the rights and moral entitlements of 
modern research institutions, empowered by sufficient institutional autonomy and abundant 
public funding. These awareness, expectations and claims become more intense as they 
engage in significant internationalisation and witness the autonomy and rights enjoyed by 
their foreign peers, partners and competitors. 
In the policy environment of higher education, I identified three ‘zones’ characterised by 
different levels of autonomy: a non-negotiable ‘no-go zone’ (‘fundamental’ issues where the 
power of the government is unchallengeable, for instance, party leadership and central 
appointment and removal of university president); a localised, low-risk ‘autonomous zone’ 
(issues that universities can manage and innovate with reasonable autonomy, such as local 
research training); and the ‘contention zone’ (academic and operational issues that are 
centrally controlled which are apparently related to social sensitivity and bear political 
implications, including student admissions, funding and the conferral of academic degrees). 
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It becomes apparent that the rules that apply in each zone are a consequence of the nature of 
the ideology and legitimacy of the political system as a whole. Certain ‘policy zones’ have 
allowed for more autonomy and universities’ intervention than others depending on the 
presumed level of political risks and social instability. This seems to resonate with what Mertha 
and Bella have suggested, that the state accepts public participation in the policy areas where 
no high-stakes confrontations are posed, and when neither democratisation nor legitimacy is 
an immediately salient concern (Balla, 2012, pp. 656-657; Mertha, 2008, p. 151). 
The leading research universities recognise that the policy constraints in the ‘contention zone’ 
hinder their scholarly engagement and public service activities, and threaten their operations, 
priorities and long-term missions. They have explicitly expressed their grievances, frustration 
and scepticism that the government and central leaders place their own interests and 
priorities over those of universities and, more broadly, education. To ensure their capabilities 
to fulfil their roles and goals, and to seek on its own terms the quality improvement in 
education, research and other academic activities, the universities have sought a greater 
autonomy and sustainable funding as being necessary for their service to the public interests. 
They envisage that such a rightful position requires increasing negotiations and interactions 
with the government as well as deeper engagement with social forces. Participating in 
policymaking and cautiously contesting these issues is therefore a way for universities to seek 
solutions through the conflicts and advance their core interests. The key arenas of interaction 
remain policies related to institutional autonomy and funding programs formulated by the 
state. 
On the other hand, the universities’ consciousness of their rightful position does not translate 
into contestation of the institutional order or the legitimacy of the regime. For example, 
instead of attempting to contest policies in the ‘no-go zone’ (such as the right to elect their 
own university presidents), Chinese research universities bury their discontent, avoid 
questioning or contesting, comply with the rules and norms, or purposely manipulate and 
exploit them to seek their institutional interests and competitive advantages. Leaders of elite 
universities have developed the ability to adapt to policies in the different zones, and their 
choices of an advocacy agenda for interactions with the government are largely shaped by a 
clear perception of what is allowed and what is not, as well as by the level of urgency and risk. 
They compromise, negotiate and obtain concessions within the bureaucratic structure and 
within the national and international roles that the government has defined and assigned to 
them. 
However, the substantial gaps between their ideal of modern research universities and the 
enduring constraints they face create a source of tension that will likely grow and become 
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more open as the central government continues its uneven progress toward greater economic 
liberalisation. As Douglass suggests, universities should be leaders in the societal process, 
engaging in debating the ethics and implications not only of their own fields but of society at 
large (Douglass, 2012, pp. 642, 659). With education and research becoming a national 
priority, the multi-skilled university leaders have strengthened their position and influence, 
shaping public values and disseminating awareness of university autonomy (Jianping Li, 2005, 
p. 10) . Although the universities’ perceptions, roles and capacity are confined by their 
dependent relationship with the government, these rising powers are likely to be in an 
unprecedented, advantageous position to negotiate their interests and entitlements in the 
government policy process.  
So how do they interact with the state to influence policies and decisions? What are their 
strategies and forms of agency? Chapters 35 will investigate these issues. The next chapter 
focuses on universities’ collective lobbying practices.   
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Chapter 3—C9: the alignment of interests amongst 
universities 
One tried and trusted [lobbying] method is simply to research whether there are any 
other bodies that hold similar or identical views to your own. You can then form a 
temporary alliance with them, joining forces to try and influence government policy in 
a specific area.  
Lobbying: the art of political persuasion by Lionel Zetter (2011, p. 56) 
Introduction 
Universities’ negotiations and interactions with the government in policy process play a central 
role in protecting and advancing their interests. This chapter and the next two are devoted to 
investigating the practices of university lobbying, including occurrences where universities 
decide to act individually or in a coordinated fashion vis-à-vis state actors. In this chapter 
particularly, I will explore occurrences where universities’ interests are aligned and therefore 
collective lobbying emerges.  
Different types of organisations lobby differently.66 Scholars have studied the behaviour of 
lobby associations and the collective actions of interest groups in various economic sectors of 
China. When examining the steel, consumer electronics and software industries, for instance, 
Scott Kennedy (2008) finds that direct contact between businesses and government agencies is 
generally more prevalent than the actions of associations and interest groups. Associations 
remain minor players in the lobbying and policymaking processes. Businesses take little 
interest in associations and, when they do, the result is often failure. Kennedy’s work also 
reveals a certain degree of variation in the extent to which companies attempt to make use of 
associations (Kennedy, 2008, p. 165): the greater the dominance of State Owned Enterprises 
                                                          
66 As noted in Footnote 22, for-profit actors (e.g. corporations or trade associations) typically choose lobbying 
techniques that differ from those of public interest groups and non-profit sectors (e.g. civil environmental groups). 
The nature of the policy issues influences a group’s lobbying strategy. In the US, for instance, higher education 
associations are occupationally based non-profit associations and generally fall into the category of non-profit 
sector. Cook, Gais and Walker suggest that such occupationally based non-profit associations are organised around 
an economic interest or livelihood and therefore appear to have more self-interest than citizen groups when 
lobbying, and they usually lobby much the same way that citizen groups do (Cook, 1998, pp. 139-140; Gais & 
Walker, 1991, pp. 117-119; Schlozman & Tierney, 1986, p. 431).  
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(SOEs) in one sector, the weaker the role played by trade associations (Deng & Kennedy, 2010, 
pp. 117, 114). Why? 
In an economic sector that is dominated by a few leading SOEs, the large, elite firms are often 
able to capitalise on their considerable resources and direct ties with the officialdom to 
influence public policy. They are highly proactive and employ a wide range of lobbying tactics 
(Kennedy, 2008, pp. 163-167). In addition, the lack of legitimacy of lobbying in China (Cheng, 
2006, pp. 44,47-48; Cheng et al., 2003, p. 63; Kennedy, 2009, pp. 213-214) and the political 
constraints over interest groups and social associations often weaken and restrict the role that 
trade associations can play (Kennedy, 2008, pp. 163, 171; Unger & Chan, 2008). Kennedy 
concludes that both ‘economic conditions’ (e.g., the size of a firm, and the level of competition 
and market concentration of the sector) and ‘political context’ (e.g., political institutions and 
official norms) shape businesses’ behaviour and choices on their collective actions as well as 
the businessgovernment interactions (Kennedy, 2008, pp. 163-174).67  
Despite their different socio-economic characteristics,68 and the particular ambit of their 
operation, the major Chinese research universities to a certain extent resemble large SOEs. In 
particular, both have close ties and proximity to the state, and operate in the same political 
                                                          
67 Kennedy finds that economic circumstances and political context are significant factors that shape business-
government interactions across sectors and how businesses actually exert their influence. Economic factors are 
particularly salient, if not more than political factors. Economic factors include the level of economic competition 
and market concentration, and the dominance of SOEs or smaller firms in the sector, and firms’ own size. Political 
context (political institutions and official norms) includes, for instance, the state administrative and regulatory 
control of associations, the importance of direct political ties, the political system’s historical practice of 
compartmentalising information and semi-transparent processes, and unproductive formal institutions for 
aggregation of industry interests (Kennedy, 2008, pp. 163-164). As a result, attempts at influence peddling have 
been driven to take other forms. Lobbying is often highly fragmented, and companies rely on various informal 
tactics, from privately meeting with policymakers to influencing the media (Kennedy, 2009, pp. 213-214). 
Businesses mostly interact directly with the state on policy, not relying on trade associations, and they avoid 
challenging the government’s authority. Instead, deference to the state and finding win-win outcomes is the most 
common strategy (Kennedy, 2008). 
68 Unlike either enterprises (marketing private goods) or government institutions (providing public goods) (R. Zhang, 
2011, pp. 104-105), universities are quasi-public organisations (providing quasi-public goods) with concentrated 
knowledge, unique socio-economic attributes and functions, peculiar internal institutional structure, as well as 
independent and academic organisational value and culture. This distinctive nature of universities guides their 
operation and behaviour, and determines how they relate to and interact with the government and society (Zijie 
Huang & Cheng, 2010, pp. 190-192; Junzong Zhang, 2004, pp. 8-9). Higher education institutions are also 
particularly sensitive and reactive to any changes to the institutional environment where they operate (J. Lin, 2004, 
p. 23). 
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economy and political system.69 The Chinese university sector is highly competitive but 
dominated by a small number of large, elite players (major research universities) in terms of 
size, capacity, influence, performance, productivity, and resources, none of which has a 
monopolistic position. These universities are subject to significant central control and the 
functional and administrative alignment with the state bureaucracy. They also heavily rely on 
the government’s funding resources and education policies rather than their market position. 
These attributes may add more distinctiveness to Chinese universities’ lobbying behaviour, 
affecting their motivations, logic of actions, and extent of political influence. 
In many countries such as the US, the UK, and Australia, there are various active associations 
and lobby groups of universities, which are independent, incorporated organisations and legal 
entities. Examples include the elite advocacy groups such as the Association of American 
Universities (AAU, 2015a, 2015b; Cook, 1998, pp. 90-91), the UK’s Russell Group (Russell 
Group, 2015a, 2015b), and the Group of Eight Australia (Go8, 2015, 2016a, 2016b), all of which 
are formed by member universities based on their common interests, and have established a 
permanent secretariat. These university groups focus on influencing national higher education 
and research policy, and play an important role in the development of the university sector. 
They address institutional issues and government actions that affect universities, lead national 
higher education policy debates, submit policy proposals and present policy analysis, engage 
with the media to influence the public society, and even openly challenge the authorities on 
policy issues (AAU, 2015b; Cook, 1998, pp. 145-146; Go8, 2016b; Russell Group, 2015b).   
So is there a role or space for interest associations or policy advocacy groups in the Chinese 
university system? If so, are they weak or powerful? Would elite universities have similar or 
opposite preferences and attitudes towards collective strategies as those of businesses about 
trade associations? More importantly, what factors determine the elite universities’ choices on 
their interest alignment and joint lobbying?  
This chapter follows the story of the creation, consolidation and decline of a university interest 
coalition known as ‘C9’, the first of its kind in China. Through tracing the long journey of the 
C9, we will gain an in-depth insight into the practices and limitations around the interest 
alignment and collective actions by the leading Chinese research universities in this unique 
political and social context. I will also identify some key factors that shape their collective 
lobbying and outcomes, and briefly discuss the main differences between universities and 
business which are outlined in Kennedy’s and others’ work. 
                                                          
69 For instance, the authoritarian political system promotes opaque policy process, lacks formal institutions for 
bottom-up initiatives, and has an aversion to lobby groups, by which both business and universities are affected. 
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Much of the information in this chapter derives from personal interviews, meeting documents, 
media reports and literature, as well as personal observations through my direct interactions 
with the C9 members and frequent involvement in their joint activities. 
Rising stars 
PKU, one of the most prestigious universities in China, was celebrating its Centenary in May 
1998. The occasion required an exceptional speaker. With the support of the MoE and the 
Beijing municipal government, the university invited then President Jiang Zemin. PKU’s 
cautious suggestions on the content of the leader’s speech included a sentence on the 
promotion of ‘socialist world-class universities’. Jiang decided to be even bolder and removed 
the word ‘socialist’. The goal of ‘building world-class universities’ thus became the central 
phrase of Jiang’s celebratory remarks. The education bureaucracy of MoE and the media 
drummed up the new slogan, and university officials and academics participated in public 
sessions to study Jiang’s ‘important speech’. PKU and Tsinghua, officially and widely recognised 
as the two most prestigious and influential Chinese universities, seized this opportunity and 
jointly lobbied the government to put their money where their mouth was. 
It was the beginning of Project 985 (as in 1998, May), formally launched the following year to 
promote a substantial upgrade in infrastructure and research capacity in these two universities 
and build them to be China’s first world-class universities. An unprecedented amount of 
special central funding entered their coffers, with an initial payment of 3.6 billion yuan for the 
first three years (round one) (Min & Wen, 2010, pp. 105-110; Guobing Zhang, 2010, pp. 59-62). 
Collective actions between the top two players played a powerful role in strengthening the 
advocacy on the centrality of research and education for China’s future development 
strategies. The MoE was also an important actor in this process, advising on and assisting the 
two institutions’ collaboration, and promoting Jiang’s speech and ‘985’ proposal to the central 
bureaucracy and public opinion (Guobing Zhang, 2010, pp. 60-62). 
Later in 1999, another seven elite national research universities were handpicked by the 
government and added to the prestigious Project 985 funding list. The seven institutions were: 
Fudan University (Fudan); Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU); Nanjing University (NJU); 
Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT); University of Science and Technology of China (USTC); 
Xi’an Jiaotong University (XJTU); and Zhejiang University (ZJU). As a result of the significant 
investment, they have achieved rapid growth and strong performance (Jinchun Li, 2007, p. 49). 
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Despite further expansion of the Project 985 in the following years,70 these nine institutions 
continue to be referred to as ‘the first nine’ (qian jiu suo 前九所), which sets their elite status 
apart from other Chinese national universities. Among the nine, a de facto ‘2+7’ structure is 
widely acknowledged and the dominant role of the two backbone universities PKU and 
Tsinghua remains explicit, which has had a long-term impact on the relationships between the 
nine universities.  
Fast-forward to November 2002. The 16th Party Congress had just appointed a new leadership 
in President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. The initial years of the decade were a difficult 
time for the country, with SARS hitting Chinese cities and the consequences of global 
downturns affecting China in various ways. Wen was widely believed to have an aversion to 
elitism and was willing to curb inequality in favour of a more equitable distribution of 
resources in society. This was also true of education. Suddenly Project 985 was on a shaky 
ground, facing principled opposition at the highest level. The elite national research 
institutions were concerned, as the failed extension of the funding scheme would be a 
significant setback. The universities known for their fierce competition suddenly found 
common ground. 
In 2003, they organised, at Tsinghua University in Beijing, the first of what would become a 
series of annual symposia on ‘Building world-class universities’ (Tsinghua, 2003, p. 104; Zhong 
Zhou, 2010). Their joint goal was to prove to the leadership, with scientific methods, that 
Chinese academic institutions were far behind the world leaders in education and research, 
and that sustained Project 985 funding was imperative for China to catch up with the rest of 
the world. The MoE agreed and supported, and worked behind the scenes for the same goal. 
They successfully mobilised national media outlets to receive extensive media coverage and 
public reports. In particular, at this 2003 symposium, SJTU’s education research team unveiled 
the ‘Academic Ranking of World Universities’ (ARWU), demonstrating the disadvantaged 
positions of Chinese universities in the global index. In that ranking, Tsinghua, the top Chinese 
university, sat at around place 250, while PKU came in second at around 300 (ARWU, 2003). 
While the 2003 Tsinghua symposium was a larger affair, with a dozen national universities 
participating, university leaders described it to me as the first real collective lobbying action by 
                                                          
70 More Chinese universities were admitted into the Project 985 in the later years during the further development 
phases of ‘Project 985’. Its members increased from nine in 1999 to 39 in 2011. In December 2011, Education 
Minister Yuan Guiren concluded that after a few rounds of project expansion in the last decade, the highly 
successful ‘985’ project would remain at their current scale from now on and no more universities would be added 
to the ‘985’ project (Xinhuanet, 2011). See Appendix D for the full list of Project 985 members. 
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the ‘2+7’ group. During the symposium, participating universities held split views and debated 
on ‘elitism’ versus ‘equity’ in the 985 funding allocations. Some suggested that if the 
concentration of resources flowed only to the few top universities, it would adversely restrain 
other universities’ development and growth. The Project 985 funding strategy was a national 
matter, affecting the entire university sector rather than just a few elite institutions. Yet, the 
‘2+7’ members argued that it would be a wise strategy for the government to prioritise and 
concentrate its limited resources on a small number of leading players to lift them to a world-
class status. They emphasised that China should take advantage of its old tradition and Deng 
Xiaoping’s slogan of ‘concentrating energy on the targeted areas (key stakeholders) to 
accomplish large undertakings’.71 They also argued that leading universities would value their 
significant national missions and social responsibilities; as the vanguards, their breakthroughs 
and achievements would drive the development of other universities and the entire sector 
(Tsinghua, 2003, p. 106).  
On the day when the Tsinghua symposium concluded, a number of participants (university 
executives and higher education experts) from the ‘2+7’ institutions gathered for an informal 
dinner to celebrate the successful event and discuss collaboration strategies. Over dinner, they 
formed a consensus that the symposium served as an important policy advocacy platform and 
should be held every year. They agreed to extend it amongst the nine members, as they 
shared significant common interests, strived for the same goal, and faced similar policy and 
development challenges. A participant in that fateful dinner explained to me how the 
membership of the nine was discussed: 
We agreed that night that we had to establish and define some boundaries and 
thresholds for the symposia membership. If all 985 members were included in this 
annual symposium, it would be too difficult for us to manage. Not that we wanted to 
exclude anyone intentionally … Additionally, within the ‘nine’, the top two members 
Tsinghua and PKU preferred to call the network ‘2+7’ rather than ‘nine’, which would 
differentiate their topmost status from the other seven. 
In May 2003, Tsinghua drafted an agreement to formalise the arrangement. It stated that 
Tsinghua and its Research Institute of Education intended to promote regular discussions on 
‘building world-class universities’ amongst the nine institutions through a series of annual 
symposia (yiliu daxue jianshe xilie yantaohui 一流大学建设系列研讨会). Given the top two 
leading players’ status, Tsinghua first sought endorsement from PKU. After the leaders of both 
universities signed this agreement, it was circulated to the president’s offices of the other 
                                                          
71 In Chinese, it is ‘jizhong liliang ban dashi’ (集中力量办大事). 
109 
seven institutions. Soon, this semi-formal collaborative framework was established, and the 
nine universities agreed to host the joint symposium on an annual rotation basis. 
Political patronage 
At this point, some MoE officials signalled to the nine universities that they would support and 
upgrade this elite ‘university symposia network’ to a ‘university alliance’. In particular, during 
an annual university consultation meeting in early 2004, an education vice minister held a 
private meeting with a few presidents from the nine institutions about this proposal.72 A 
university president who attended that meeting recalled:  
The minister asked us whether we would consider forming a new university group, 
something like a network or association of research universities. We discussed the idea 
at that meeting. Tsinghua University agreed to follow up and help draft a proposal on 
this initiative. Some logistical issues were later sorted, including the formal registration 
of a civil organisation supervised by the MoE … We then had another meeting at 
Tsinghua which involved a key MoE official … The MoE was involved in most of the 
following negotiation and progress of the group. 
Given that the Chinese government restricts associations or groups in important economic and 
societal areas (Unger & Chan, 2008, pp. 66-68), and that the MoE generally deals with 
universities separately, why was a formal alliance of elite universities more applauded than an 
informal network? One may see that formalising an elite university group was 
counterproductive for the MoE to maintain its authority and the order and equity agenda in 
the sector. 
There is a good explanation. At that critical time, the MoE was facing difficulties in securing a 
commitment from the top leadership for the future of Project 985 funds. The risk of losing 
Project 985 permanently was extremely high, with potential serious consequences. The 
suspension or loss of the 985 funding was the MoE’s greatest fear. It would considerably 
reduce the portfolio and resources of education and worsen the low-clout status of the 
ministry in the central bureaucracy. The desperate and low-profile MoE had to find a creative 
and potent way to promote Project 985, seek attention, maximise influence, and secure 
support from the leadership and key central organs. It believed that a collective advocacy and 
                                                          
72 As noted in Chapter 1, the MoE hosts the Chinese university consultation meeting (gaoxiao gongzuo zixunhui 高
校工作咨询会) at the end of each calendar year, attended by senior officials (e.g., state councillors and senior 
executives from the MoE and other ministries) as well as university leaders (presidents and party secretaries) from a 
wide range of universities. It invites national universities as well as a small number of local universities to 
participate. The meeting discussions are often considered for the MoE’s work plan for the following year. 
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voice of the presidents from the best Chinese universities would make an impact and help its 
case. It was a strategic decision to take advantage of the nine backbone universities of Project 
985, and mobilise a powerful policy advocacy group to jointly target and persuade the central 
decision-makers. Additionally, due to the MoE’s tight control over these universities, the risks 
of them challenging its authority would be relatively low. Hence, the MoE went against its 
normal preferences and practices, proposing to formalise a coalition of elite universities. 
Essentially, it was patronage from the MoE to advance certain interests within the 
government’s political structure. One interviewee recalled: 
In the MoE’s plan, this university alliance would not target the MoE, but the top leaders, 
the State Council, the Leading Small Group for Science, Technology and Education 
(LSGSTE), the National People’s Congress (NPC), the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), as well as the public. 
Because Tsinghua was nominated as the chair and the location of the secretariat of the group, 
the MoE provided guidance and assistance directly to Tsinghua to resolve the group’s legal and 
operational issues, including the formal application and registration with the Chinese Ministry 
of Civil Affairs as a civil group and the sponsorship of MoE as its supervisory authority.73 
Tsinghua also drafted a group constitution (zhangcheng 章程).74 Despite its policy advocacy in 
nature, the university coalition was self-portrayed as a ‘high-level education forum’ which 
would ‘drive the development of Chinese research universities and raise the public profile of 
higher education in China’. 
In early April 2004, SJTU hosted the second ‘Building world-class universities serial 
symposium’, which was chaired by the then SJTU President Xie Shengwu, and attended by the 
nine institutions and government officials from the MoE and the State Council.75 Its theme was 
‘Exploring and optimising funding resources to achieve development targets’. SJTU announced 
its latest results of Chinese universities’ positions in the ARWU world ranking system, 
highlighting the significant gaps and disadvantages between them and some leading foreign 
research institutions (ARWU, 2004b; Tsinghua, 2004). The nine universities again argued that 
                                                          
73 In China, all civil groups must be registered, authorised and supervised by a formal government agency. In this 
case, the MoE offered to sponsor the new group as its central supervisory organ. 
74 The constitution states that the group’s goal is to provide a high-level education forum on the development of 
leading research universities as well as on the higher education reforms, theories and practices, which helps build 
Chinese world-class universities. The group strives to raise education and research quality and performance, raise 
universities’ public profile, drive research universities’ development, and share research findings and work 
experiences (Tsinghua, 2004). 
75 The meeting attendees (60 people or so) included the officials from the MoE and the State Council. 
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the government should concentrate its limited resources on a few leading players to achieve 
the best outcomes. They suggested that it was imperative for the government to commence 
the second funding round of Project 985 as soon as possible, and give the leading research 
universities a greater institutional autonomy. 
As an important agenda of this symposium, the nine universities formally discussed a ‘self-
initiated’ university group.76 Tsinghua briefed on its preparation and progress, circulated the 
draft constitution, and iterated the group’s objectives and operation. Especially, Tsinghua 
presented its study on the successful international models of university groups, including the 
US’s AAU (Tsinghua, 2004, p. 120). However, the nine universities did not reach a formal 
agreement at the meeting, partially because several university presidents were absent, and 
partially due to a shared concern of the political sensitivity around formalising an interest 
coalition. In the end, the participants tentatively agreed to establish a group at ‘an appropriate 
time’. They emphasised that when established, the new group should ‘limit the size of its 
membership’, and should ‘handle the relationships with other universities discreetly’. 
Several participants of that meeting told me that they sensed an uneasiness during and after 
the meeting. Many felt that it was still too risky and premature to formalise a new policy-
focused university coalition at that time, despite the initial endorsement by some MoE 
officials. A C9 university president pointed out that the MoE also seemed to be pulling away its 
support: 
Despite its initial support, we sensed that the MoE had some hesitation and declining 
enthusiasm, so we just decided to let it [the proposal] sit for a period. However, our 
university coalition had already taken shape and solidified in practice, and the nine 
members had started collaborating closely, even though the group was not formally 
registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs as a civil organisation. 
The change of MoE’s attitude may be well explained by the fact that in early 2004, the national 
leadership eventually capitulated and accepted that Project 985 funding should continue, and 
that the top universities would enjoy the largest share of the funding. ‘Catching up with world-
class universities’ became more important than equity again. Maintaining the order of the 
                                                          
76 Based on the MoE’s advice, Tsinghua proposed that the group might be called ‘Association of Chinese Research 
Universities’ (ACRU) (zhongguo yanjiuxing daxue lianhehui 中国研究型大学联合会). This is not to be confused with 
the other association of research universities which was unsuccessfully proposed by Renmin University in 
20072008 (see Chapter 1 Footnote 34). 
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university sector also became more important. Hence the political urgency to support this 
university coalition and influence the national policy sharply declined. 
Nevertheless, undoubtedly the MoE played a key role during the early years of the group in 
providing political patronage, cultivating the idea of a university advocacy alliance, and 
facilitating the formalisation of the group. These leading universities saw the benefits of 
collective actions and were keen to sustain and strengthen their interest alignment to further 
advance their competitive advantages in the government policies. 
Consolidation: collective activities and advocacy 
The symposia in the following three years took place at Nanjing University (NJU), USTC and 
HIT, respectively. During this period, their lobby collaboration was further consolidated. The 
focus of their discussion had shifted from the conceptual analysis of the idea of world-class 
universities to specific government policies. The convenors of the symposia moved to their 
president’s offices and started to include more informal networking activities, including 
banquets, lab tours and local sightseeing.77 Journalists continued to be invited to the open 
sessions. 
The nine executive deans of graduate schools became highly active and collaborative. They 
held separate, concurrent joint sessions on specific policy issues during and between the 
symposia, which they also invited relevant government officials to participate. This helped 
them acquire policy updates, present policy concerns, and offer suggestions and 
recommendations directly to the government.78 
The nine university leaders played a growing part in driving the group activities, too. They 
began to hold a separate joint meeting during each symposium, attended by senior 
government representatives, where they discussed policy issues and strategies informally.79 
                                                          
77 In the earlier years of the symposia series, the main coordinators at each university were the policy research 
offices, higher education research institutes, as well as the 985/211 offices (often located within the graduate 
schools). 
78 For instance, in 2006, the meeting discussed the reform of the university admissions policies so as to increase the 
universities’ autonomy in selecting and recruiting students. In 2007, the meeting discussed national policies and 
university operational issues including increasing institutional autonomy on the use of government funds, and the 
reform of university human resources system. 
79 The attending government officials varied each year. They often came from the MoE and the Academic Degrees 
Committee of the State Council (located at the MoE), the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and others. Within the 
MoE, the participating officials regularly came from the MoE Department of Higher Education, the MoE Department 
of Development and Planning, and others. The university leaders often asked these participating officials to brief 
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They agreed that the attendance of all nine presidents was important and hence should be 
mandated. If a university president was unable to join the annual symposium, the party 
secretary of that university (who generally doubles as chairman of university council and the 
top party representative of a university) or a vice president would fill in.80 The MoE and State 
Council were frequently involved in these activities. In addition, after each of their annual 
symposia and presidents meetings concluded, the nine universities submitted a joint report to 
the relevant government departments, summarising the universities’ policy discussions and 
advocacy. 
A university president said: 
Each year we focused on the current, major policy issues at our annual joint meetings. 
Our discussions and views were often picked up by the government and media, shaping 
forthcoming policy agendas and directions, and impacting on the sector and society. 
On one side, they promoted a generic, pro-education agenda with a big-picture, in-principle 
approach. For instance, they drummed up the importance of the strategy to ‘build world-class 
universities’, and the central role of Projects 985 and 211. They appealed for a higher funding 
rate for each university student and a regular increase of the central budgetary allocations for 
national education. They asked the government to remove rigid restrictions and frequent 
audits for the spending of the government funds, and to allow universities to have a greater 
discretion on student selection and admissions. They advised the government on the reform 
for the central university entrance examinations, the degrees awarding system, as well as 
research training models. In particular, they pushed for an ‘institutional governance reform for 
modern universities’ to enhance the power and autonomy of university academics. 
Apparently, these issues largely reflected their own policy concerns, firsthand experiences and 
development priorities. Yet, they were also long-term challenges affecting many other 
universities. Hence, by taking the lead to negotiate these issues with the government through 
collective actions, the group played a positive role in seeking resolutions and improvements, 
                                                          
them on current policy issues, such as the policy plans and measures for the undergraduate recruitment reform and 
the postgraduate entrance examination reform. 
80 In terms of the internal hierarchy in universities, university presidents are in charge of daily academic and 
professional operations, but they are supervised by their party secretaries (who double as chair of the university 
council) and need their approval on significant institutional matters. Chapter 2 and Diagram 2.1 provide details 
about their roles in the senior university management system. In addition, notably, not all the university leaders 
participated in their joint meetings in 2003, 2004 and 2005. In 2006, however, all the nine university leaders 
attended the forum.  
114 
which would benefit other stakeholders in the higher education community and society at 
large. 
On the other, they focused on three specific areas of joint advocacy, and adopted a focused, 
localised approach to advance their special interests and competitive advantage.  
First, they debated with other national institutions on the ‘elitism versus equity’ models for 
allocation of the government funds, and strongly advocated that the state should concentrate 
its financial resources on a small number of elite players. Since 1999, other national 
institutions had actively lobbied the state for their fair share of the 985 investments, which 
resulted in the expansions of Project 985 membership. The inclusion of more institutions 
unavoidably led to a dilution of the central resources. Hence, to prevent its further expansion, 
since 2003, the nine promoted a performance-based, high-entry point threshold for any 
university to enter the Project 985, and a regular accreditation and periodic performance 
review system.  
Additionally, in order to maintain their large share of the funding, they jointly advocated 
‘funding concentration’ and ‘separate funding’ strategies. For instance, at one joint meeting, 
the nine members drafted and proposed a long-term strategic plan (to 2020) for future Project 
985, based on the needs of the ‘comprehensive development of the top-tier universities’. In 
the proposal, university presidents outlined their achievements as a result of Projects 985 and 
211 funds, and called for a separate set of funding conditions for the first nine universities to 
further strengthen their development. Moreover, over the years, they highlighted their leading 
role in the ‘national mission to advance science and education’ and ‘building a knowledge 
economy’, which was shaped by the official directives, commitments and language. They 
repeatedly employed the rhetoric and slogans of the state to legitimise and frame their claims, 
such as ‘concentrating energy on the targeted areas (key stakeholders) to accomplish large 
undertakings’ (jizhong liliang ban dashi 集中力量办大事), and ‘achieving breakthroughs 
through prioritisation’ (zhongdian tupo 重点突破).  
Second, the group advocated that privileged treatment and a much greater institutional 
autonomy should be provided to the nine leading players, so that they could achieve world-
class quality sooner, set up successful exemplary models in the sector, and help develop sound 
public policies. These privileges would include favourable student admission quotas, relaxed 
university personnel policies, greater flexibility for their use of government funds, generous 
operational expenditures, a higher government funding rate for each student at the nine 
institutions, as well as a separate quality assessment and evaluation system. In particular, they 
proactively pursued opportunities and permissions to undertake new policy innovation and 
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reform trials at their institutions.81 They argued that as the most reputable and mature 
Chinese universities, their local policy trials would be able to provide good examples, test new 
ideas, and reduce the risks and drawbacks often caused by broader reforms. Essentially, the 
goal of such experimentation was to seek legitimate privileges and competitive advantages in 
autonomy and resources. Individually and collectively, the special, trial policies they advocated 
included a pilot trial of autonomous student selection, new research training models, PhD 
admissions reform, and the elimination of standardised national postgraduate entrance exams. 
For example, in 2007 and the following years, the group collectively lobbied the state for a 
local policy trial of ‘PhD admissions reform’ at their institutions, with the aim to lift policy 
restrictions and increase allocated student quotas in their recruitment of PhD students. They 
organised joint group meetings with officials and also interacted with them separately. In 
addition to presenting data, facts and policy analysis, the nine members kept reminding these 
officials that they had the moral support and backing from the top leaders who handpicked 
them to ‘build Chinese world-class universities’ as a national strategic priority. They claimed 
that the current policy restrictions of PhD admissions severely hindered universities’ 
development and undermined their fulfilment of the national goals and missions. They 
pleaded that it was an obligation and responsibility of the central government bureaucracy to 
support their endeavours, alter the policy parameters, and deliver on the leaders’ directives. 
There would be ‘negative consequences’ if the relevant departments did not make the 
changes soon. In the end, they received the permission for a 10% annual increase in PhD 
admissions in exchange for an increased efficiency with non-performing students,82 which was 
a much greater allowance than other universities. This was seen as a significant success in a 
policy area that had long been off limits for any negotiation.  
As an interviewee heavily involved in the policy trial suggested, this special policy trial had 
‘opened the door’ to a greater flexibility and incremental reform for the future. Once the 
                                                          
81 Policy experimentation has a long tradition in China. Sebastian Heilmann has observed an unorthodox 
combination of novel policy experimentation with long-term policy prioritisation in China over the last few decades 
in the economy field, which is characterised by ‘foresighted tinkering’ (Heilmann, 2009). Heilmann observes that the 
Chinese point-to-surface approach entails a policy process that is initiated from individual ‘experimental points’ and 
driven by local initiative with the formal or informal backing of higher-level policy-makers. If judged conducive by 
the government, the ‘model experiences’ from the initial experiments will be disseminated, refined and expanded 
to more and more regions (Heilmann, 2008, pp. 2-4, 29-30). Such approach is in fact commonly seen and well 
developed in education policies. I will discuss this more in Chapter 5. 
82 A policy green light was eventually given to the C9 members, but with certain conditions. As a compromise, the 
C9 agreed to a 10% elimination rate of poor performing PhD students, in order to ensure quality. 
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thinking of the government has some ‘inertia’ (guanxing siwei 惯性思维), it will lead to a long-
term, regular increase. He added: 
Our universities will continue to negotiate and push for a larger increase each year—
10% this time, 20% the next. This policy [trial] has helped increase the autonomy in this 
area for other national universities too and ultimately benefited the entire sector. 
Third, the nine universities cautiously sought the government’s recognition and endorsement 
of their formal grouping with ‘the top nine’ branding. Having been increasingly exposed to the 
experience of university groups internationally, the nine agreed that forming a university 
coalition with like-minded peers would maximise their mutual interests and policy influence, as 
well as help achieve their individual goals. By formalising their collective brand and quality 
threshold, they would strengthen their privileged, leading status in the competitive sector, and 
secure their funding concentration and greater autonomy. If successful, the establishment of 
their elite university group would become China’s first of its kind and a significant new 
experiment in the sector. 
However, it was a tough issue. Social groups and associations were tightly regulated by the 
Chinese government. The tension between the nine and the other universities was growing. 
The MoE had reduced its support and involvement in the group since the Project 985 crisis 
ended in 2004. In facing these obstacles, the nine institutions spent several years testing the 
waters, setting the scene and laying the foundation. 
The university leaders publicly promoted the importance of their ‘grouping’ for the country 
and the potential win-win outcomes. They also acted prudently and highlighted their loyalty 
and commitment to the government and its directives. For instance, in 2005, the then Nanjing 
University President Jiang Shusheng, who was chair of the 2005 symposium, made an opening 
address stressing that the nine universities had a strong sense of national responsibility and 
faith, and should strengthen their concrete collaboration and take some coordinated actions 
on common policies. Their network would facilitate China’s goal of developing world-class 
universities (NJU, 2005). In 2006, the group chair, USTC Party Secretary Guo Chuanjie, 
reiterated that university coalitions such as the US’s AAU played an important part in driving 
the development of the higher education sectors in their countries and the world. Similarly, 
the nine Chinese research universities’ collaboration network should be strengthened to 
advance Chinese higher education’s world-class development (USTC, 2006). Again, in 2007 the 
nine university leaders promoted their joint view that as the research leaders shared national 
responsibilities and common goals, their coalition should be crystallised and endorsed by the 
nation. They argued that they should not fight alone and single-handed, instead they should 
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grow and mature together through positive interactions. Forming a research university 
coalition was the global trend and practice, and should also be considered in China. In that 
year, a formal collaboration agreement for research training was signed by the nine 
universities (HIT, 2007).  
As they had agreed at the 2004 joint meeting, they had been ‘waiting for the right time’ and 
preparing for the next significant milestone of the group. 
Formal establishment: C9 coalition 
In October 2008, Zhejiang University (ZJU) hosted the group’s annual symposium and the joint 
presidents’ meeting in Hangzhou, in which various government officials participated. Apart 
from the usual public campaign for a university coalition, the nine leaders had one important 
agenda item for their private meeting: the formal establishment of a new university group. 
As an unusual move, they invited Australia’s Group of Eight (Go8) Executive Director Michael 
Gallagher to present at the private presidents’ meeting, attended by a deputy education 
minister. It was the first time they had ever involved a foreign group in their joint activities. 
The Go8 was asked to deliver a presentation on the grouping of Australian leading research 
universities, and share its experience on how the Go8 was established and operated, how it 
worked with the Australian federal government, and how it benefited and facilitated the 
development of Go8 members and the Australia’s higher education sector in general. The 
motive was explicit. The nine universities mobilised a third-party ally and foreign expert to help 
their case and enhance their capacity of persuasion. A participant in that meeting recalled: 
We required ‘external forces’ to push things forward. Go8 could help lobby and 
persuade our government from a foreign expert and objective advisor’s perspective 
about the value of a Chinese elite university group. Sometimes, ‘foreign pressure’ is 
more influential and effective in interacting with our government. 
The presentation went well. The meeting participants nodded in approval, including the vice 
minister. After the Go8 representatives left the meeting room, they continued their private 
discussion with the MoE officials. A few moments later, the presidents re-emerged at the 
dinner reception. The exciting news was out: the presidents received the tacit approval of the 
government on the establishment of a group; and they also discussed and agreed to the ‘group 
constitution’ drafted by ZJU. Interestingly, the officials informally suggested that the new 
group should be named ‘jiuxiao lianxi huiyi’ (九校联席会议) in Chinese.83 The carefully chosen 
                                                          
83 In Chinese society, the group is also often called as ‘the coalition of nine schools’ (jiuxiao lianmeng 九校联盟). 
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Chinese name refers to a ‘forum’ or ‘joint meeting’ of nine universities, demonstrating a 
voluntary and informal arrangement, rather than a formal, consolidated alliance. This vague 
language was also meant to avoid legal and financial accounting complexities, and to reduce 
tension arising from concerns of other Chinese universities. In contrast, the group named itself 
differently in English as ‘Consortium of China Nine Research Universities’ or ‘C9’, which 
projected a more ‘radical’ stance and confident image as a formalised group to international 
partners. 
Shortly after this joint event, the group establishment document was finalised and signed by 
the nine presidents. A copy was also sent to the MoE. The first self-initiated elite university 
coalition in China was officially established, discreetly and quietly. The nine presidents had 
unanimously agreed to keep low key about this historic development without attracting too 
much attention. They wanted to move gradually and avoid domestic tension. They saw their 
arrangement evolving over several years towards a more definite organisation. 
Group’s operational agreement 
So what did they agree to in 2008 as a group? According to the C9’s mission and operational 
guidelines listed in the minutes of the meeting (C9, 2008), the objectives of the new group 
included: to strengthen the communications and collaborations among the nine universities; 
to build world-class universities and lead the development of China’s higher education system; 
to raise the Chinese universities’ profile and influence in the global academia; to enhance C9’s 
international engagement and dialogue with other international university consortia and 
leading universities; and to strengthen China’s capacity and efforts to solve the global and 
regional challenges. 
In terms of operation, the group maintained the annual chair rotation system;84 the executive 
chair and secretariat of C9 (the host university of the annual symposium and the presidents’ 
meeting) would rotate yearly amongst the nine members; and the director of the president’s 
office of the host university would act as secretary general for that year. 
The annual C9 presidents’ meeting would continue to be held during the annual symposia 
series on ‘building world-class universities’. However, if necessary, the executive chair could 
                                                          
84 The C9 has adopted an annual chair rotation system amongst the nine presidents without a permanent 
secretariat. C9 presidents usually decide their next chair at their annual meeting. When a C9 president is selected to 
be the forthcoming chair, s/he will host the following year’s C9 annual meeting on a specific theme and act as a 
group coordinator during a certain timeframe. However, the hand-over procedure and timeline between the 
current and next chairs have been unclear and controversial. 
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convene special C9 high-level meetings to discuss important agenda related to the 
collaboration of the nine universities. 
In relation to group branding, the nine members would explore the options to create an official 
C9 website, design a C9 logo, and establish an IT platform for group communications and 
resource sharing, as well as form a C9 brand by promoting joint academic and social activities. 
Last, but not least, the nine members agreed to strengthen their cooperation on education, 
research, community engagement, and talent training. Regular meetings and seminars would 
be organised for C9 offices with equivalent administrative functions, such as directors of policy 
and planning, and directors of teaching affairs.85 
‘Policy influencing’ and ‘policy advocacy’ were never mentioned, although these had been 
central to the group activities since 2003 and would continue to be. Avoiding the association of 
the C9 with a lobby group was critical. As my interviewees said, the government might have 
informally accepted the C9 as a platform for collaboration, but it ‘would never formally 
legitimise or support its bottom-up lobbying role’, as it implied the risk of ‘political challenge, 
contention or [organised] resistance against the authority’. A university president suggested to 
me that this group would only survive if it avoided defining, labelling and behaving like a lobby 
group. 
The C9 did not incorporate or apply to become a civil association. Such a legal formalisation 
was thought would touch the nerves of the government and other universities. 
Public announcement 
In 2009, XJTU became the new symposium host and chair of C9 presidents’ meeting. It decided 
to seize the opportunity and formally publicise the new C9 group through a high-profile event 
in Xi’an. On 9th October 2009, XJTU invited Zhao Xinping, who had just retired as deputy 
education minister, to address the annual symposium.86 It also mobilised third-party allies, 
                                                          
85 During 20082009, the C9 started to expand and deepen the group cooperation at other levels of key university 
personnel, such as C9 directors of policy and planning, directors of teaching affairs, and directors of president’s 
offices. In addition to the presidents and C9 executive deans of graduate studies who usually held regular, separate 
meeting sessions, other C9 sub-committees have also gradually formed their own regular meeting mechanisms. 
New ideas raised and formed by C9 presidents were passed onto the relevant C9 sub-committees of equivalent 
administrative roles to follow up and operationalise. 
86 Zhao publicly praised and endorsed the group at the opening. He said, ‘The annual joint meetings of the nine 
universities have been very important. This is the seventh year and the first one held in our western region … It has 
provided a fantastic opportunity for us to discuss the issues of building world-class universities … I hope that the 
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higher education experts, to speak at the event on the global trends and benefits of forming 
university coalitions (XJTU, 2009; Zhao, 2009).87 
More importantly, XJTU organised a formal signing ceremony for a C9 group agreement by the 
nine university leaders, witnessed by the government and media. This agreement derived from 
the 2008 C9 document, explicitly confirming their decision of formal grouping, and outlined 
their key collaborative areas.88 This news quickly attracted widespread attention, and pushed 
the elite C9 group into the public spotlight. 
News reports and online discussions about the new powerful ‘C9 coalition’ surged. Several C9 
presidents accepted media interviews to improve the public understanding and support of the 
group.89 For instance, SJTU President Zhang Jie spoke with China National Radio (CNR) on 14 
October 2009 (CNR, 2009): 
This group is a collective alliance of China’s nine leading, comprehensive 
universities … The C9 embodies Chinese characteristics and a Chinese model [of higher 
education]. It brings together the power of a few universities with similar characteristics 
to help build Chinese world-class universities collaboratively.  
The rise of the C9 attracted wide discussions and different reactions. Especially, scepticism and 
criticisms quickly grew within the sector. The leaders of some other national universities 
attempted to join this elite group, but became bitter and angry when they were rejected. They 
openly slammed and challenged the group, defining it as an ‘exclusive, self-interested 
university presidents club’, and accusing the C9 of ‘disadvantaging other national institutions’ 
                                                          
joint meetings of nine will become more and more successful, and will deepen exchanges and consolidate joint 
work, and engage with the world better’ (XJTU, 2009; Zhao, 2009). 
87 The head of Research Institute for Educational Policy and Law, Beijing Normal University, for instance, spoke at 
the conference. He said that under the current circumstances, it was imperative to form university coalitions and 
share resources, and the grouping of universities was a trend and direction for the development of higher 
education. 
88The full title of the agreement is ‘Agreement on talent training collaboration and exchange’ (rencai peiyang hezuo 
yu jiaoliu xieyishu 人才培养合作与交流协议书). The agreement included the following objectives: to carry out 
undergraduate exchange and postgraduate joint training; complete credit recognition among the nine members; 
host joint C9 summer schools; strengthen collaboration with the US’s Ivy League and Australia’s Go8; establish a 
joint C9 website; establish a joint online review system for PhD theses evaluation; carry out joint work on teaching 
material and teaching reform; develop joint academic programs and online education portal; hold joint 
undergraduate internship programs; and drive national research training reform (Q. Wang, 2009; XJTU, 2009; Zhao, 
2009). 
89 They included the then Zhejiang University President Yang Wei, Fudan University President Yang Yuliang, Xi’an 
Jiaotong University President Zheng Nanning, and Shanghai Jiao Tong University President Zhang Jie. 
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and ‘damaging the equity of the sector’. Some even made formal complaints to the MoE, 
urging the government to intervene and dismiss it.90 Many believed that the C9’s 
establishment was too sensitive and controversial to succeed in such a context. 
Despite its informal involvement and acknowledgement of the group, the MoE remained 
obscure and silent about the C9 in public. It was indeed caught in a dilemma in the debate and 
pressure from the sector. The only time it formally commented on the C9 was at a MoE media 
conference on 26th October 2009. When asked by a journalist about the government’s view on 
the C9 coalition, the MoE spokeswoman Xu Mei made the following statement (China News, 
2009): 
There is an Ivy League in the US, which includes top institutions like Harvard and Yale. 
We recently saw that there is a similar university coalition called the Group of Eight in 
Australia, which includes prestigious Australian universities such as the University of 
Sydney and the University of Melbourne. We have also noticed that a joint collaboration 
agreement was signed by the first nine university entrants in Project 985, including 
Peking, Tsinghua and Fudan. The coalition of the nine institutions is a very beneficial 
and advantageous exploration for China to build high-level universities, train elite and 
innovative talents, as well as strengthen international collaborations. The MoE has a 
positive and supportive attitude towards this coalition.  
In addition to this positive comment, a dedicated ‘C9’ webpage was added to the homepage of 
a website of the Academic Degrees Committee of the State Council, which doubled as the MoE 
Department of Postgraduate Education and was chaired by a state councillor. The page 
included the following line, ‘As a result of the establishment of the coalition by nine prestigious 
Chinese universities, China’s very first elite university league was born’ (CDGDC, 2009). The 
party-controlled People’s Daily also set up a special English web section to introduce the C9. 
The page noted, ‘In 2009, nine Chinese universities formalised an elite group to foster better 
students and share their resources. This group is called C9 League, China’s Ivy League (People's 
Daily, 2009).’ 
                                                          
90 For instance, there were numerous reports and recounts that the then President of Renmin University, Gu Jibao, 
a former head of the MoE research and development centre, had tried to pressure the C9 universities to accept his 
university to join the C9 group. When he failed, the university slammed the C9, questioned its legitimacy and urged 
the MoE to suspend it. 
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Retreat and decline 
Despite the above acknowledgement by the state, the C9 very soon encountered explicit 
pushbacks from the MoE. For instance, the C9 was ignored when it sought the MoE’s 
permission to set up a permanent secretariat. This was ironic given that it had been the MoE 
itself that proposed a permanent secretariat at Tsinghua for the group in 2004. The C9’s initial 
intention was to avoid a permanent secretariat in order to minimise political sensitivity and 
tension. However, since 2008, the lack of a stable, central coordination support and the 
difficulties in undertaking collaborative activities suggested the need for a more permanent 
structure. At the end of 2009, a C9 presidents’ delegation visited the Go8 Secretariat and Go8 
universities in Australia. Upon its return, the delegation submitted a joint C9 report to the 
MoE, outlining the things they learnt from their Australian counterpart during the trip, 
including the importance of a permanent secretariat to facilitate the group activities and 
operation. It pleaded for the government’s permission and support for the C9 to set up a 
similar secretariat. The MoE never responded. 
In the years following the group’s formal establishment, the annual symposia and presidents’ 
meetings proceeded as agreed, yet the C9 achieved much more on its internal academic and 
professional exchanges as well as international collaboration than in its policy interactions with 
the government. 
Internally, the group deepened its cooperation at various management and academic levels 
and continued to hold regular professional meetings (for example, amongst directors of policy 
and planning and deans of undergraduate education). Increasingly, the members shared best 
practices and strategies in operational areas including academic and research management, 
information management, and the reporting and auditing system. After the establishment of 
the C9, the internal undergraduate and postgraduate student exchanges had grown and 
expanded. The C9 deans of graduate schools remained actively engaged with officials and 
achieved some success in certain policy trials, such as the PhD admissions reform and increase 
of student quotas by 10% from 2012. However, competition and conflicts of interest did exist 
amongst the nine members, especially in the areas of student recruitment and government 
funding. In 20102011, for instance, some members could not agree on a joint C9 
undergraduate student recruitment policy trial, so they went separate ways and teamed up 
with some other national universities to conduct the trial. 
Internationally, the C9 presidents promoted the ‘C9’ branding and strengthened partnerships 
with other leading university groups. For instance, in the 2010 presidents’ meeting in 
Shanghai, C9 presidents signed a collaborative framework Memorandum of Understanding 
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with Australia’s Go8. In 2012, the Go8, AAU and the League of European Research Universities 
(LERU) attended the C9 meetings to exchange views on global world-class universities and 
explore collaboration options. In 2013, particularly, the C9 signed a joint Hefei Statement on 
the ‘ten characteristics of contemporary research universities’ with other international 
university groups, including AAU, LERU and Go8 (Go8 et al., 2013). However, the C9’s practical 
activities with its international partners seemed to have been restrained by its lack of a 
permanent secretariat. 
In the domestic environment, the C9 maintained a humble and cautious approach when facing 
the government and other universities’ scrutiny. Importantly, despite the group’s formal 
establishment, it continued to operate in an unstructured, informal manner without a central 
office, and was often referred to as a ‘loose network’ or ‘forum’. This reduced the collective 
policy influence of the group. 
In particular, despite their regular discussions on the group’s policy positions and strategies, 
the C9 presidents progressively reduced their policy collaboration and joint lobbying actions, 
and their joint meetings seemed to become more of a formality. For instance, at the 
presidents’ meetings in 2011 and 2012, university leaders deliberated the current policy issues 
and C9’s future development plan, including how to handle the tricky relationship with other 
non-C9 Project 985 universities, and how to strengthen their collective policy capacity and 
influencing. C9 presidents also invited senior MoE representatives to participate and share 
policy updates,91 and raised common concerns about some new policies and bring them to 
MoE officials’ attention. However, no concrete actions followed after these discussions. This 
lack of collective action amongst the presidents affected the group policy cooperation at other 
levels as well. In 20092010, C9 deans of graduate studies drafted a joint proposal letter to the 
government on graduate education policies, but the plan was soon abandoned because one of 
the C9 presidents refused to sign the letter. 
According to a university president, on one occasion, before the third round of Project 985 
funding was launched, the MoE submitted an operational plan for the project to the State 
Council. The C9 presidents were concerned by the MoE’s proposal, and they needed to act 
immediately before the policy decision was finalised. Hence, they made a bold decision to send 
an urgent joint petition letter directly to the state councillor in charge of education. 
                                                          
91 For example, in 2012, the head of a MoE department was invited to the C9 presidents’ meeting to provide 
briefing about the new national project ‘2011 Scheme’, including the current progress and structure of the draft 
policy and the involvement and advocacy of the Ministry of Finance in the policy. 
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This letter contained policy recommendations that were very different from what the MoE had 
proposed. The C9 explicitly advocated that the forthcoming round of Project 985 should 
provide a differentiated policy for C9 universities to strengthen their development and 
optimise their performance, including favourable funding, a separate evaluation system, as 
well as increased postgraduate recruitment quotas. All presidents signed the final letter, and 
one of them volunteered to hand it over to the state councillor in person, claiming that he had 
a good personal relationship with her. 
Yet, a week later, there was still no reaction, and concerned C9 presidents phoned the 
messenger to ask for news. It turned out that he had singlehandedly decided to pull out of the 
plan without informing or consulting the other presidents. Everyone was shocked that he had 
‘hijacked’ the letter and prevented it from going out to the government. He later explained to 
another C9 president that he did not want them to ‘take the risk of offending the MoE’, which 
might lead to political reprisals against the group, the universities and personal careers. 
After a number of similar attempts failed, one president openly expressed his frustration at a 
C9 presidents’ meeting: 
In the west, rules and principles usually come before real actions. In China, we tend to 
try things out and accumulate practical experiences before developing the rules. The 
C9 group now has accumulated nine or ten years’ experience—shouldn’t it be enough 
for us to take some real collective action?! 
Factors contributing to the decline 
There are a number of factors contributing to the decline of the C9. 
After the 20032004 crisis catalysed their collaboration, no other major crisis consolidated the 
need for close, joint actions. For instance, in 2010, another round of 985 funding was 
distributed to universities, followed by the MoE and MoF’s announcement of China’s 
Education Reform and Development Guideline (2010-2020), which promised that Project 985 
funding would be extended to 2020 (L. Xu, 2014a).92 The longer-term security placated the 
concerns of the university presidents. Despite their common interests in many other policy 
issues, the urgency, motivation and incentives to invest in collective lobbying actions declined. 
                                                          
92 In 2010, the national strategy of ‘building world-class universities’ and Project 985 were strengthened in the 
‘Medium and Long-term National Education Reform and Development Plan (2010-2020)’ as a policy priority 
(Xinhuanet, 2011). 
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This was particularly true of the most powerful universities PKU and Tsinghua which had 
already secured the ‘top two’ status and enjoyed special policy privileges. 
The political and regulatory environment also inhibited collective action. The powerful interest 
group faced political scrutiny, scepticism and restrictions from the state, which were 
exacerbated by the complaints and pressure of other universities.  
In the early years, the MoE was an important ally which helped cultivate and formalise the C9 
coalition and was heavily involved in its initial development. Yet, from 2009, the MoE became 
increasingly reluctant to legitimise the C9 group, despite its rising international reputation and 
domestic profile in recent years. Some key officials who personally supported the 
establishment of the C9 had left their senior positions, whereas their successors held a more 
sceptical view about the group. There was also a decreased urgency for a policy collaboration 
between the MoE and C9 universities on Project 985, compared to 2003 and 2004. Using the 
C9’s collective influence to lobby the central leadership and other ministries thus became 
much less important for the MoE.  
In the meantime, some universities vigorously attacked and criticised the so-called ‘exclusive 
university presidents club’, urging the MoE to dismiss the group and to maintain equity and 
fairness in the sector. In public meetings and official documents, the MoE avoided identifying 
or differentiating C9 universities from others in the sector.  
Most importantly, according to university executives, the MoE became increasingly suspicious 
of the C9, interpreting its ‘collective policy voice’ as ‘a political challenge or organised 
resistance against the authority’, ‘ganging up to resist the central control’, a ‘potential threat 
of authority’ and ‘source of instability’. It refused to support a C9 permanent secretariat. A C9 
university president told me that the government was constantly making disapproving 
gestures towards C9:  
It has often signalled us [presidents] many times that ‘I know you exist, but do not try 
to gang up on me, or communicate with me in this collective, group form.’ Collective 
actions really touch the nerves of the government and cause much political sensitivity. 
In 2012, Deputy Education Minster Du Yubo addressed the annual C9 symposium. The speech 
acknowledged the nine universities’ important national roles and its international 
collaboration, which seemingly signalled an official acceptance of the C9 as a formal alliance. 
However, Du and other government officials walked out of the conference venue as soon as 
they finished the government speeches, unwilling to stay and listen to the policy discussions 
during the presidents’ meeting. It was generally seen as a snub for the ideas of the C9. Such a 
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negative attitude significantly limited the C9’s lobbying opportunities and capacity. After all, a 
meaningful and effective policy dialogue requires an open ear on the government’s side. 
As several university leaders told me, the government might have informally accepted the C9 
as a platform for mutual collaboration, but it would always remain wary and hostile about this 
type of organised form of collective policy advocacy and reluctant to legitimise or engage with 
it. In practice, the MoE silently restrained this interest group to protect its own authority and 
maintain the original order of the sector. A university director of policy explained to me: 
The MoE has its concerns. China never had such an influential university coalition. The 
MoE does not want the C9 to exist in a formal, structured form, as it [C9] would become 
too substantial and independent. It would be too difficult for the MoE to keep it under 
control. In this sector controlled by the government, an independent university 
association has never been allowed to exist in China’s history.  
Another university executive said: 
If several top national universities are leading the talk and collectively running the show,  
their group could become, or be seen, almost as the second Chinese Ministry of 
Education or something similarly powerful… The officials feel threatened and 
disgruntled. 
Furthermore, there was an increasing split of interests between the ‘two’ and the ‘seven’. 
According to Hula, there are three types of coalition members: core members, players, and 
tag-alongs. They vary considerably depending on their long-term and short-term goals. Core 
members seek a bill or a key element of legislation. Players are satisfied if they can alter a 
paragraph or two in a bill. The tag-alongs lend their support, even though everyone recognises 
that they will not marshal their membership or be particularly active. In the words of one 
lobbyist: ‘All right, as a favour, use our name’ (Hula, 2000). This pattern was truly reflected in 
the C9’s internal dynamics. The most influential, privileged members, Tsinghua and PKU, 
shifted their role from proactive core players of the early years to passive tag-alongs with 
decreasing enthusiasm and involvement, especially at the policy front. The other seven had 
more to gain from the prestigious group’s collective influence, and hence became core players 
to advance the C9’s policy agendas and joint actions. In this process, all members 
demonstrated a strong self-interested focus. 
In the early years, the seven were the two’s important allies who helped secure the future of 
Project 985 during the 20032004 crisis. However, Tsinghua and PKU had maintained the view 
that they were in the topmost position of the hierarchical sector and in a more advanced 
development phase than the other seven. They already enjoyed a wide range of special policy 
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privileges, and had close, more direct ties with the officialdom. Therefore, their common 
interests with the seven on policies, as well as their motivation and need to use the C9 on 
policy issues, remained relatively low. The exception was provided by common concerns about 
the new funding rounds of Project 985, which needed a collective strategy and voice. 
Additionally, the two felt that this C9 brand diluted their superior status, and their influence 
was being capitalised by the other members to their own advantage. Hence, over the years, 
the two institutions strengthened policy lobbying collaboration with each other to advance 
their mutual interests and shape government decisions, and had been highly successful. One 
interviewee from Tsinghua explained their policy partnership and why the two often ‘acted 
separately’ without talking to the seven: 
We [Tsinghua and PKU] often receive early notice and intelligence on policies that the 
central government is developing. When we share common views on policy issues, we 
often have to take immediate joint actions and tackle them before decisions are 
finalised and things are locked in, otherwise it will be too late. We cannot afford to 
waste any time by consulting other universities. Despite complaints from other 
institutions, we believe that we are doing a service to all universities. 
Due to their significant individual influence, the interference or reluctance of PKU and 
Tsinghua undermined and dampened any collective lobbying attempts by the C9 group. For 
example, when PKU and Tsinghua became the C9 chair in 2011 and 2014 respectively, their 
lack of enthusiasm and commitment weakened the C9 group activities. They shortened and 
downsized the C9 meetings, and downplayed or postponed joint activities or decisions. Such 
an attitude seemed to imply that they intended to phase out the coalition. The other seven, on 
the other hand, had remained motivated and proactive in influencing policies through the C9 
platform and a cohesive group action to maximise chances of success and seek competitive 
advantages. 
In 2011, for instance, a few C9 presidents from the seven suggested that they should co-sign 
and submit a joint letter to the MoE with recommendations on the new 2011 Scheme and 
other issues including increasing the government funding rate for each university student. One 
of the top two universities strongly disagreed and insisted that other national universities 
would have similar complaints and concerns, if not more than the C9 members, on these 
issues, hence the C9 should leave them with other universities to handle, as ‘a larger crowd 
would make a louder noise’. It is worth noting that PKU and Tsinghua had received the highest 
level of funding rate per student in China. In the end, this lobbying proposal was dismissed by 
the two. 
128 
The coordination and effectiveness of the C9 were exacerbated by the lack of leadership and 
stability in the group, largely because of the governments’ constraints over university 
leaderships and the group’s formal presence (e.g. permanent secretariat). This is closely 
related to the political and regulatory restrictions which I mentioned earlier. For example, the 
central appointment system of university leaderships made the turnovers and tenures of 
university presidents unpredictable and irregular (see Chapter 2), causing disruptions to the 
universities’ consistent policy strategies and hindering the group’s joint plans and long-term 
commitments. 
In addition, university leaders’ work experience with the state and personal attributes (e.g. 
personality) influenced their decision-making and actual role in group lobbying.93 For instance, 
some presidents had previously participated in the initial C9 meetings of the earlier years as 
the government’s representatives from the State Council and the MoE before becoming C9 
presidents themselves. They were the target of collective and individual lobbying by 
universities as government officials before moving to the ‘other side’.94 Many of these officials-
turned-presidents were experienced and assertive about collective lobbying. However, during 
20102014, many of these presidents left their positions, and their less experienced 
successors were more cautious about group lobbying, and avoided any risks of confrontation 
with the MoE. Their careers were controlled by the state, and their personal and professional 
relationships with officials were vital for their personal and institutional interests. Before 
investing in any joint action, these university presidents made careful assessment about the 
                                                          
93 ‘Face’ (mianzi 面子) and peer pressure, for example, cornered a reluctant university president to agree to co-sign 
a C9 letter to the government on some policy issues, but his immediate successor has a stronger personality with a 
more sceptical view on collective actions. Since his appointment, he had skipped several group meetings and 
downplayed his university’s role in this group. 
94 Here are some examples: before appointed as President of Zhejiang University in 2006, Professor Yang Wei (C9 
Chair in 20082009, and again in 20122013) attended C9 meetings as head, the State Council Office of National 
Academic Degrees Committee (double as the MoE Department of Postgraduate Education). This is an influential 
governmental department, managing Chinese academic degrees, research programs, and some important funding 
projects, such as Projects 985 and 211. He served this government role from 20042006. After his term as ZJU 
President in 20062013 ended, Yang Wei moved back to the government and was appointed head of the National 
Science Foundation of China in 2013. As a new official, he again attended the C9 presidents’ meeting in late 2013. 
Prior to becoming President of Fudan University in 2009, Professor Yang Yuliang (C9 Chair in 20102011) also 
attended C9 meetings as head, the State Council Office of National Academic Degrees Committee which he served 
in 20062009. Professor Zhou Qifeng formerly filled the same role in 20012004 before taking up the position of 
PKU President in 2008. Professor Zhang Jie, President of Shanghai Jiao Tong was formerly a head at the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences at the State Council during 20032006. 
129 
risks and consequences involved, including whether it would offend or upset the government, 
and what was the best and safest option for their universities’ interest and their own careers. 
As a result, the group lacked an effective leadership to carry out its collective plans. In 2012, 
the ‘seven’ C9 presidents agreed that a more coordinated action was necessary for policy 
advocacy. Despite the pushback of the MoE, they suggested that this group needed to set up ‘a 
secretariat or a dedicated officer’ in Beijing or Shanghai to facilitate government engagement 
and undertake ‘scientific’ intervention from the C9 in the form of data analysis, background 
reports and joint submissions. They even agreed on an annual budget and membership 
levies.95 However, nobody raised a hand to take the lead or offer to follow up. The presidents 
had too much else to worry about. The plan faded away. 
New challenges 
The dynamics between the C9 and the MoE, and the ambivalent role of the MoE in this story 
leave many questions open. On one side, the MoE was instrumental in creating the C9 as its 
political ally; on the other, it remained increasingly sceptical and wary about its role. 
It seems unlikely that the MoE will support the C9 to jointly lobby the leaders as it did in 
20032004. In fact, recently the MoE has grown its power in the central structure. The 
national education budget officially reached 4% GDP in 2012, as a result of an increased policy 
focus on education. This has also started to alter the existing funding mechanism for 
education. The role played by the MoF and central leaders in decisions regarding education 
budget is destined to decline, while the MoE is set to become a more influential central 
decision-maker to drive the national education policies (see Chapter 4). In this new power 
structure, the MoE will be less likely to require political support and collaboration with 
influential universities. Rather, universities are likely to shift their lobbying focus and targets 
towards the MoE for more resources and favourable policy. 
Moreover, new policy directions and contingencies may also affect joint group actions and the 
future development of the C9. University leaders I interviewed believe that the administration 
                                                          
95 According to the discussion at the C9 presidents’ meeting in 2012, the presidents agreed to provide the same 
membership levies (100,000 yuan each member per year): the money would come from university’s own fund or 
other non-government sources; alumni donations could also be sourced; the small office would likely be established 
independently and separately in Shanghai or Beijing; one third of the running fund would go to the office rent; C9 
might employ one or two dedicated staff; and the office would operate under the agreed C9 guideline and chair’s 
supervision. The secretariat would regularly report to the current C9 chair and the executive committee; important 
group decisions would be informed and made by all the presidents; its secretariat might be named as ‘Secretariat 
for Building World-class Universities Symposia’, as opposed to ‘C9 Secretariat’ (to avoid tension). 
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and funding system for Project 985 and Project 211 are currently undergoing a reform and the 
central government intends to rebrand them as ‘program for building world-class universities’ 
(yiliu daxue jianshe 一流大学建设) and ‘program for building first-class academic disciplines’ 
(yiliu xueke jianshe 一流学科建设) respectively. This will likely diminish the brands of ‘985’ 
and ‘211’. If Project 985 is to be phased out one day, its demise is likely to disrupt the 
sustainability of the C9 and lead to a restructuring of its membership, priorities and strategies, 
unless these lobbying partners can renew their common policy agenda or find new common 
interests after ‘985’ becomes a fading memory. The fact that the C9 failed to produce concrete 
policy contributions to the competitive funding program 2011 Scheme may signal its limited 
common ground and shared interests outside of Project 985. This means that new power and 
policy structures may significantly shift the current interest alignment and interdependence 
amongst these universities. In that scenario, C9 members are likely to engage in increased 
competition and rivalry rather than collaborative lobbying for common interests. They will 
perhaps prioritise an individual, direct approach to the MoE. 
While the C9 was exploring collaborative lobbying, the government was also practising how to 
deal with ‘potential challenges’ by powerful universities and maintain the sector in an 
acceptable order. For example, the government advised the universities that they are no 
longer allowed to name or promote themselves using ‘211’ and ‘985’ brands. After the new 
2011 Scheme was officially announced in 2011, the MoE also issued a pre-warning, prohibiting 
all participating universities from identifying, branding or grouping themselves as ‘2011 
universities’. This was to prevent the universities from repeating their practices during Projects 
985 and 211. In September 2014, the State Council tightened up the rules in the policy trials of 
national student admissions, and suspended several self-initiated university coalitions of joint 
student recruitment (State Council, 2014; Guo Zhang, 2014).96 These gestures may signal a 
                                                          
96 Several university coalitions based on joint student recruitment policy trials (Beiyue (北约), Huayue (华约) and 
Zhuoyue (卓越)) (Zhe Zhang et al., 2010) and a few regional university associations in Beijing and Wuhan have 
emerged in the last few years, but none of these groups is linked to a policy lobbying function or possesses the 
same influence as the C9. Since late September 2014, the State Council has tightened up the rules regarding student 
recruitment trials and suspended all self-initiated university coalitions for their joint student testing and recruitment 
(State Council, 2014; Guo Zhang, 2014), because their collective policy ideas and activities have allegedly 
undermined government policies in the area of national student admissions and led to conflicts and chaos in the 
sector. For their latest development, see China Youth Daily (zhongguo qingnian bao 中国青年报) 29 November 
2014 (Guo Zhang, 2014). The Zhuoyue coalition (formed by a number of engineering-intensive universities) has 
continued their collaboration in other areas and rebranded the group as ‘Excellence 10’ (Qian, 2014), but according 
to my interviewees, this group now mainly focuses on internal exchanges and resources sharing. 
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more restrictive political and regulatory environment for the development of interest groups 
like the C9. 
In a constantly changing environment where global influence is increasing, will the C9 stay 
relevant and revitalise its lobbying desire and power at the next phase of Project 985? Or will 
the members go different directions, diminish their joint role and influence, and eventually 
fade out of the political arena? The Chinese government’s scrutiny and disapproval towards 
group actions by universities is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The political, 
regulatory environment, the internal conflicts of the C9 group, and the latest education policy 
developments do not show a very promising prospect for this lobby coalition, unless 
circumstances (e.g. government regulations) drastically change. Yet, it might be premature to 
conclude that the C9 will be unable to exert its collective influence again, especially if new 
crises arise. If it is to exist, it is safe to predict that the C9 will most likely maintain its loose 
organisational form and a covert form of collective lobbying approach. My interviewees 
believe that it is perhaps the only way for this university interest group to survive and function. 
A university president said: 
The C9 is a recognised, useful platform for its members to support and learn from each 
other. It is a group based on common interests, but in practice it has to exist and 
collaborate in a relatively loose and semi-formal structure due to political constraints. 
As for the future, we can only watch and see, and ‘let nature take its course’. 
Some university leaders have stayed hopeful and optimistic on the future of Chinese university 
coalitions. A president said: 
Things in China take a long time to develop. During the significant social and economic 
transformation process in China, only a few [advocacy] groups can survive. Those that 
do survive may not be direct and aggressive like [groups] in Australia or the United 
States, but they will likely make a long-term contribution and impact. 
Concluding remarks 
The C9 is a significant, first-of-its-kind, lobby group in China’s higher education sector. The C9 
experience sheds light on how collective lobbying works in the university sector and on the 
limitations it has faced in the Chinese political context that eventually lead to its weakening. 
Project 985 policies have served as a catalyst for collective lobbying actions by the nine 
universities. Their joint lobbying peaked at the times when the risk of political backlash was 
the greatest, and the need to do anything possible to influence the official decision-making 
was highest. The approach of the MoE in the central power structure was also instrumental in 
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the creation and efficacy of the C9 when the interests of the bureaucracy and those of the 
universities were aligned. 
The story of the C9 is also, to a great extent, the story of Project 985. The universities saw an 
opportunity that required collaboration that much later led to the formalisation of the group. 
This origin also presented a substantial weakness and contributed to the temporary nature of 
the organisation. With the changing of political conditions and policy priorities, the C9 has 
found itself unable to adapt, with its universities reverting to their traditional individual 
lobbying. 
Over the years, the C9 has seen mixed success in three common policy areas: concentrated 
funding, privileged policies, and formal grouping. Project 985 was extended several times, and 
provided significant support to the C9 members, but it was also broadened to other 
universities. The C9 members sought special policy advantages. They received higher research 
student admission quotas, and larger allocated numbers of government scholarships to send 
their PhD students to receive training overseas.97 They were also allowed to recruit a larger 
quota of ‘postgraduate admissions by recommendation with exam exemptions’ (tuijian 
mianshi yanjiusheng 推荐免试研究生).98 The C9 members, collectively and individually, 
initiated and led many new policy trials, which increased Chinese university autonomy in policy 
areas highly restrained by the government. Importantly, the C9 also successfully received tacit 
understanding from the government and established China’s very first elite university league. 
The establishment of the C9 was regarded by many as an important and historical move for 
the increasingly ambitious Chinese universities, despite the growing constraints from the 
government, the lack of formalisation and the decline of joint actions, especially at the 
presidents’ level, in the later years. 
So how do the university leaders evaluate their group? The ones I interviewed have applauded 
the C9 and valued its potential. They believed that without the C9, they would be worse off. 
One university president pointed out that to a certain extent, their collective goals on some 
policy issues were achieved through the C9 group platform, because each year the presidents 
                                                          
97 For instance, the C9 universities have received higher scholarship quotas from the China Scholarship Council 
(CSC). The CSC is China’s most prestigious government scholarship agency (affiliated with the MoE), providing 
funding for Chinese students to study abroad and for overseas students to study in China at various degree levels. 
98 ‘Postgraduate admissions by recommendation with exam exemptions’ refers to a system that permits universities 
to select and admit a small number of bachelor degree graduates (from the same university or another university) 
to their postgraduate programs without requesting them to take the national standard postgraduate admissions 
examination. Eligible students should have received recommendations from their own institution, and obtained 
excellent academic records or other awards.  
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initiated the agenda, raised policy suggestions and made coordinated efforts to speak with the 
government on such occasions. The advocacy of the C9 meetings was heard by both 
government officials and the public. The C9 also established cooperation with research 
university groups from other countries, which raised the international recognition and 
reputation of the C9 institutions.  
Additionally, the university leaders also highlighted their leading role and contributions to the 
wider sector and society as well as their public interest nature. I believe that their rhetoric and 
motivation are a mixture of sincere belief and strategic calculation. Undoubtedly, the C9 
members mostly focused on their self-interested agenda to maintain a competitive advantage. 
However, these leading players’ actions often brought about broader consequences and led to 
positive changes to the higher education sector and policy development trajectory, including 
on university funding policy and institutional autonomy reforms. 
For example, they lobbied for Project 985 funding policy as they would be the most affected by 
its cancellation, but their efforts to sustain the program eventually benefited all ‘985’ 
institutions. Moreover, the Shanghai Jiao Tong academic ranking system developed and 
publicised during the ‘985’ lobbying process also greatly advanced China’s longitudinal 
understanding and integration in the global higher education development. The C9’s 
postgraduate self-selection recruitment trial soon expanded to improve other Chinese 
universities’ research training capacity. In addition, the C9 coalition, as the first of its kind, set 
up a bold, innovative, and exemplary model of joint policy lobbying in the Chinese university 
sector.99 
Based on the above analysis, the C9 does represent a certain degree of public interest. As a 
president pointed out, as policy pioneers in the sector, the C9 universities need to take 
broader actors’ interests into account. He said:  
The higher one stands, the further one can see … As university pioneers and reformers 
with a long-term vision and mission, we do look at the big picture, consider and address 
strategic, long-range and holistic issues. Many policy issues and directions we tried to 
influence were general and universal issues that affected and concerned many 
universities in the broader higher education community. We indeed have played an 
                                                          
99 See Footnote 96. The Zhuoyue coalition (formed by a number of engineering-intensive universities) has 
established a group ‘Excellence 10’ (Qian, 2014), but this group mainly focuses on internal exchanges and resources 
sharing. 
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influential role in the sector, such as on the education policy reforms and the 
development of world-class universities. 
Yet, one should also recognise that university lobbying is often a zero-sum game. Competition 
and inequity do exist between the C9 and other universities. Elite institutions in general have 
much more political access, leverage and resources than less prestigious institutions in the 
policy process. China’s central bureaucratic system channels more advantages and 
opportunities to the former (see Chapter 5). Consequently, the interests of the latter may not 
be well represented in the policy debates, and hence tend to lose in the battles for education 
resources. For instance, some policies that C9 universities have collectively lobbied for, such as 
the concentration of funding on a few top players and privileged student admission quotas, 
would advantage themselves but perhaps damage lower-ranking universities’ interests. A new, 
separate study may be needed in the future to probe the ongoing contention between elite 
and non-elite institutions, and assess how their relationships and strategies shape China’s 
policymaking and the development of the tertiary education sector. 
Implications of collective lobbying in China 
What does the story of the C9 tell us about the lobbying of collective and particular interests in 
an authoritarian political environment? Under what conditions can non-government actors 
advance vested collective interests? 
Collective lobbying is intended to add value and influence to the action of individual players in 
particular circumstances, to allow a combination of resources and to increase the power of 
persuasion, while providing greater visibility towards the general public. The experience of the 
C9 reveals, however, that collective lobbying is not necessarily an effective and accessible tool 
in the special Chinese political environment, and a group of nine is also not necessarily as 
effective and successful as the action of one or two players. There is a rather confined space 
for interest associations or policy advocacy groups in the system; and if they do operate, they 
likely play a weak role. 
The state’s suspicion and control, the lack of formalisation and leadership in the group, 
decreasing urgency for policy collaboration, and the conflicts between the C9 and other 
institutions, together with the C9 members’ competition and dependence on the state, have 
all contributed over time to the weakening and vulnerability of the group and its lobbying 
activities.100 
                                                          
100 It is possible that other unknown aspects and back stories have contributed to the C9’s decline, which could be 
further explored and revealed in future research. 
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However, if we take a deeper look, the powerful overarching political environment is the most 
salient factor that drives the decline and retreat of the C9 coalition. In many other countries, 
such as the US, the UK and Australia, it is common for similar universities to align interests and 
formalise coalitions despite their fierce competition, conflicts of interest and dependence on 
government funding. However, in China, the significant difference is the political system that 
inhibits and punishes the formalisation of advocacy coalitions. In this system, the alignment of 
interests around collective organisations in the university sector is subject to political 
restrictions and scrutiny. This is similar to what scholars have observed in other sectors 
(Cheng, 2006, pp. 47-48; Kennedy, 2009, pp. 213-214; Unger & Chan, 2008). The state controls 
universities’ behaviour by controlling university leaders and their careers. They need to act 
discreetly for the interests of their university and themselves. 
As a result, it is generally difficult for university coalitions, even the most powerful one(s), to 
produce significant change. ‘Collective action’ remains a controversial modus operandi for 
universities as for other sectors of society. In this respect, the elite Chinese universities have 
shown a similar preference and attitude towards collective strategies as large businesses have 
for trade associations. They typically focus on direct interactions with government officials and 
have limited involvement in collective lobbying. Nevertheless, the factors shaping the elite 
universities’ choices on their interest alignment and joint lobbying differ from the ones for 
businesses. Businesses are largely affected by their economic circumstances, possibly more 
than they are by their political context (Kennedy, 2008, p. 164). However, the political and 
regulatory factors seem to have played a much greater role in universities’ choices and 
practices. After all, these universities are more proximate to the central bureaucracy, and 
considerably more distant from the market. Their academic and economic success, relative 
autonomy, and competitive advantages mostly depend on the state which determines their 
destiny. 
Here I identify three important factors shaping the C9’s lobbying outcomes and practices. 
First, in the highly fragmented central bureaucracy, the changing dynamics within the internal 
power structure to a certain extent explains C9’s rise and fall, and affects the C9’s interest 
alignments and lobbying actions. For instance, the evolving role and power status of the MoE 
in the central political power structure determined the increase or the reduction of its support 
to C9, and shifted the C9’s main lobbying target from the central leaders to the MoE. This 
highlights the existing political imperatives that universities need to deal with—it is the 
political master who has the last word. 
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Second, the regulatory environment remains highly rigid. It does not support a sufficient level 
of autonomy and independence or an open, bottom-up advocacy dialogue in the sector. The 
formalisation of interest alignments and collective actions is scrutinised and inhibited by the 
central authority. University leaders have to be particularly cautious due to their institutions’ 
dependence on the government, and state-controlled personal careers. Similar to trade 
associations and companies, universities mostly avoid challenging the government’s authority. 
Deference to the state and seeking win-win situations remain the most common strategy 
(Kennedy, 2008, p. 164). 
Third, specific contingent circumstances (crises) produce political opportunities for interest 
alignment and joint actions. In the highly rigid environment, taking advantage of or reacting to 
the contingencies becomes crucial for any effective collective decisions and actions. Agents 
seize specific opportunities (or react to major threats and crises) and rapidly align their 
interests to advance their collective interests. A particular interesting example: when facing 
the Project 985 crisis in 2003, the MoE went against its normal preferences and aligned its 
interest with the C9. Other examples include the joint lobbying of PKU and Tsinghua on Project 
985 in 1998, as well as the joint decisions of the C9 to act on the second and third funding 
rounds of Project 985 in 2003 and 20092010 respectively. 
These three key factors have shaped the C9’s practices and outcomes. They also highlight this 
interest alliance’s unstructured and issue-based nature (Watson, 2008, p. 39): it is more a 
consequence of a social movement over specific issues and power relationships under certain 
circumstances, rather than a structured, consolidated framework of interest alignment. 
The C9’s significant experience and influence may appear to some as suggesting a potential 
structural change in governmentuniversity relations. However, the C9 members rapidly 
returned to the norm (individual action), and the MoE quickly returned to the priority of 
strengthening its authority and restricting university activism (after supporting the creation of 
the C9 at a time when their interests aligned). This proves the difficulties of continuing open 
and collective lobbying efforts. Nevertheless, given the rapid development of the national 
circumstances, alliances are still possible. Chinese universities may seize or produce other 
opportunities to align their interests and exert influence on policies. However, the experience 
of the C9 casts a pessimistic shadow on the possibility of collectiveness ever becoming the 
norm. 
The next chapter focuses on the prevalence and general practices of university lobbying, which 
is mostly individual, self-focused in nature.   
137 
Chapter 4—Going solo: universities pursuing 
individual interests 
Governments represent either a threat or an opportunity to organisations. Lobbying is 
all about acquiring—or maintaining—a competitive advantage. 
Lionel Zetter (2011, p. 29) 
Introduction 
Lobbying is a commonly known concept in western countries, although no definitive definition 
of lobbying has ever been agreed upon (Zetter, 2011, pp. 3,29). The UK Public Affairs Council 
(UKPAC), for instance, broadly defines lobbying as ‘in a professional capacity, attempting to 
influence, or advising those who wish to influence, the Government, Parliament, the devolved 
legislatures or administrations, regional or local government or other public bodies on any 
mater within their competence’ (UKPAC, 2010). 
A range of scholars who studied the lobbying behaviour of Chinese businesses and industries 
have broadly defined ‘lobbying’, or its Chinese word youshui (游说), as activities undertaken to 
influence officials’ views, decisions and actions regarding government regulations and policies 
(Deng & Kennedy, 2010, pp. 101-102; Z. Tian & Gao, 2006, pp. 560-568, 579). So how do the 
leading Chinese research universities understand and interpret youshui? 
In this political system, youshui is neither regulated or legitimised (Cheng, 2006, pp. 47-48; S. 
He, 2009, p. 8; Yue Wang, 2008, p. 40), nor openly discussed by government or academic 
leaders. Nevertheless, according to the numerous university executives I interviewed, lobbying 
behaviour ‘widely exists in every aspect of society in China’, including in the higher education 
sector. The leading national research universities proactively engage with the government and 
conduct full-fledged lobbying activities, attempting to influence higher education policies and 
to seek competitive advantages in autonomy and funding. 
So how is lobbying generally being practised by the universities? What role(s) does lobbying 
play in universitygovernment interactions? How often do universities lobby collaboratively? 
How do they understand the complex central bureaucracy and exploit it through lobbying? 
Which state actors in the system are their major targets and how do universities identify and 
interact with lobbying targets in the fragmented structure? This chapter addresses these 
questions. 
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In this chapter, I first present the salient characteristics of universities’ general lobbying 
practices, including their common perceptions, language, frequency, organisational forms of 
agency, and targets for lobbying. I illustrate why lobbying is so prevalent and widely 
considered as a vital and expedient component of universitygovernment relationships; why 
universities strategically choose to camouflage or even avoid open discussions around their 
lobbying behaviour; as well as why interest alignment and organised, collective actions remain 
rare in the university sector (in contrast to the collective group of C9 illustrated in the previous 
chapter). I will then provide examples of how universities understand and exploit the 
fragmented, hierarchical and opaque central bureaucracy, identify their various lobbying 
targets (crucial central decision-makers) within the system, and interact with these state actors 
to seek opportunities and exert their influence. Universities’ capacity to successfully produce 
opportunities and influence often largely depends on how well they understand and exploit 
the fissures within the system. Universities constantly monitor the central bureaucracy to gain 
a clear sight of opportunities and adopt tactics to promote their interests. 
Decoding ‘university lobbying’: practice versus expression 
To begin with, how do universities interpret youshui and its practices in the higher education 
sector? A simple and common definition of youshui by my interviewees is ‘a bottom-up 
attempt or action to influence government officials and shape governmental decisions on 
certain issues of interest’. The word ‘bottom-up’ highlights the hierarchical nature in 
universitygovernment relationships. In some interviewees’ view, youshui also refers to 
influencing a broader range of actors, including media, the general public and local 
communities. As a university president suggested, universities may, and should, youshui 
society, because it is important to ‘raise people’s understanding about universities’ roles and 
contributions to the nation and seek their support’. In practice, however, youshui mostly 
targets the government. The engagement with media and the public often serves as a strategy 
for universities to attract attention and support from government leaders and officials. 
A large number of university leaders I spoke to view youshui positively and label it as ‘natural 
and logical behaviour’ and a ‘global practice’, which ensures ‘a balanced two-way flow of 
information (xinxi duichen 信息对称) between universities and the government’, and ‘delivers 
the views of universities to the state officials directly’. Especially, it provides both sides with, as 
one associate president described, ‘a capacity to raise concerns, seek solutions and resolve 
conflicts long before they become serious or go public’. A university president said, ‘Youshui is 
well established and well developed in China. Through the practices of youshui, our voice, 
feedback and ideas are able to reach the government officials regularly.’ My interviewees also 
hold a unanimous and firm opinion that ‘every university lobbies’, especially the leading 
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research universities that require continuous policy and funding support and need to monitor 
and explore opportunities on a broad variety of policies.101 
As I illustrated in Chapter 1, formal channels of policy communications are typically top-down 
and led by the government; and there is a lack of legitimate spaces and formal institutions for 
bottom-up initiatives where universities can be policy advocates and lobbyists. Attempts at 
policy influencing and seeking competitive advantages have been driven to various informal 
tactics and behind-the-scenes, covert interactions due to the political constraints. A university 
president said:  
Lobbying is extremely important and common … Taking my university as an example, 
we lobby the government almost on a daily basis for various matters and at various 
levels of personnel … Personally, I have meetings with senior government officials two 
or three times per week for funding policies. This is what we call ‘visiting the ministries 
to cash in’ (paobu qianjin 跑部钱进).102 
Within the government, competitive allocations of funding resources are often controlled by 
different government bureaux and divisions as well as individual personnel within those 
bureaux. This allows space for manipulation and game playing. To influence government 
decisions and seek financial interests, universities have to actively lobby the bureaucracies and 
officials. For example, in 2012, the government developed a special elite program. The aim was 
to select the best five national institutions in science and fund their training of young talents in 
basic science. Due to the considerable investment attached to the program, numerous 
national universities mobilised their special connections within the government and lobbied 
individual officials for ‘a special consideration’. A few months later, 17 universities of various 
ranking managed to secure a funding place in this previously ‘exclusive’ program. Several 
interviewees told me that ‘this happens nearly every time when there is a funding 
opportunity’. 
                                                          
101 A few interviewees also suggested that besides leading research universities, the second and third-tier 
institutions are also active lobbyists for government funding. They are unable to compete with top players on 
performance and quality, so they often rely on informal lobbying and expedient means, such as personal 
connections and nepotism, to seek policy favours and compensate their disadvantages in national competition for 
funding. As explained in the Introduction, comparing the lobbying practices by different types of universities is not a 
focus of this thesis, however, it may be an interesting area for future research. 
102 This is a word play on the original expression of ‘fast steps to move forward!’ with the character for ‘step’ (bu 步) 
being replaced by ‘ministry’ (bu 部) and the character for ‘forward’ (qian 前) being replaced by ‘money’ (qian 钱). 
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Nevertheless, despite its prevalence, university lobbying is typically couched in non-political 
and non-confrontational terms, and many people in fact avoid using the word youshui in 
formal conversations or in writing.103 More neutral terms are frequently applied to describe a 
lobbying process, such as ‘policy interactions’ (zhengce hudong 政策互动), ‘participation in 
policy discussions’, ‘exchanging views’, ‘providing policy feedback’, ‘bottom-up reporting’ 
(xiang shangji huibao gongzuo 向上级汇报工作), ‘universitygovernment communications’, 
and even ‘providing services to the government’. This is similar to what Shu He has observed: 
many tertiary institutions set up offices in Beijing to facilitate their lobbying of the 
government, but these offices are ambiguously labelled as ‘managing relations with 
government’ (zhengfu gongguan 政府公关) (S. He, 2009, p. 8). Why? 
One explanation provided by some interviewees is that youshui is not an idiomatic word in 
China thus is not widely understood or used. They have argued that it is a newly introduced, 
foreign term translated from the English word ‘lobbying’.104 A university president also 
suggested that youshui is an informal, colloquial expression which is never used in the official 
language. 
Another more plausible explanation offered by my interviewees is that youshui is a sensitive 
topic in the Chinese political context: this is neither ‘a legitimate form of policy 
communication’ nor ‘something that people bring up to the table for open discussions’, 
despite its common existence. The popular understanding amongst interviewees is that the 
state does have ‘an aversion to bottom-up initiatives’ (Zheng, 2010, p. 143), which may 
‘undermine its paramount authority’ and ‘permit greater social activism’. In particular, the 
government does not wish to be subject to influence or appear vulnerable, hence it is vigilant 
and hostile towards explicit, open lobbying attempts. One interviewee commented: 
Youshui plays an important role in universitygovernment relations, and the 
government knows that it can be influenced through youshui. But it will never admit to 
it, or use the expression youshui. The state maintains that its authority is not subject to 
influence. It dislikes to show any signs of vulnerability and susceptibility. It likes to 
suggest that all great new policy ideas originate from the government, even though it 
is universities that often come up with innovative proposals. 
                                                          
103 A few interviewees were hesitant to discuss it in the beginning of my interviews. 
104 In fact, the concept of youshui has long existed in China, and can be traced back to the diplomatic and military 
policy strategy of interest alliance ‘hezong lianheng’ (合纵连横) practised 2,500 years ago during the Warring States 
period. 
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However, according to my interviewees, the government informally accommodates 
universities’ behind-the-scenes lobbying behaviour, and appears comfortable labelling and 
treating it as part of ‘bottom-up reporting’, which is ‘familiar and acceptable to both 
government officials and universities’. Consequently, universities desensitise and legitimise 
their lobbying interactions and mitigate political risks by adopting expressions that relate to 
acceptable bureaucratic practices. 
A third explanation by my interviewees is that youshui carries negative connotations in Chinese 
society because of its mercantile origin, which is often associated with profit-driven, selfish 
interest groups, and shady, unethical conduct. Earlier studies on interest groups in China have 
shown that lobbying practices often involve clientelism, rent-seeking, nepotism or even 
corruption (Cheng, 2006, pp. 45-46, 48; Cheng et al., 2003, pp. 66-70; H. Liu, 2006, pp. 53-54; 
Z. Tian & Gao, 2006, pp. 563-564, 566; W. Yan, 2009, pp. 77-78; Jing Yang, 2010, pp. 152-153; 
Q. Zhu, 2011, pp. 34-35). Universities want to distance themselves from this bad reputation, 
although their closed-door youshui practices may sometimes involve ‘shady business’ and 
unethical behaviour. A university’s vice president confessed to me that universities are 
sensitive and reluctant to relate their practices to youshui or discuss their acts, especially when 
they did something ‘below the belt’ and ‘cannot discuss it on the table’. 
I find that the second and third explanations are more convincing for the restrained expression 
about youshui. Universities conceal their lobbying behaviour or intention. They avoid 
describing their activities as ‘lobbying’ or tagging themselves as part of ‘interest groups’ in 
order to avoid political sensitivity and negative connotations. 
Acting alone: the avoidance of collective lobbying 
In her book Lobbying for Higher Education, Constance Ewing Cook (1998, p. 141) suggests that 
in the US, higher education does two types of lobbying. One is generic, pro-education lobbying 
which is commonly conducted by coalitions of institutions and associations. The other is purely 
selfish and conducted individually (e.g., lobbying by a single institution for earmarked funding 
for its own use). This statement does not fully apply to China: Chinese universities rely on 
private, individual and direct interactions with the officialdom for both their self-interested 
agenda and for the broad, big-picture policies that affect them all. 
Leading Chinese national universities do meet regularly to exchange policy views and 
strategies on in-principle and pro-education issues of shared interests, such as university 
autonomy on fund spending, student admissions, academic programs and degrees, and the 
government’s funding for research overheads or the average education expenditure for each 
university student. However, institutions typically avoid forming policy allies or undertaking 
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joint actions on these common issues. Lobby coalitions only emerge under special 
circumstances for certain issues amongst a small number of elite players, such as Tsinghua and 
PKU.105 Taking the C9 as an example (Chapter 3): the C9 members share many common 
concerns and collective interests; they coordinated their lobbying efforts when facing critical 
crises; and the institutionalisation of this lobby group has seemed to emerge. However, my C9 
interviewees admitted to me that they only conducted organised, joint policy work ‘once in a 
blue moon’—they act alone most of the time. 
Two main factors seem to explain such patterns of practice. 
Intense competition, self-interested focus and conflicted needs 
Individual lobbying of a private, covert nature is a popular form of promotion with which 
Chinese universities have become very familiar when their self-interests are at stake. 
Universities work in an extremely competitive sector and are under constant pressure to 
increase productivity and perform well. Their quality and performance are measured by the 
government through merit-based indicators, such as rankings in the national discipline-based 
evaluations (conducted by the MoE), numerical counting of published articles in MoE-selected 
journals, and the receipt of government grants, funding programs and national awards.106 High 
yields in these areas in turn boost their status, reputation and influence, increase their success 
of receiving further financial resources, and improve their competitive recruitment of quality 
students. While racing to raise their quality, outputs and competitiveness, universities have 
developed a strong sense of vigilance, rivalry, self-interested focus, and a high proactivity to 
seek competitive advantages. A university executive suggested: 
                                                          
105 A rare example of successful coordinated lobbying is the alliance between the elite Tsinghua University and 
Peking University. They jointly lobby the state on a wide range of policy issues that affect and concern them both. 
Despite their fierce competition on nearly every aspect of their activities, they often have to put their differences 
aside and work together to achieve shared goals and resolve issues of common interest. Jointly, they have made 
impacts on some significant higher education policies, including Project 985, 2011 Scheme and Young 1000 Talents 
Plan. They have also jointly initiated and led a number of new policy experiments, such as the first Chinese joint 
degree programs (with overseas institutions) and innovative research training strategies. On one occasion reported 
by my interviewees, PKU and Tsinghua successfully sought an unprecedented approval from the state to conduct a 
first-of-its-kind trial to accredit and issue their own academic degrees in 2015 without going through the 
government’s accreditation process. Although the two universities still remain subject to the government’s audits 
during the trial, it is still a significant step given the government’s strict control over all university academic degrees 
in China. 
106 National prestigious awards, for instance, include ‘Excellent undergraduate teaching and learning reform’ (benke 
jiaoxue gaige jiang 本科教学改革奖) and ‘Top 100 outstanding doctoral dissertations’ (baipian youxiu boshi lunwen 
pingxuan 百篇优秀博士论文评选). 
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It is very common that a few elite universities compete for one funding program, and 
they spare no effort to win the game and interact with government officials separately 
and privately. Last time, our university quietly submitted a policy proposal to the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) making policy 
recommendations on a new national science project. If our proposal was adopted by 
the NDRC, we would have a better chance of winning a funding place [under this 
project]. [Another university D] received intelligence from the government about our 
good plan, and also secretly submitted a counter-proposal to the NDRC based on their 
own strengths, needs and interest … Competition and individual lobbying like this 
happen frequently. 
In particular, as I earlier mentioned, decisions on government funding programs and awards 
may be subject to personal discretion, manipulation and game playing, it is common for 
university leaders and personnel to lobby the relevant authorities and officials that manage 
these programs or process their project applications. They often seek the economic interests 
of their own universities, special privileges, favourable votes, and earmarked opportunities, 
such as investment funds for new infrastructure on their campus or obtaining special 
intelligence on a new source of revenue. Personal and informal factors play an important role 
in such private interactions (see Chapter 5).  
Competition in other policy areas, such as student admissions, is also invariably a zero-sum 
game for national universities: there are only a certain number of quality student applicants 
each year; one’s loss is another’s gain; and the government decides on how many students are 
allocated to each university (fixed percentage and capped student numbers for each province). 
Therefore, the universities actively lobby the government individually to explore the ‘flexible 
components’ (jidong yuansu 机动元素) of the policy and optimise their game in student 
recruitment.107 
So what about the big-picture, general policy issues about which the universities share similar 
concerns and common ground? An interviewee made the following observation: 
On important broad national policy issues, university presidents sometimes meet in 
person and advocate the same view. They all agree to say something similar to the 
government. However, when they really meet with individual government divisions and 
                                                          
107 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the government’s policy on national postgraduate student recruitment quota, for 
instance, contains rigid rules and fixed recruitment quotas for each university, as well as some ‘flexible 
components’, such as a special annual percentage for ‘recruitment of students by recommendation (instead of 
standard exams)’. 
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officials in private, their words are likely to be inconsistent and different, reflecting their 
own needs and interests first. 
Another university executive said: 
Everyone is focusing on their own business first. Their own agenda and needs are always 
more important and urgent than the collective or others’ needs. University leaders have 
to think twice before investing too much energy on collective activities. 
Different priorities and needs often prevent universities from forming consensus and taking 
joint actions. C9 member universities X and Y, for example, are both leading national research 
universities and funding recipients under Projects 985 and 211. As partners and collaborators, 
they share the goal of ‘building world-class universities’ and face similar policy challenges and 
concerns, so they often meet to exchange ideas and experiences. Both universities strongly 
agree that key development funding schemes such as Projects 985 and 211 policies should be 
long-term commitments from the central government. Yet, X advocates that 985/211 funds 
should move away from the current priority setting for specific research fields, so that 
universities can build upon their historic strengths and develop freely without being 
constrained by the government’s short-term goals, and they can also gain the security, stability 
and flexibility to fully decide on how and where to spend the money, such as infrastructure 
development and overheads. Y, on the other hand, believes that the priority-setting strategy 
works better for the 985/211 policies. In its view, national funding should be concentrated on 
selected, key priority areas to favour rapid development in targeted areas. 
Essentially, their split opinions are the result of their different research strengths and 
development strategies. X excels in basic sciences and humanities which research fields have 
not been a funding priority for a few decades. Y focuses on engineering and technology fields 
which are well funded by the government as high-priority areas. Both universities prefer a 
funding model that best suits their own needs and provides the most financial support. X and Y 
are keen to lobby the central government for a long-term, sustainable set of Projects 985 and 
211 policies, but they are unable to form a consensus or collaboration on this funding 
allocation policy, even though they belong to the same lobby group. 
The story of the ‘Association of Chinese Research Universities’ is another example of how a 
potential lobby group misfired because universities failed to establish common grounds and 
strategies. In 20072008, China’s Renmin University in Beijing invited 1520 leading national 
research universities in China to join and establish a self-initiated, autonomous ‘Association of 
Chinese Research Universities’ (ACRU). According to Renmin University, this new group aimed 
to represent the ‘common interests’ of its members and serve as a ‘communication platform’ 
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between the elite research universities and the government. It intended to submit joint 
proposals to the government, provide higher education policy advice, and help the 
government hear universities’ voices on their development needs and reduce the 
government’s micromanagement and over-supervision (Juan Hu et al., 2007; Ji, 2008). In other 
words, the proposed ACRU would operate in a form of ‘higher education lobby group’ of 
research universities. 
The then President of Renmin University worked at the MoE as head of a division before 
moving to the university. He believed his connections with the MoE officials and national 
universities would facilitate the establishment of this coalition. He selected and invited a 
number of universities based on some self-developed membership criteria. However, the so-
called ACRU group was discontinued after only two meetings. According to interviewees who 
were involved in the ACRU, it fell apart largely because of the lack of support and enthusiasm 
from peer universities. One university’s vice president said: 
Renmin University is a university of humanities and social sciences. Some other more 
comprehensive research universities with strong sciences and engineering focus found 
that they had significant differences in terms of their development vision, background, 
priorities and strategies. Besides, some universities did not agree with the ‘membership 
criteria’ independently developed by Renmin University in the first place. So there was 
not enough common ground, interests, or urgency to sustain the group. 
A political and regulatory environment inhibiting collective lobbying 
Most of the university executives that I interviewed envisaged that a collective voice and 
position is likely to add value and influence. However, they also pointed out that even if there 
is a genuine consensus and desire to act on issues of shared interest, individual lobbying still 
‘fits better’ and ‘is more practical’ in the Chinese political system. Why? 
First, in a structural sense, universities are individually sponsored and supervised by various 
central ministries and agencies, such as the MoE, CAS, and MIIT. They need to conduct 
separate internal reporting and negotiations with their own central supervisors on major policy 
issues. This system creates structural barriers and fragmentation amongst national universities 
and discourages them from dealing with the government collectively, which often turns issues 
of common interest into individual, isolated lobbying of different authorities and central 
supervisors. In short, central fragmentation divides universities. 
Second, it is a unanimous view amongst university executives I spoke to that interest coalitions 
and collective lobbying by universities are ‘sensitive, delicate matters’ in the Chinese political 
146 
system and higher education regulatory environment, facing scrutiny and suppression by the 
government, hence are ‘difficult to establish or operate’.108 One interviewee said: 
Joint lobbying by a few Chinese universities, such as signing joint policy petitions, is the 
most sensitive, difficult and challenging [form of agency]. ‘Huddling down below’ is 
what the government fears and opposes the most. 
A university president pointed out: 
It is not a big deal if one university president writes to the government. If both Peking 
and Tsinghua presidents submit a jointly signed letter, the pressure [on the government] 
will be a lot greater. If nine or ten national leading university presidents jointly sign and 
submit a letter, it will become a matter of great significance … The central authority 
does not wish to see bottom-up communications in such a ‘confrontational, threatening’ 
form … A university coalition or interest group can only survive if it operates informally 
and does not define itself a ‘lobby group’. 
A government official also told me that allowing ‘an independent interest group’ is almost 
equivalent to allowing ‘separation from the central control’ (gao fenlie 搞分裂) and a ‘small 
gang’ (gao xiaotuanti 搞小团体). State officials remain cautious and wary about a joint voice 
and united policy front by prestigious institutions, as this may lead to potential political 
challenge and negative consequences. They fear that interest group(s) composed of powerful 
players may hinder, confront, withstand, resist, and undermine their authority. Therefore, the 
government has maintained its tight control and regulations over collective actions and 
interest coalitions in the higher education sector. 
As noted in previous chapters, the higher education sector has produced some loosely 
organised university coalitions and forums, such as the government-initiated council of deans 
of graduate schools, several self-initiated student recruitment university coalitions (see 
Footnote 96), and a few regional university associations in Beijing and Wuhan. Their bottom-
up policy lobby function is strictly limited. The government only legitimises them as civil 
platforms for inter-university collaboration that are subject to the central authority, and 
sometimes takes advantage of them to distribute policies or collect information from 
institutions.  
                                                          
108 In this thesis, an interest coalition by universities or an education interest group can be generally defined as a 
coalition or multiple coalitions with common goals and interests; It is an organisation (or a potential organisation) 
influencing (or hoping to influence) public education policy and receive benefits through its interest expression to 
the government or legislators. 
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Such patterns of interaction resonate with the other areas of China. In the corporatist 
structures of the Chinese state, associations or groups in important areas of economic and 
societal activity are subject to state’s tight control (Unger & Chan, 2008, pp. 66-68). Interest 
groups face legitimacy crisis and lack independence and autonomy (Cheng, 2006, pp. 44,47-48; 
Cheng et al., 2003, p. 63; Kennedy, 2009, pp. 213-214).  
University leaders are well aware of the political sensitivity of interest coalitions and advocacy 
groups, hence they carefully avoid formalising their lobbying collaboration. One university 
president told me that a decade ago, he met a few other presidents from leading research 
universities in private, and talked about forming a coalition of like-minded universities. At the 
end of the deliberation, they all agreed that it was too sensitive and could not fit in the 
Chinese political system. 
Consider the C9’s experience as an example. As illustrated in Chapter 3, although C9 members 
play an important role in many national policies and have an increasing international 
reputation and profile, the government has shown an increasingly sceptical attitude towards 
the group. It did not want the C9 to operate more formally or autonomously, and it refused to 
engage with the C9 when it attempted to initiate a bottom-up policy dialogue. To date, the C9 
is still not a legally registered ‘civil organisation’ (minjian zuzhi 民间组织) in China.  
In addition, the government-appointed university leaders often tread cautiously to protect 
their universities’ interest as well as their personal interests. As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 
2, through its nomenklatura system (Zheng, 2010, pp. 103-107),109 the party-state has a final 
say over personnel decisions of all important positions, including university presidents and 
party secretaries. The state controls university leaders’ careers, and it is able to retire, or even 
forcefully remove, those who disobey (Zheng, 2010, pp. 103-107): such disciplinary measures 
can severely dampen academic or professional careers. This system greatly influences 
university executives’ decisions and strategies. University leaders I interviewed admitted that 
they need to behave deferentially and maintain good personal relationships with senior 
central officials. For instance, they avoid dissent or critical language and tone when raising 
concerns. A vice university president said: 
It is very important for the MoE leaders to maintain a good personal impression about 
us [leaders of national universities]. When we want to propose changes or new ideas, 
we have to consider beforehand whether the officials had thought about them and may 
be inclined to accept or tolerate them. One would not want to bring up difficult 
                                                          
109 See Footnote 52. 
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questions that put them under pressure or make them feel uncomfortable and 
challenged … that may create problems later on. 
A number of interviewees made similar observations that some university presidents 
prioritised their own personal interests over that of the university when facing political risks. 
One said, ‘It [a lobbying attempt] always becomes more complicated when it goes to the 
presidents’ level because of their position and potential risks’.  
For instance, in 20092010, the nine deans of graduate studies of the C9 universities drafted a 
joint proposal on postgraduate admissions and funding policies. They asked their presidents to 
approve and sign their names before submitting it to the government. One university 
president refused to sign, insisting that this ‘group action’ resembled ‘forming a clique’, which 
would put too much political pressure on the MoE officials. 
In another case I have discussed in Chapter 3, a university president pulled out from a joint C9 
submission at the last minute and abruptly prevented the letter from going out to the 
government. He later explained to another president that he did not want them to ‘take the 
risk of offending the MoE’, which might lead to political reprisals and strategic suicide for the 
group, universities and their careers. He said to the other president: ‘This is for your own 
interest … If we do so, how would the MoE officials react? Have you thought about the 
potential consequences!?’ 
An alternative strategy: coordinated but separated lobbying activities 
Collective actions by universities remain difficult. However, there is an alternative strategy to 
work together and ‘coordinate lobbying’ towards the same goal. When a number of 
institutions form a consensus on a policy matter, they may coordinate their individual 
advocacy and efforts by communicating simultaneously and separately with officials on the 
same issue. As an interviewee suggests, if there are some shared concerns on a complicated 
and significant policy issue, C9 members will first try to lobby the government ‘separately and 
simultaneously over a period of time’ and ‘see how it goes’. The C9 deans of graduate studies, 
for instance, have often used this strategy over the years. One dean said: 
We sometimes lobby the government on one specific issue individually, simultaneously, 
and persistently. If several institutions try to raise and influence the same issue, after 
receiving a number of complaints from various stakeholders, the government will start 
to see the problem and reconsider the policy.  
In one vice president’s words, ‘a quantitative change can eventually make a qualitative change 
(liangbian dao zhibian 量变到质变)’. For example, in the last few years, a handful of research 
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universities simultaneously complained to the MoST about its research grants policy 
concerning fund management, overhead charges, performance evaluation and staff 
reward/penalty system, calling for a review of the policy. Due to the repeated, separate 
lobbying efforts by various institutions on this issue, the MoST finally accepted that the 
existing research funding policy for competitive grants was flawed. The MoST officials 
undertook inspection visits to a number of national universities in 20122013 and held 
meetings with university staff to collect proposals and recommendations, with the aim of 
reforming the relevant policies and fixing the loopholes. 
Although this interesting approach may help universities achieve their goals from time to time, 
it remains weak and unlikely to evolve into powerful formal alliances. More often than not, 
their ‘coordinated actions’ merely means ‘lobbying separately and simultaneously on the same 
issue of shared concerns and advocacy’ rather than ‘forming allies and taking concrete, joint 
actions’. 
A multi-player game: identifying lobbying targets within a 
fragmented, hierarchical and opaque central bureaucracy 
So far, I have illustrated some general characteristics of university lobbying, including common 
perceptions, language of youshui, frequent practices, and organisational forms of actions. So 
given their perceived importance and effectiveness in lobbying the central government, how 
do universities understand the complex central bureaucratic system, in which state actors are 
their major lobbying targets, and how do universities identify targets in this structure and 
interact with them to exert influence? 
The opaque and fragmented political and regulatory environment offers hidden space and 
opportunities, and the capacity of universities to advance their interests often depends on 
their ability to monitor, understand and exploit the fissures in the system. An interviewee 
shared with me his insights and experience: 
Generally speaking, there are always possibilities and loopholes [in the central system] 
for a university to seek preferential treatment and advance its interests. More policy 
issues are opening up for discussion and negotiation … In today’s situation, universities 
can lobby on most policy issues as long as the fundamental and sensitive issues remain 
unchallenged, such as the party leadership of universities. 
For instance, when several peer universities enter a competition for winning a place under a 
national funding program, one institution can access relevant government authorities through 
its informal networks to obtain special assistance and confidential information such as the 
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composition of the selection panel. The institution may then court the panel members 
individually to influence their votes. Such borderline corrupt cases ‘happen more often than 
one thinks’, according to my interviewees. Personal connections and discretions, informality 
and game playing still play an important role in manipulating the system and influencing the 
government’s decisions (I will discuss further on this topic in Chapter 5). 
As I illustrated in Chapter 1, despite an important role in managing education and supervising 
universities, the MoE is only one of the many players, often restricted by the intervention of 
other organs on higher education policies (Jupeng Yang & Su, 2012, p. 57). A range of decision-
makers and central organs are involved in national education and research policies, and they 
may present various resources and funding opportunities for universities. Therefore, besides 
the MoE and their primary sponsoring ministries, national universities need to interact directly 
or indirectly with any other parts of the central bureaucracy which have responsibilities and 
powers over specific policy issues. For instance, universities make frequent contacts with the 
MoST on spending policies of some major university research grants. 
Universities are often skilled operators led by experienced insiders to this complex network.110 
My interviewees paint a picture of the central system characterised by fragmentation, rivalry 
and hierarchy of central players as well as the paramount authority of top leaders. These 
important features not only help highlight the key decision-makers for various policy matters, 
but also have played an important role in shaping universities’ strategies for dealing with 
individual central players. Universities maintain a clear understanding and close view of what is 
happening in the system and where the opportunities are. 
Fragmentation and rivalry 
The central bureaucracy is highly fragmented and its governmental organs are poorly 
coordinated. Each central ministry or agency of an equivalent rank, such as the MoE, CAS and 
MIIT, may administer certain policy areas and distribute resources for various uses that 
universities can seek access to. However, these agencies are not necessarily coordinated and 
their scopes of management sometimes overlap.  
The party-state leads China’s education, science and research development through the 
Leading Small Group on Science, Technology and Education (LSGSTE) at the State Council. 
However, despite its alleged leadership over the national educational bureaucracy, in reality 
                                                          
110 As mentioned in the earlier chapters, many university leaders of leading institutions are former public servants, 
so they generally have already developed interpersonal networks within the government and sound knowledge of 
how the bureaucracy works (e.g. central politics and power structure for resources). For specific examples, see 
Footnote 94. 
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the LSGSTE has neither fully functioned in macro-level coordination between central agencies, 
nor involved itself in the central financial budgeting process. It has never issued an official 
document in its own name. Although the LSGSTE is chaired by the Premier, the issues on 
science, technology innovation and education are less important than others in his portfolio. 
Real leadership is normally held by a vice premier or state councillor, who may also have other 
priorities. The LSGSTE is run by a Secretariat under the General Office of the State Council, 
which also has many other responsibilities, with neither sufficient manpower nor incentives to 
coordinate. As a result, direct responsibility for science, technology and education policies is 
stretched across many ministries or ministry level agencies under the State Council, each with 
the power to propose and administer national programs under its jurisdiction, and with a 
budget directly allocated by the MoF. There is no uniform, national quality control standard, 
nor is there much exchange of information about projects funded across different agencies 
(Cao, Li, Li, & Liu, 2013, p. 460). 
The central government has adopted a ‘countersigning system’ (huiqianzhi 会签制) to improve 
its internal coordination and accountability and to achieve agreement among an array of 
bodies.111 The ‘countersigning system’ refers to a bureaucratic process that requires all the 
relevant central ministries to approve, sign off, or stamp an official document before it takes 
effect.112 However, in this deeply fragmented system, the ‘countersigning system’ only 
addresses superficial problems while adding more tasks and complications to the decision-
making process. As a university vice president suggested, when each matter has to go through 
and be approved by so many ministries, it often enters a limbo. Each ministry has its own 
interest, priority and understanding on a certain matter, and does not necessarily liaise or 
consult with others. It is difficult to achieve a good outcome, and many project proposals 
submitted by his university have drifted away and were never completed. 
Meanwhile, ministries and agencies at the same administrative rank within the central 
bureaucracy often have conflicts of interest and develop rivalries. Central ministries regularly 
                                                          
111 The bureaucratic system of Chinese ‘countersigning system’ also enables some institutions to gain more political 
power. The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), for instance, now has a special project approval authority 
(xiangmu shenpiquan 项目审批权) role to sign off many national projects, because one will need MEP’s official 
stamp during the establishment and conclusion of a project in order to complete a project. As a result, MEP has 
gained an increase in power. 
112A vice president gave me an example of a university research project that he managed. The ‘huiqian’ system for 
his project involved a number of central bodies, including the NDRC, MIIT, MOST, MoE, as well as the State 
Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT), the Quality Supervision Bureau, and the Intellectual Property 
Office (IPO). 
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compete with each other for resources, influence of portfolio, performance ratings, and 
especially, the leadership and decision-making authority (qiantou bumen 牵头部门) over key 
national development and special funding projects (zhongda zhuanxiang 重大专项), which is 
determined by the State Council. A university executive recently observed that some MoST 
officials ‘got really upset’ that the MIIT won the competition to manage several new 
technology programs, because this defeat ‘downgraded the MoST from a leading to a mere 
supervisory body (jiandu bumen 监督部门)’. So why is it so important? 
Managing more programs means gaining more money, power, influence and a higher profile in 
the central system. Generally speaking, once a national Research and Development (R&D) 
program is established and funded, the managing (leading) organ handles the implementation 
of the program on its own, such as calling for proposals and organising assessments and 
selections, and exercising executive power on project establishment, approval, recipients and 
amounts of funding. 
These decisions are crucial to universities, and knowing where the final authority lies is of the 
greatest importance. The MoST, for instance, is in direct control over a large of amount of 
national science and research expenditure funds due to its portfolio of science and technology 
and its ownership of a range of major programs. Because the considerable resources and 
policies are under its own administration, the MoST is often a lobbying target that universities 
interact with regularly. 
Universities are not only well aware of the fragmented structure of the central bureaucracy, 
but also adapt themselves to its structure. Universities try to exploit the fragmented and 
competitive nature, and focus on various lobbying targets simultaneously to maximise their 
chances of success. A key national university C, for instance, actively monitors and engages 
with multiple central agencies, such as the MoE, NDRC and CAS. The Chinese Academy of 
Sciences (CAS) in recent years has been endowed with significant policy and executive power 
and can offer substantial central resources that are separate from the MoE budget. As a result, 
university C has placed a lot of emphasis on seeking direct policy support and financial 
opportunities from CAS on areas including research training, international scholarships, 
commercialisation and priority setting for key national science programs, despite the fact that 
the university also receives supervision and governance from the resource-constrained MoE. 
University C’s strategy has successfully increased its funding resources.  
Central agency A led and administrated a new significant national science and research funding 
program. The program accepted project funding applications that were submitted either by 
national universities directly or through their central sponsoring ministries (as a 
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recommendation). One leading national university, H, was determined to win a research 
funding place under this program, therefore developed a research proposal and lodged it 
directly to the central agency A. Shortly after, H received a verbal rejection from an official at 
the agency A before its application went further to formal proceedings. The explanation was 
that ‘the topic of the research is not on the funding priority list’, hence ‘this direct funding 
application will not be considered in the first instance’. 
Knowing the competitive nature and poor coordination among the central departments, 
university H’s executives decided to slightly revise this proposal and submit it to a different 
central agency, the university’s sponsoring ministry B. Through informal interactions, repeated 
persuasions, third-party endorsement and evidence-supported analysis, H convinced ministry 
B to believe that this research project would make a significant, high-profile achievement and 
help improve the overall performance of ministry B. H also told ministry B that agency A 
endorsed their research project. Ministry B soon agreed to recommend and sponsor H’s 
project proposal and submit it to A. According to this national program’s policy, if a central 
ministry recommended and sponsored a university application, agency A had to consider and 
assess it thoroughly. Therefore, A accepted H’s application formally. 
Being accepted did not guarantee success. University H soon organised informal meetings with 
officials from agency A, suggesting that ministry B highly valued their innovative research 
project and believed that it was in the national interest and would boost the government’s 
performance. Executives from H also claimed that the university was in the process of 
negotiating other funding sources (from B) for this program’s implementation, and that it 
would not be in agency A’s best interest to ignore the significance of the proposal. Should 
agency A be interested in also providing matching funds, the benefits and achievements would 
be shared between agency A and ministry B. Agency A was vigilant about competition and 
tentatively agreed to consider to ‘chip in’ to match the level of funds allegedly ‘promised’ by 
ministry B. After gaining some leverage, university H then went to ministry B, repeated the 
same strategy, and eventually convinced it to provide some funding. In the end, the university 
successfully managed to receive fiscal endorsement from both central organs. 
A vice university president who was involved in the whole process concluded: 
During this lengthy and complex process, our university’s executives undertook 
intensive and repeated bargaining, personal reporting, elaboration, and consultation 
with relevant departments and officials. They also involved internal and external 
research experts to promote the quality of the project and to add more weight to their 
arguments. Knowing that the central bodies would not speak to each other on many 
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competitive matters like this case, and that they are sensitive to peer pressures, we 
took advantage of it from the beginning and strategically lobbied individual 
departments. In the end, we turned the whole situation around! 
Power hierarchy 
The central bureaucracy has a highly hierarchical structure of power. Although many central 
organs are equally ranked on the official organisational chart, there is in fact ‘a world of 
difference between the strong and weak ones (in terms of power influence and wealth)’, in the 
words of one interviewee. 
The effect of such a hierarchical power structure is well illustrated by China’s Medium and 
Long-term Strategic Plan for Science and Technology Development 20062020 (MLP). For each 
of the 99 supporting policies making up the plan, one lead ministry (or a central organ of an 
equivalent level) is assigned responsibility and authority. Prime responsibility for 
administrating the largest number of these policies and funds goes to the NDRC with 29 
policies, followed by the MoF with 21 (or 25 if including the State Administration of Taxation), 
the MoST with 17, and the MoE with nine. The NDRC and MoF have lead roles not only by 
merit of these large numbers but also in managing arguably some of the most important 
policies with enormous resources and of great influence. The NDRC is in charge of significant 
innovation schemes, while the MoF takes the critical role of developing fiscal incentives for 
R&D increase and independent innovation (Liu Li, 2009, p. 26). Until recently, the MoE has 
been a relatively low-power and constrained department in the central power hierarchy, with 
a limited ability to secure state funding resources. However, the MoE’s power has gradually 
increased in the last few years, which is shifting the central dynamics and university strategies. 
Powerful ministries often attract more attention and lobbying efforts from a wide range of 
stakeholders and actors, including from other weaker central departments like the MoE as well 
as national research universities. My interviewees confirm that they directly or indirectly 
interact with a range of central agencies on a regular basis due to their important resources 
and decision-making power. So what are the most powerful and relevant central agencies for 
national research universities? 
As noted in Chapter 1, the NDRC is a key decision-maker and powerful organ in charge of many 
significant, large-scale national development and investment programs in science, technology, 
education, culture, and civil administration, including the national funding university scheme 
Project 211. Many interviewees believe that any policy input provided to the NDRC can 
potentially make an impact and lead to an investment policy that benefit the policy proposers 
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and funding recipients a great deal. As a result, the NDRC is a highly popular lobbying target for 
all types of organisations. 
One university personnel from Beijing who once worked at the central government told me 
that a NDRC’s sub-department responsible for developing China’s high-technology industries 
receives numerous lobbyists each day for investment proposals and funding requests. He 
added, 
A small decision from the NDRC can make a huge impact on a region or organisation’s 
development … Even some of the janitors and cleaners working at the NDRC have made 
a fortune—many local government officials paid them to leave proposals or paper notes 
at the desks of heads of departments and sections. 
Universities engage with the NDRC on developing and implementing higher education policies 
such as Project 211. They also lobby the NDRC to seek competitive funding under special 
science investment programs, such as ‘Large Science Programme’ (dakexue gongcheng 大科学
工程). 
The MoF has also obtained significant control of central fiscal revenues over the recent 
decades. It has a key role in developing fiscal policies, managing central financial expenditures, 
and deciding on funding formulas and delivery for national programs, such as Project 985. It 
also executes the financial aspects of plans made by the NDRC. In other words, the MoF has 
fiscal discretion and decision power to decide what blocks of money can be used, how they 
should be spent, and when to release the funds to recipients (including other ministries). 
When it comes to money, the MoF is so powerful that even some national leaders are 
intimidated. It seemed to be a well-known fact amongst some of my interviewees that the 
former Chinese President Hu Jintao received ‘resistance’ and a ‘dismissive attitude’ from the 
MoF when he tried to get the ministry to deliver on his predecessor’s promise to increase 
central spending on education to 4% of the GDP in 20102011. According to a witness, Hu 
expressed his outrage and frustration with the ‘stubborn’ and ‘uncooperative’ MoF at an 
internal meeting. The informant said, ‘Hu lost his temper at the meeting and pounded his hand 
on the table … After both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s push, the MoF finally delivered the 4% 
GDP target for education in 2012. The figure however was only justified by manipulating the 
formula developed by the MoF.’ Due to the heavy dependence on funds controlled by the 
MoF, universities interact with the MoF on a range of issues, including policies of regular 
education expenditures and implementation of special university funding schemes. 
In addition, as mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, the Organization Department of the CPC Central 
Committee remains the primary authority and decision-maker for personnel matters. This 
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department leads a range of major special funding programs to attract and retain high-level 
overseas experts (particularly elite Chinese-born researchers) to work at Chinese institutions, 
including the ‘1000 Talents Plan’, ‘Young 1000 Talents Plan’, and ‘10000 Talents Plan’ (CPC 
News, 2013). Universities may interact with the department on these programs that are crucial 
to their interests. A number of university executives I spoke to have submitted policy 
recommendations and special letters and reports to the department regarding these 
programs. 
Despite its official rank within the State Council and its essential role for managing higher 
education which is vital for China’s development strategy, the MoE has been a relatively low-
profile, low-priority department in the central bureaucracy, with limited clout, fiscal resources 
and decision-making power in significant national projects. The MoE has limited financial 
independence and inadequate revenue sources. The MoF decides the national education 
funding allocated for the MoE based on the MoE’s budget proposals, and imposes spending 
conditions or rules that the MoE has to follow. Regular funding for universities is also directly 
provided to the universities’ accounts by the MoF. Although the MoE ostensibly manages some 
significant university funding programs, such as Projects 985 and 211, these are often in reality 
supervised by a multiplicity of actors, including the MoF, MoE, and NDRC that operates the 
‘985/211 Office’ located within the MoE. Therefore, the MoE’s implementation of existing or 
new programs is often subject to other central agencies’ endorsement and approval. 
In 2013, for instance, the MoF advised the MoE and some national universities that it would 
not fund another round of Project 985 unless it saw some ‘big changes’ to the existing 
operational model. The MoE was thus forced to develop and submit new proposals and await 
approval from MoF. Similarly, the new 2011 Scheme is also jointly developed and managed by 
the MoF and MoE, hence the MoE’s independent power over this program is largely 
constrained. Even when the MoE has sound policy suggestions and program proposals, it also 
often finds it challenging to seek or compete for central resources and support. Consequently, 
the MoE often acts like a lobbyist in front of high-powered agencies. An informant shared with 
me his experience: 
If we [universities] raise issues and make policy suggestions on for example the future 
of the 985 program, we first lobby the ‘985 Office’ at the MoE. The ‘985 Office’ at the 
MoE, however, has in turn to lobby the MoF for any changes or real outcomes. 
A Chinese higher education expert I interviewed also pointed out: 
If the MoE wants to ask the central government to provide more funds to universities, 
the first problem is how it can put this proposal on the powerful MoF officials’ ‘radar’ 
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and draw their attention. This proposal has to be presented to the right people 
[powerful officials at the MoF] who will open their ears and listen. Due to the big gap in 
power and status between the MoE and MoF, it is sometimes difficult for the MoE to 
even get the MoF’s attention or time, not to mention its support. 
Apparently the MoE has little influence on ‘the God of Wealth’ (caishenye 财神爷)—MoF. 
Sometimes, it is even a challenge for senior MoE officials to book a meeting with a mid-level 
MoF official. The MoE at times attempts to develop good relationships with the MoF, including 
through informal means. An insider shared with me a story: 
There was one time when a MoF section chief [mid-level official] was already attending 
a social dinner, he phoned [X, a senior-level official at the MoE] at the last minute to 
ask some MoE people to join him at the drinking and dining event. The MoE official had 
no choice but to please the section chief and send [Y, a MoE deputy minister] to drink 
with him. 
Such a situation naturally raises concerns amongst universities. According to protocol, national 
universities must in the first instance approach the MoE as their main supervisor to raise 
university-related policy issues. However, the MoE may not be able to help. As one university’s 
director of policy put it: 
Increasingly, our universities feel that some national policies are really constraining for 
us … The MoE also wants us to voice our views and ideas. But we all understand that 
the MoE does not have the final say or great influence on national matters, so our 
complaints and proposals do not work. 
This is particularly true of large funding schemes. One interviewee said: 
The MoF proposed a new policy on how to spend the new Project 985 funds. Many 
universities saw huge flaws and complained to the MoE. The MoE explained 
disappointedly to us that these issues were out of its hands, as it could not get a positive 
response from the upper levels and relevant ministries, including the MoF. 
Due to the MoE’s limited power and influence in central politics, universities often try to avoid 
the bureaucratic barriers, and go over the head of the MoE to directly lobby other higher 
decision-makers on some significant national policy issues.113 A chief financial officer at a 
university suggested that Chinese research universities’ finance offices make regular, direct 
                                                          
113 Guobing Zhang records some cases when university executives lobbied other ministries and national leaders to 
seek central funding support for education programs such as Project 211. It is often seen as ‘helping the MoE’ 
(Guobing Zhang, 2010, pp. 83-84). 
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contact with the MoF on financial policy issues, although in theory they should only speak to 
the MoE. He added: 
We feel that the MoF likes to hear from universities directly, because it can find out 
through universities how the MoE uses central funding and how effective the spending 
is. On the other hand, the MoE also encourages national universities to help it [MoE] in 
the central structure and seek the MoF’s attention by raising issues directly to the MoF. 
On one occasion, for instance, Tsinghua received some ‘internal intelligence’ through the MoE 
that a powerful central agency Z had drafted policies on a new funding program for young elite 
researchers. The agency was believed by universities and the MoE to lack professional 
expertise and experience in education and research-related policies. The draft policies it 
proposed for the new program focused on developing national science and technology and 
importing human capital, but neglected Chinese universities’ interests and needs in the area of 
domestic research training and postgraduate education. 
Tsinghua was very concerned about the draft policy that could, in the words of one 
interviewee, ‘destroy the future of research training development in China’. Tsinghua 
immediately liaised with PKU, prepared an urgent letter that was jointly signed by the two 
university presidents, and asked the Education Minister to hand it over to agency Z. The 
emotional and well-argued petition letter listed all the drawbacks of the draft policy, 
suggesting it was ‘a huge discrimination and disadvantage against domestically trained 
researchers’ and could ‘force talented Chinese students to go abroad’. It also offered feasible 
alternative options as policy recommendations. The issue quickly received Z’s attention, 
resulting in revisions of its policy before its formal implementation. 
SJTU also indirectly lobbied other agencies by offering a helping hand to the MoE. In 2008, 
when the international financial crises hit, China seized the opportunity and launched a ‘1000 
Talents Plan’ (or ‘1000 Plan’) to bring back overseas trained talents to universities and research 
institutes so that this could contribute their expertise and knowledge to China’s scientific 
research and national development. This high-end talent funding scheme is led by the 
Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CPC. The selection process requires 
universities to first lodge all applications to the MoE, which then selects and submits a shortlist 
to the Organization Department. The latter has the final say on the successful applicants. The 
‘1000 Plan’ provides significant funding to hundreds of scientists and professors, and is 
therefore an important program for both universities and the MoE. 
After three rounds of funding, however, some criticism of this scheme gradually emerged in 
the media, accompanied by scepticism whether the ‘money draining’ program delivered any 
159 
concrete results. While the Organization Department was re-considering whether it should 
continue or suspend this scheme, it also requested the MoE to respond to such criticism. The 
MoE’s Department of Personnel sought desperate assistance from SJTU that had research 
expertise and data in this area. Within only ten days, SJTU produced an urgent report to 
demonstrate that this scheme had achieved significant results in bringing in top talent and 
should continue. This report included scientific persuasion and factual analysis to prove the 
overall quality and high yields of the paid returnees, and listed evidence to forecast future 
demand for high-end human capital in China. It also included a number of concrete policy 
recommendations and argued convincingly that not only should the program continue but it 
should also be expanded to younger cohorts. The MoE then formally submitted this SJTU 
report to the Organization Department as its official response to the recent policy 
developments. 
Soon after, the ‘1000 Plan’ was continued and expanded, and it has been in operation to date 
(1000Plan.org, 2009). An interviewee involved in this case suggested that although it was 
difficult to measure the influence of the report in this high-level decision, he believed it 
certainly accelerated the decision-making process, including the introduction and development 
of the program’s by-product ‘Youth 1000 Talents Plan’. He added, ‘I recall that Li Yuanchao, the 
then head of Organization Department, once quoted verbatim some lines from our report at 
one of his major official speeches.’ 
Despite its widely perceived weakness, the position of the MoE may change in the future. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the official national expenditure reached 4% of GDP in 2012, covering 
all the expenditures for the education sector, including university funding programs. The 
delivery on the public promise of the government not only ensures that the MoF will allocate a 
guaranteed proportion of funds to the MoE annually, but also provides MoE with more power, 
discretion and control on how and where to spend the large investment on education, such as 
decisions on the existing and new university funding programs like Project 985 and the 2011 
Scheme. A university vice president explained: 
For quite a number of years in the last decade, China invested about 2% of GDP for 
education. The MoE and universities spared no effort to lobby the central leadership 
and MoF to seek and secure additional funding. But now a promised 4% of national GDP 
is to be allocated and provided to the MoE every year for the education sector. Once 
the MoF hands over the budgetary expenditure fund and leaves the money with the 
MoE, the MoE will be able to decide how to spend it and how to fund existing/new 
programs, so the dynamics will necessarily change. 
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The MoE will gain security, resources and governance power on national education 
investment. This power gain will likely reduce the need for MoE to lobby the central 
government for funding, and my interviewees have predicted that universities will also likely 
shift their focus and spend more efforts on directly lobbying the wealthier MoE to seek 
benefits, resources and support. 
The supreme power of the top leaders 
In 1998, Zhu Rongji was appointed Chinese Premier.114 He attended a national university 
consultation meeting at the Great Hall of the People and delivered a speech to university 
presidents and party secretaries. During that conference, many observed the then Education 
Minister Chen Zhili slowly walked to Zhu Rongji on the stage and handed him a note. After the 
discussion session ended, Zhu spoke assertively yet positively: ‘Just now Comrade Chen Zhili 
handed over a handwritten note to me, and it read “Dear Premier, please give some support to 
education” … I would like to promise an annual increase of 1% from the central financial 
budgetary expenditure for education.’ This surprising move was considered a significant 
annual growth and was warmly welcomed by universities. 
In the Chinese political system, top party-state leaders, including the CPC Politburo and its 
Standing Committee, hold paramount decision-making power. They may overturn and overrule 
any established policies and procedures as well as authorise new initiatives. The Chinese 
leaders’ supreme authority is evident in education policy areas. It is well documented that a 
number of most significant national science and education programs in China were often 
associated with individual national leaders’ personal decisions. Examples include Deng 
Xiaoping and the National High-tech R&D Programme (or Programme 863) (MoST, 2010b), 
Jiang Zemin and Project 985 (Min & Wen, 2010; MoE, 2011a; Guobing Zhang, 2010) and the 
Knowledge Innovation Project (KIP) (CAS, 1998a, 2012), as well as Hu Jintao and the 2011 
Scheme (MoF, 2014c). Many university leaders I spoke to suggested that the top leaders’ 
personal endorsement of these programs was vital for their successful implementation. The 
case of the drastic university enrolment expansion in 1999 is a good example of how the 
Politburo overturned existing education policies developed by the MoE. The Politburo 
authorised the State Council to abandon MoE’s standardised education policymaking 
procedures and immediately increase college enrolment, with the political goal to maintain 
social stability and economic growth, reduce unemployment rate, and strengthen its regime 
during financial crisis (Q. Wang, 2014, p. 151).  
                                                          
114 Zhu Rongji was Chinese Premier from 1998 to 2003. 
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Such intervention on education policies from top leaders was repeated in 2013. A university’s 
dean of undergraduate studies explained to me: 
This year [2013] [Chinese Premier] Li Keqiang suddenly asked all national universities to 
revise the existing university recruitment numbers for students from western regions, 
that was an increase of 30,000 student quota for the western regions. This directive 
came through long after the MoE had already developed and finalised its 2013 national 
student recruitment plan … It is a governance model ruled by men. In this case, it is all 
about a political agenda and equity … It is a huge decision … It is difficult for the MoE or 
universities to change or influence big decisions like this, but it is an ‘easy as pie’ matter 
for the national leaders such as premier and vice premiers. 
As another example, in 2009 universities and a number of key central organs, including the 
MoF and MoE, jointly proposed and endorsed a new policy on deregulating postgraduate 
tuition fees. However, then Premier Wen Jiabao refused to sign it off. The progress of the 
policy was blocked and its final implementation was held up by Wen until after the end of his 
term. 
Universities recognise the critical importance of interacting with top leaders. Having 
connections to top leaders and their support can be a game changer during the process of 
lobbying—as it opens up all opportunities and maximise chances of success. Through 
networking with top leaders and seeking their attention on significant, urgent or challenging 
policy matters, university actors can take advantage of the supreme decision power and 
topmost authority to receive special treatment and enjoy bureaucratic shortcuts and 
immediate results. 
Chinese scholars have provided evidence of such situations. Pan suggests that the personal 
relations between the Tsinghua leadership and national leaders created opportunities for the 
university to affect the government’s decisions, helped Tsinghua break the restrictions and 
constraints of national policy, and increased its capacity to make autonomous policies in 
pursuit of its own goals (Pan, 2007, pp. 138-139). As mentioned in Chapter 3, leaders of 
Tsinghua and PKU directly lobbied top leaders (Jiang Zemin and Li Lanqing) and successfully 
proposed an unprecedented national university funding policy, Project 985, which allowed 
them to fulfil their ambition to build world-class universities (Min & Wen, 2010, pp. 114-116; 
Guobing Zhang, 2010, pp. 65-67). 
A vice university president shared with me his experience: 
In the face of endless issues caused by the ‘countersigning system’ and the complexity 
of central politics, universities are often frustrated and exhausted. Every day we have 
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to deal with different views and attitudes from various central agencies, and it seems 
to take us forever to get a conclusion, decision, closure or final approval. We have found 
that the attention and intervention from a top leader can quickly resolve these issues, 
like a charm! 
Due to its sensitive nature and personal concerns, my interviewees appeared discreet when 
sharing details of specific examples about how they interacted with national leaders, whom 
they normally targeted and what policies or decisions they influenced. However, they assured 
me repeatedly that such strategies have worked well for them. One interviewee said: 
In the Chinese central governance, there is one top leader for each policy portfolio and 
policy area. When speaking about significant reforms, large policies or institutional 
changes requiring several layers of consideration and approval, the final decision 
ultimately comes down to the individual top leaders. It is vital to engage with and seek 
support from that particular person. 
Interviewees from leading research universities explained that they sometimes directly reach 
senior officials and leaders and seek their support through informal contacts (e.g., alumni 
network and personal guanxi) and private interactions (e.g., private chats and sending special 
personal letters). They also indirectly lobby them, such as through voicing their opinions at the 
‘neican’ (内参, known as ‘Internal reference’ or guonei dongtai qingyang 国内动态清样), an 
internally circulated paper that is read by high-ranking officials. 
According to my interviewees, in 2004, Tsinghua and PKU prepared a joint letter on the future 
of Project 985, which was signed by 20 prestigious academics and professors (ten professors 
from each university), and submitted to then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. During a more 
recent lobbying attempt for a new policy proposal for a joint PhD program in biology, a 
number of influential professors and overseas returnees sent a jointly signed letter to a CPC 
Politburo member and Chinese Vice Premier (for education) Liu Yandong, pleading her to grant 
the two universities a special policy green light for a new ‘policy trial’. They succeeded. 
One university leader shared with me his insights: 
Based on my experience and observation, many things that froze for a period of time 
saw a sudden breakthrough once they received the highest level’s attention. It helped 
universities cut through layers of bureaucratic procedures and barriers. Once the top-
level decision-makers provided personal views and instructions, the relevant central 
organs would quickly organise themselves and reach a consensus, leading to immediate 
results and actions. The most effective lobbying we have ever done and cannot restrain 
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from doing over and over again is the strategy of ‘reaching the top’ (zhijie zhaolingdao 
直接找领导). 
It is important to note that not all universities have the capacity to ‘reach the top’. Even for the 
elite universities that often have special connections with and access to the national leaders, 
this strategy has limitations. ‘Requesting top-level attention and support’, said one university 
leader, ‘is only saved for critical, challenging and urgent matters. You don’t want to overuse 
such relationships and invaluable power.’ I illustrate further how universities develop their ties 
and interact with national leaders in the next chapter. 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter presents some outstanding and peculiar characteristics of university lobbying 
practices in China. One striking finding is the contradiction between the prevalent, important 
practices of lobbying and the contentious language around lobbying: they do it but do not say 
it.  
Lobbying is a de facto common practice. Chinese national universities are so familiar and 
accustomed to lobbying that they see it as a most significant, regular and effective component 
of university–government interactions and is of extreme importance to the university sector. 
Nevertheless, youshui, the Chinese word of lobbying, is still politically and socially sensitive, 
lacks legitimacy and bears negative connotations which inhibit the formalisation of its 
practices. Scholars suggest that lobbying is not institutionalised in China and lobby groups 
often face legitimacy issues (Cheng, 2006, pp. 44,47-48; Cheng et al., 2003, p. 63; Kennedy, 
2009, pp. 213-214; Yue Wang, 2008, p. 40), and this includes the higher education sector (S. 
He, 2009, p. 8). As Scott Kennedy suggests, this situation to a large extent reflects a deep 
dilemma for the government: although the central leadership wants to appear more 
consultative on public policy, it fears the political consequences of permitting greater social 
activism (Kennedy, 2009, p. 213). The higher education sector is not an outlier in this pattern. 
On one side, the government needs increasing input and feedback from universities, informally 
accommodates and tolerate lobbying practice, and is indeed subject to influence; on the other, 
it is more comfortable with top-down communications and dislikes appearing vulnerable or 
subject to influence. 
Consequently, universities rely on various informal tactics and private interactions with the 
officialdom. University executives, especially those whose careers are controlled by the state, 
generally adopt covert, cautious and low-key approaches when dealing with government 
officials, and adjust their language and desensitise their actions accordingly. They hardly ever 
label their lobbying behaviour as ‘an attempt to influence the government’ to mitigate the 
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risks of confrontation. They tend to use alternative, non-confrontational, neutral expressions 
to describe youshui, such as ‘participation in policy discussions’, ‘providing policy feedback’, 
and ‘bottom-up reporting’, which reflect legitimate policy interactions, or recall acceptable 
bureaucratic practices.  
In addition, as another salient feature, lobbying in this sector is highly fragmented. Universities 
mostly lobby in an individual, self-focused, and specific issue-based form as opposed to the 
interest alignment and collective actions that I portrayed in the last chapter, even for a range 
of important issues of collective interest which require cooperative and joint actions by 
individuals. 
Direct lobbying remains the norm and main course of action because the state is especially 
wary about a collective voice and united policy initiative from universities that may lead to 
undesirable threat and challenge to its political authority, thus treats university lobby groups 
as an illegitimate form of policy communication and restrains their collective political activities. 
It is also partially due to the conflicted priorities, self-interested focus and competitions 
amongst universities, as well as the fragmentation of the central bureaucracy that complicates 
the sponsorships and government reporting of universities. The political factors seem more 
predominant than the other reasons, because university leaders have made serious attempts 
to lobby collectively on some policy issues but pulled back due to concerns on the potential 
political consequences. 
Nevertheless, although formal coalitions remain exceptional, universities developed an 
alternative solution within the confined authoritarian political and regulatory environment: 
they may ‘coordinate’ their lobbying efforts by acting simultaneously and separately on an 
important matter of common interest and consensus. This means talking to the same office at 
a similar time on the same issue with the same position, rather than taking concrete, joint 
action. Such an ‘alternative’ strategy avoids ‘political risks’ and circumvents the political 
constraints against formal organisation and alignment of interests. Although it can help 
achieving their goals, such a custom of ‘coordinated’ lobbying is unlikely to evolve into a 
formalised form of allies and organisation.  
This behaviour also demonstrates that despite their various strategies and activities of 
different natures, universities still largely act within the perceived rules and boundaries of 
statesociety interactions and remain cautious not to push the sensitive buttons of the 
government. 
Furthermore, universities’ capacity to successfully produce opportunities and exercise 
influence often depends on how well they understand a fragmented, hierarchical and opaque 
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political environment, and how well they identify the crucial central decision-makers (various 
state actors and targets) and exploit the fissures within the authoritarian system. Universities 
constantly monitor the central bureaucracy to have a clear sight of opportunities and changes 
in the system. 
Fragmentation, rivalry and hierarchy amongst central organs, and the supreme power of the 
top leaders are the most important characteristics of the central bureaucracy that universities 
try to exploit in the ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’(FA) framework (Lieberthal & Lampton, 
1992, pp. 2-24; Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988, p. 4).115 They identify and adjust their lobbying 
targets and strategies based on internal power relationships in the central bureaucracy.  
For instance, they explore and interact with multiple agencies simultaneously to maximise 
resources and policy support due to the fragmentation and power rivalry. They access the top 
leadership to cut through the limitation of the bureaucratic structure and receive policy 
shortcuts due to the supreme power of the national leaders. They also go over the head of 
their supervisory MoE and reach out to other central bodies to improve the standing of 
education or help the MoE to overcome its weakness in the power hierarchy. By monitoring, 
adapting themselves to and penetrating the central bureaucratic system, universities have 
shown their capacity to influence the government’s decisions and effectively seek comparative 
advantages.  
The universities’ lobbying experiences portrayed in Chapters 3 and 4 have demonstrated how 
universities strategically adapt what language to use, what matters to influence, when to act, 
who to network with, as well as how to share intelligence and experiences to overcome 
difficulties coming from formal collective activities. In this process, the political factors and 
regulatory environment, including the restrictive rules imposed on universities and the political 
power structure within the central bureaucracy, have a significant impact on universities’ 
positioning, choices and behaviour, including their lobbying targets, expressions, and both 
coordinated and uncoordinated actions as well as tactics. Universities shape their lobbying 
strategies and practices for specific policy issues or events based on their understanding and 
                                                          
115 The FA refers to a model for understanding policy process in the Chinese polity, including structural distribution 
of resources and authority; and processes of decision-making and policy implementation. The fragmented 
authoritarianism model argues that authority below the very peak of the Chinese political system is fragmented and 
disjointed. The fragmentation is structurally based and has been enhanced by reform policies regarding procedures. 
The fragmentation, moreover, grew increasingly pronounced under the reforms beginning in the late 1970s 
(Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992, p. 8; Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988).  
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knowledge of the regulatory and political conditions, and their estimation and judgement of 
what works the best in this system for the contingents. 
Meanwhile, by playing by the ‘rules of the game’ within the system to strategically influence 
specific policy issues and decisions/contingents (in either a coordinated or uncoordinated 
manner), universities have shown capacity to produce opportunities for certain elements of 
change, such as obtaining a competitive advantage, loosening up a specific regulatory 
constraint and attracting additional resources to the sector. 
However, the game of lobbying is not an even playing field, as elite universities in general have 
much more capacity, resources and personal connections to effectively utilise those strategies 
in this central system than those smaller, lower-tiered institutions. Thus, the latter is largely 
disadvantaged in competition. 
As a repository of scientific knowledge, social and political influence and connections, and as 
central players in delivering the national developmental strategy, would universities gain more 
influence and leverage in the governmental process? The next chapter examines the most 
significant aspects of the universities’ toolkit and tactics when adapting to this complex 
bureaucracy and lobbying government officials in various scenarios. 
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Chapter 5—Lobbying imperfect institutions: human 
factors, scientific persuasion and policy 
experimentation 
Introduction 
Every government organisation develops self-restraining rules and legitimate institutions to 
ensure its operation and regulate the conduct and behaviour of its agents in the governmental 
process (X. Liu, 2007, pp. 9-10). Since 1979, the Chinese government has undertaken reforms 
and developed new rules to render the system more legible and predictable by formalising 
official procedures (K. Yu, 2008, pp. 8-12). A ‘government personnel accountability system’ 
(guanyuan wenzezhi 官员问责制) and a ‘public servants law’ (gongwuyuanfa 公务员法), for 
instance, were introduced as institutional rules to constrain power abuse of individuals within 
government organisations (L. Han & Xie, 2013, p. 83; X. Liu, 2007, p. 10; K. Yu, 2008, p. 11). So 
has the new institutional structure of this unique authoritarian system changed its operational 
and regulatory environment and governmental processes? More importantly for my discussion 
here, how has this development impacted on universities and their lobbying practices? 
The chapter provides an in-depth study on the workings of these institutions and processes 
within the central system, especially the institutionalisation versus informal and personal 
factors. It then examines the most significant aspects of the universities’ lobbying strategies in 
various scenarios when they interact with the system. 
This chapter reveals that in the university sector, informal and personal factors still prevail in 
the central system due to a range of political, institutional, normative and economic factors. 
The idea that the Chinese system becomes more institutionalised and the importance of 
guanxi is changing (Deng & Kennedy, 2010, p. 124; Gold et al., 2002; Guthrie, 1998, 1999; 
Kennedy, 2008, p. 109; 2009, p. 207; USCBC, 2008) is challenged by the enduring centrality of 
these factors in the central system and in universitygovernment interactions.  
The capacity of universities to adapt and prosper in such a complex bureaucratic setting largely 
depends on their accumulation and deployment of three specific forms of social and cultural 
capital. These are the most significant aspects of the universities’ toolkit: mobilising human 
factors (e.g., personal connections, alumni networks and intelligence gathering), rational 
persuasion through knowledge (e.g., presenting evidence and third-party endorsement), and 
involvement in local policy experimentation (e.g., policy innovation to force a new policy and 
leading by example (Heilmann, 2008, pp. 2-4, 29-30)). This chapter investigates these three 
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aspects. It concludes that the central system plays a dominant role in shaping universities’ 
lobbying behaviour; and that universities’ lobbying strategies may potentially produce 
incremental impact on the system. 
Institutionalising the Chinese state 
‘Institutions’ are usually understood as semi-persistent ‘formal and informal procedures, 
routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity or 
political economy’ (Haggart, 2014, pp. 34-35, 46). Institutions generally provide a defined 
framework of rules, regulations, norms and standards for human behaviour and interactions. A 
related term ‘formalisation’ refers to the extent to which ‘rules governing behaviour are 
precisely and explicitly formulated and … roles and role relations are prescribed independently 
of the personal attributes of individuals occupying positions in the structure’ (Guthrie, 1999, p. 
43; Scott, 1987, p. 33). For the purpose of this chapter, I broadly define both 
institutionalisation and formalisation as the progressive establishment of formal rules or 
norms, or the standard operating procedures and structures that govern the operations and 
behaviour of bureaucratic organisations and their relationships with external actors. 
The motivation and logic behind the institutional formalisation of an organisation shape the 
outcome of the process and what new rules are adopted. Institutions may reduce personal 
influence in the organisation structure and its operations, or create greater regulation, 
routinisation, objectivity, stability and transparency of decision-making. Scholars have 
provided various characterisations of such a process. From a rationalist perspective (Elster & 
Hylland, 1985; Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 944-946; Shepsle & Weingast, 1987, pp. 85-104; 
Swidler, 1986, pp. 273-286), formalisation is a rationalisation process enacted by the 
management or leadership of the organisation to simplify internal relationships, and increase 
efficiency, predictability, and profitability. As informality and personal factors (variable 
personal traits, hierarchy, and factions) often cause organisational inefficiency and volatility, 
many new rules and principles (formalised organisational processes) are intentionally 
developed to reduce the influence of these personal and informal elements. 
The institutionalist perspective, on the other side, posits that organisations exist in institutional 
environments, and often adopt institutions for reasons of legitimacy rather than because of 
the demands of efficiency and productivity. In other words, the new institutional forms, 
practices and procedures adopted by modern organisations are cultural-specific. Even the 
most seemingly bureaucratic practices are shaped by ideas about what they mean in a specific 
cultural or normative environment. The goal is to enhance the social legitimacy of these 
organisations or their participants, and respond to normative pressures, political mandates, or 
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economic certainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, pp. 1-40; Dobbin, Sutton, Meyer, & Scott, 1993; 
Edelman, 1990; Guthrie, 1999, p. 44; Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 946-950; Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 
pp. 340-363). As social factors and cultural practices shape institutional outcomes, such 
institutional structures may be more symbolic than practical (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 946-950; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977, pp. 340-363; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, pp. 1-40). 
Campbell described the distinction as a ‘logic of social appropriateness’ in contrast to a ‘logic 
of instrumentality’ (Campbell, 1995, p. 8). For example, Soysal illustrates that the policies 
toward immigrants adopted by many states in Europe were pursued, not because they were 
most functional for the nation, but because the evolving conceptions of human rights 
promulgated by international regimes made such policies seem appropriate and others 
illegitimate in the eyes of national authorities (Soysal, 1994, pp. 141-142).  
So how does this discussion apply to China? Guthrie’s work (Guthrie, 1999, pp. 42-44) on 
formal rational bureaucracies in Chinese firms clearly fits more with the social institutional 
perspective than with rationalist theories. His research shows that the formalisation of 
organisations during economic transition is often not a consequence of a rational calculation 
to maximise profits. While Chinese firms may be embracing Western-style structures with the 
long-term goal of efficiency, they are adopting these specific institutional structures because 
they are perceived as being efficient based on the success of Western companies. As such they 
respond to normative pressures, and imitate the practices of other successful organisations, 
which represent a type of legitimacy in line with the ideals and organisational models hailed as 
exemplary in the economic transition. 
In the cases illustrated by Guthrie (1999), formalisation has, to a certain extent, reduced the 
importance of informal behaviour and personal relationships in an organisational structure. 
For instance, company managers allow connections and networks to factor significantly into 
labour market decisions and practices. Thus, the effect is more than symbolic. However, social, 
normative, and economic factors, such as the background, professionalism and economic 
conception of general manager, firm location, and foreign investment partnership, all play an 
important role in the institutional decisions. 
The institutionalist perspective appears to explain the reasons behind the Chinese 
government’s institutionalisation better than rationalist theories. In facing pressure from the 
public to improve its efficiency and behaviour, the government needs to constantly adjust its 
practices, review its relationships with social organisations, and establish new structures and 
rules, to respond to changes of values and norms in society (Sha, Yuan, Jian, & Wang, 2009, p. 
233). While the CPC has been in a protracted state of ‘atrophy’ (Shambaugh, 2008a, 2008b), it 
has undertaken a number of pragmatic, incremental and adaptive measures aimed at 
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reinventing itself and strengthening its rule to retain its grip on power in an effort to 
strengthen the regime itself. Its institutional adjustments are deliberately established in order 
to deal with social pressures, adapt to the socialist market economy system, and create new 
bases for the social and political legitimacy of the CPC’s authority (X. Liu, 2007, p. 10; Zheng, 
2010, p. 43).  
In the early reform period, informal practices prevailed in every Chinese organisation at every 
level, but were particularly intense at the highest level of the state. Personal judgement was 
crucial, demand for quick decisions was great, and secrecy was imperative (Pye, 1992, pp. 171-
179). Since 1978, the Chinese government has started to establish a range of self-restraining 
rules and formal policies to increase accountability, regulate its internal organisations, and 
reduce informal, personal practices (X. Liu, 2007, p. 10; K. Yu, 2008, pp. 8-12). The 15th National 
Party Congress in September 1997 indicated that the Chinese government began its official 
process of management legalisation and formal institutionalisation (zhengshi zhidu 正式制度). 
At the 17th National Party Congress and 11th National People’s Congress, the government 
reports presented by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao respectively covered 
detailed analysis of the institutionalisation of the administrative system. According to Hu’s 
report, the areas for institutional reform included: moving the central government’s functional 
role away from ‘centralised control’ to ‘supervision and services provision’; linking 
accountability to individual officials’ power; improving the government’s overall responsibility 
system; improving scientific decision-making (kexue juece 科学决策); regulating administrative 
behaviour; regulating administrative approval procedures (xingzheng shenpi 行政审批); 
improving the coordination of central organs; as well as reducing the official ranks within the 
administrative hierarchy (xingzheng cengci 行政层次) (Jintao Hu, 2007).Again, reports from 
the 18th Party Congress in October 2014 also indicated reform in the same direction 
(Xinhuanet, 2014a).116 
To demonstrate the progress of governmental institutionalisation during early 1979August 
2008, the State Council issued 1,110 internal administrative regulations or organisational 
policies, including regulations on administrative policy formulation and decision-making 
proceedings, administrative agency establishment and staffing, as well as a civil servants act 
and administrative supervision and review law. Between September 2001 and October 2007, 
the State Council also cancelled or improved 1,992 administrative approval items to reduce 
                                                          
116 While Hu/Wen tenures promoted rules and institutions, Xi’s first term suggests a return to autocratic rule and 
concentration of power in the elites. It remains unknown whether there will be a decline of institutions, and how it 
will impact on universities. 
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bureaucratic procedures for administrative examination and approval and black-box 
operations. A government staff legal training system was gradually established at many central 
organs (Q. Huang, 2008, pp. 46-47).  
With the need to make informed decisions, the state also increased consultations and 
deliberations in policy processes, especially with experts, to facilitate the drafting of policies. 
The development of think tanks and decision-making consultations became an agenda for the 
first time in a CPC document in 2013.117 A former vice president of the Party School Li Junru 
said (Y. Chen, 2014):  
In an effort to improve deliberative, consultative democracy, the CPC is in the process 
of developing new rules and regulations to define which significant national issues have 
to be deliberated before decisions are made … In the future process of decision-making, 
think tanks can play a role. The reports by important think tanks may even directly 
become the basis for decisions.  
Is it appropriate to assume that such a lengthy process of institutionalisation has direct (and 
indirect) consequences on government organisations, universities, as well as individuals? The 
existence of such new institutional arrangements does not, on its own, constitute evidence of 
a dramatic shift away from the enduring practices of the pre-reform system. As Guthrie 
suggests, if the new institutional, rational-legal structures adopted at the state level are having 
little impact on decisions and practices on the ground, this indicates that, even in the reform 
era, elements of the past communist system, such as personalised patron-client authority 
relations, would endure (Guthrie, 1999, p. 72). So have the pragmatic adjustments and 
adaptive measures adopted at the central level to enhance legitimacy significantly changed the 
traditional structures of authority relations and the norms of informality in the system or on 
the ground? Have they altered the interactions between the government and universities? 
Higher education governance: institutionalised arrangements 
versus informal practices 
Through interviewing numerous university executives, I learnt about their personal 
experiences and firsthand observations on the internal operations, policy processes and 
decision-making within the central system, especially the various government bodies that 
                                                          
117 The CPC document ‘the CPC central committee’s decisions on several major issues about deepening reform’ 
(zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding 中共中央关于全面深化
改革若干重大问题的决定) was issued at the third plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee meeting in 
2013. 
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produce higher education and research policies and regulations (W. Huang, 2002).118 They 
suggested that under constant pressure and demand to improve their public accountability 
and transparency, the central agencies have demonstrated a growing consciousness of public 
credibility and fairness. The governance is, at least on paper, becoming more formalised with 
respect to organisational budgeting, procedures and structures. However, the overwhelming 
view is that despite the increasing institutional formalisation, informal and personal practices 
prevail and the traditional relations and norms endure in the central system. This situation has 
impacted on universities’ lobbying behaviour and outcomes.  
Institutionalised arrangements 
Being part of the central system, the higher education governance has undertaken a series of 
institutional reforms, including formalising the internal organisational structures and 
regulating education policymaking processes, with the aim of transforming the highly 
hierarchical and centralised ‘government control model’ to a more participatory, autonomous 
and rational ‘government supervision model’. If the system is successfully reformed, 
universities would ‘receive greater institutional autonomy and accountability’ (M. Yang, 2003a, 
pp. 3-4).  
In recent years, the official procedures for various major higher education policies and funding 
programs, such as the 2011 Scheme administered by the MoE and MoF (MoF, 2014c), have 
been increasingly built on policy research, public consultations, policy assessment and peer 
reviews, as well as merit-based selection and deliberations. Many central ministries, such as 
the MIIT, have become particularly strict on funding applications and appraisal, especially in 
sensitive research areas such as national defence technologies.119 A national funding proposal 
may take several years before its implementation.120 An interviewee shared his experience on 
the progress of this institutionalisation: 
Ten years ago, the requirement of ‘ticking all the boxes and going through all the steps’ 
did not exist. A chief of an MoE office (chuzhang 处长), for example, was often able to 
                                                          
118 As explained in Chapters 1 and 4, the MoE and its subordinate departments are the core education governance 
body (Yao, 2004), but national higher education and research policies are closely associated with a number of 
central government organisations and actors, such as the State Council, the MoF, the MoST, and the NDRC. 
119 Some typical procedures include recommendation letters from third-party financial companies, investment 
appraisal, project practicality assessment, preliminary design evaluation, inspections and acceptance, and financial 
auditing. 
120 One example is a significant national funding program ‘Large Science Project’ (dakexue gongcheng 大科学工程) 
led by the NDRC. It has taken some universities five years to go through the proceedings and receive an initial 
approval. 
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make an on-the-spot decision on many matters such as medium-scale national 
programs. But now things are more regulated. The officials have to follow the rules, go 
through all procedures, and tick off the boxes. At least now one can see and feel some 
level of ‘procedural fairness’ (chengxu gongzheng 程序公正) on paper, although within 
each of the defined procedures, the actual conducts and practices may be quite 
different from the ‘theory’. 
Expert panels have been added to the mandated policymaking proceedings of many major 
national policies and funding projects. In March 2014, for instance, the MoE initiated and 
convened a series of consultations with university representatives and education experts to 
collect suggestions on the gaokao reform and student admissions policies. Such procedural 
measures help the government strengthen its political and social legitimacy, and demonstrate 
to the public that its decisions are ‘fair, objective and open’. Some interviewees hold an 
optimistic view that the increasing involvement of academics in the government processes 
may help promote objectivity and integrity in public policymaking. One interviewee said: 
I participated in a number of government formal proceedings and expert panels for 
national policies and programs. I saw that some members on the expert committees, 
especially those overseas returnees and foreign trained professors, took their policy 
advisory roles very seriously. Sometimes they did their own investigations and debated 
vigorously about certain facts at our panel meetings. Notwithstanding the strong 
administrative power in the central bureaucracy, I believe that the integrity and 
intellectual engagement of these experts will bring positive influence to bear and 
gradually improve the quality, objectivity and openness of governmental policies. 
To a certain extent, the government has become more consultative and willing to consider 
universities’ opinions and advice, especially on technical and professional matters and complex 
macro-level reform issues which largely require experts’ knowledge. The MoE officials, for 
instance, often seek policy ideas and feedback directly from personnel of key national 
universities. Numerous university executives suggested that they often receive personal 
invitations for face-to-face meetings or phone calls from their MoE colleagues on specific 
matters. When developing new policies, it is common for MoE officials to organise small, 
private meetings with personnel from only a few prestigious universities. They often ask my 
interviewees questions such as ‘what do you think about this approach? How would it work?’ 
Many interviewees gained a strong impression that government officials work hard and 
prudently to ‘avoid any mishaps and public embarrassment’. They also seek a rationale to 
justify their decisions, because stakeholders that are disadvantaged by certain government 
policies often contest and question the officials. 
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Informality and human factors 
Despite these new arrangements and developments, personal and informal practices remain 
central and prevalent in the complex bureaucratic structure and throughout the operational 
proceedings and organisational decision-making process. This resonates with what some 
Chinese scholars have observed: informal, personal practices and rule violations are 
widespread in central agencies in China (Cao et al., 2013, p. 461; Y. Shi & Rao, 2010, p. 1128; 
W. Zhou, 2011, pp. 18-19).121  
For example, scholars find that a substantial portion of public funding is funnelled to favourite 
scientists and universities through informal channels, such as internal deliberations, earmarks 
or informal requests, rather than through rigorous and fair peer review processes. Competitive 
advantages are given to those who maintain close relations with government officials, such as 
favourable evaluation and career promotion. Some scientists are able to receive major 
financial support from multiple sources. Information on internal deliberations, including 
nomination for fellowships with the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Chinese Academy of 
Engineering, supposedly strictly confidential, are at times disclosed to those who have guanxi. 
Academics on personal terms with officials receive a disproportionate support for their 
research in China and are more likely to be considered for various academic honours (Cao et 
al., 2013, p. 461; Y. Shi & Rao, 2010, p. 1128). My interviews have strongly supported and 
proved the above observations. Institutionalisation has not reduced the importance of 
informality and what I call ‘human factors’. 
In this thesis, I broadly define ‘human factors’ (renwei yinsu 人为因素) as ‘personal 
relationships and informal interactions with the policy interest-related actors inside and 
outside the government (officials and policy advisors), as well as the personal attributes of 
individual government officials (personal interests, background and ties)’. ‘Informality’ 
generally refers to the informal behaviour, conducts and interactions of policy actors (e.g., 
officials, policy advisors and consultants) in the government structure and processes which are 
against, or near the border of, formal regulations and codes of conduct. In this chapter, human 
factors and informal practices closely relate to each other, with examples including personal 
arbitrary discretions, power abuse to pursue special interests, and the capacity to speed up 
decision-making or twist the rules. 
To illustrate the prevalence of human factors and informal practices in the system, I focus on 
four aspects of interaction: the authority relationships within the government organisations, 
                                                          
121 Examples of the rule violations include officials’ abuse of administrative approval authority, personal 
misconducts, and breach of confidence. I will elaborate later in the chapter. 
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power concentration and discretions of individual officials, policy consultations for decision-
making, and policy implementation and rule enforcement. 
Authority relationships 
Andrew Walder’s (1986) research on the structure of the work unit in pre-reform China reveals 
an organisational system that emphasises political and social relations in the firm, and the 
workers’ dependence on supervisors, management, and the party. The relationships between 
workers and supervisors were particularistic, and supervisors had considerable discretion over 
processes in the workplace. Supervisors within organisations made decisions about worker 
advantages and advancement based on personal relations and attributes, unrestrained by 
formal rules or routinised decision-making systems (Guthrie, 1999, pp. 44-45; Walder, 1986). 
The validity of Walder’s analysis still extends to most of the formal institutions of the socialist 
state. 
Due to the legacy of clientelism and a culture of hierarchical authority within the government 
bureaucracy, government personnel are highly submissive to their work-group leaders and 
superiors, and comply with their instructions deferentially without questioning. The 
government officials I spoke to suggested that they may attempt to provide advice and 
persuade their superiors on certain matters, but they never challenge the superiors’ personal 
views or decisions, even when they seem erroneous or unethical. Why? In the central cadre 
system, one’s personal career and promotion opportunities are in the hands of the superiors, 
so as an interviewee said, ‘It is wise not to offend or hassle them [supervisors]—just listen and 
do it!’ A university executive has observed that the hierarchical relationships within the central 
bureaucracy seem to have gotten worse and worse in recent years. He described: 
For many big decisions, if the superior in charge (zhuguan shangji lingdao 主管上级领
导) makes up his mind, indicates his wish, or simply nods, his subordinates will and must 
abide by it, even if the subordinates feel that the decision is inappropriate or makes 
little sense … This deeply-embedded organisational culture is very difficult to change. 
In the meantime, as the government leaders and superiors can significantly impact on their 
subordinates’ handling of policy matters, this hierarchical structure and logic of authority 
relationships have been taken advantage by universities in lobbying. A university executive 
shared with me his experience and strategy: 
When the heads of divisions (sizhang 司长) refuse to help a university or disagree with 
it on a policy decision, the university can lobby their bosses—the higher levels of senior 
executives, such as minister or deputy minister, because they have the personal power 
to overturn the earlier decisions by the heads of divisions. 
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Individual powers 
A flat government structure facilitates top-down and bottom-up communications and enables 
ground intelligence to reach the top more rapidly and uninterruptedly (M.-a. Jiang, 2008, p. 
76). Whereas China’s hierarchical and fragmented structure (as illustrated in Chapter 4) is 
highly susceptible to personal and informal influences at various administrative levels, leading 
to inflated personal discretions and the concentration and abuse of power. One salient feature 
is that individual officials’ administrative powers and discretions often seem to be greater and 
broader in practice than formally defined for their level. This applies to individual officials 
ranging from high-level decision-makers, to middle-level policy developers and directors, to 
ground-level policy implementers and administrators. Subsequently, these actors involved in a 
policy process may all affect the policy outcomes. 
As I discussed in Chapter 4, the government leaders and senior executives hold significant 
personal decision-making authority and influence. It is not rare that substantial policy 
deliberations are ultimately concluded and decided based solely on their personal preferences. 
An interviewee said: 
Some high-ranking individuals in the central government, for instance, can quickly 
decide to invest three billion yuan on one specific province instead of another 
[province]. Similarly, some senior leaders and executives at the MoE have a great 
authority and discretion to decide on, for example, which national universities should 
receive special funding for a large campus infrastructure project. When high-level 
officials want to do something, they possess the power to make it happen. Their 
decisions on policy matters are often subject to personal backgrounds, ties and 
personalities. 
A university vice president pointed out: 
The higher [rank] you go, the more flexible it becomes. Government officials, especially 
higher-level leaders and executives, often follow their own feelings (genzhe ganjue zou 
跟着感觉走) when they are making administrative judgements or decisions. 
As Chen suggests, due to their influence and discretion, high-level officials’ public statements 
and casual comments are often carefully analysed and acted upon by the government as a 
directive or guidance for forthcoming policies or future development directions. Their personal 
visits to a university or attendance in a campus event are often interpreted as special ties and 
endorsement for that university (C. Chen, 2009, pp. 42-43) which may indicate priority 
support. The universities I spoke to pay particular attention to strengthening their ties and 
activities with the senior officialdom, such as inviting them to their campuses.  
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In the meantime, the mid-level management officials of the bureaucracy, such as heads of 
divisions (sizhang 司长), chiefs of offices (chuzhang 处长) and directors of sections (zhuguan 
主管),122 often hold discretional authority and make executive decisions on the details of small 
and medium national policies, such as the numbers of recipients and financing of funding 
programs. They also manage the drafting and implementation of the specifics and 
technicalities of major national policies, such as national student recruitment reforms. 
Particularly, the mid-level officials from the central units that handle and allocate ‘resources’ 
possess significant powers, because many funds are in their hands. A central ministry’s office, 
for instance, has the authority to manage detailed distributions of some major national funds 
to individual university recipients. A university executive explained to me the significant 
discretion and influence of the chief of that office: 
We are talking big numbers here, like millions. If the chief decides to move her fingers 
a little to the left when writing on the paper, and make a slight modification to the 
figure, which she can, it will make a difference of millions of yuan to us [universities]. 
A university’s vice president pointed out: 
In comparison, the government may establish more boundaries and rules for significant 
national policy decisions, such as large competitive funding projects, than 
implementation-level policies, such as medium and small-scale grants. Some formal 
proceedings like peer review-based selection are mandated for the former but not for 
the latter. Hence, mid-level officials can make swift and final decisions on many medium 
policies or implementation issues. 
This situation allows space for personal manipulation and game playing for both officials and 
universities. A university vice president suggested to me without providing further details that 
some government executives have favoured certain institutions that they have special 
personal connections with, and created tailored programs (teshu zhuanxiang 特殊专项) just to 
fit these institutions’ conditions and needs. A former middle-rank government official also 
admitted to me in private that he has helped his old university secure significant funding 
numerous times and suggested that it is a common practice amongst his government 
colleagues. By mobilising human factors and exploiting such fissures in the government, the 
universities have advanced their competitive interests. 
                                                          
122 Three major levels/ranks of MoE organisational management include ministers and deputy ministers (buji 部级), 
heads of departments or divisions (siji 司级), and chiefs or heads of sections or offices (chuji 处级). 
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Another interesting aspect of middle-level officials’ power is how they can reshape the upper-
level decisions and their implementation in practice. A university executive shared his 
experience: 
This has happened to us several times: after the upper-level executives have made 
decisions to approve and support our policy proposals, the mid-level directors in charge 
of actual implementation ‘conveniently’ misinterpreted or altered some technical 
details of the decisions, or even intentionally delayed the implementation 
process … That was because they felt disrespected or humiliated that we lobbied their 
superiors and put pressure on them … Therefore, to prevent such resistance, we have 
to make a great effort to maintain good guanxi with officials at all levels and to keep 
them all in the loop. 
In addition, the ground-level administrative personnel also have effective individual powers 
depending on their roles and responsibilities. For instance, some junior officials have 
important gatekeeping authority and discretion, including to validate university applications 
with an official stamp (gaizhang 盖章) or reject one’s proposal upfront on a small technicality. 
These officials may decide on when and how to apply a certain rule to block approval of a 
specific project. During a meeting that I attended in China, a number of university presidents 
complained in private that many junior government clerks held too much of such power over 
university matters and were difficult for them to deal with. 
Policy consultations 
Despite increasing consultations and expert panels, in certain restricted policy areas that 
normally involve sensitive or high-stake issues (the ‘no-go zone’ and ‘contention zone’ as I 
illustrated in Chapter 2), the government continues to have a dominating, top-down 
policymaking style with minimal consultations, openness and transparency in the process. For 
instance, several universities have complained to me about a specific central ministry’s division 
which approves new campus construction and infrastructure projects (jijian xiangmu 基建项
目). The division often applies rules and standards from a very old 1992 policy document 
(partially revised in 2004) to scrutinise and reject universities’ construction proposals. An 
interviewee explained that the government officials know the 1992 policy is extremely 
outdated, rigid and irrational. Universities request them to relax the rules, but they ‘hold onto 
them tightly and use them whenever they need to justify arbitrary decisions (jieshiquan 
quanzai tanali 解释权全在他那里)’. In episodes like this, universities have to employ informal 
tactics to network with the relevant officials and explore loopholes. 
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What about the other policy matters that allow for formal consultations? In the Introduction 
and Chapters 1 and 2, I demonstrated that the government has increasingly involved 
professional experts and non-state stakeholders in the official policymaking proceedings to 
seek trustworthy information and technical advice, as well as to legitimise their decision-
making and prevent mishaps. This is especially true of new, major national policies. However, 
the participation of various non-state entities is not yet formally accommodated and 
supported at the institutional level (H. Han, 2013, p. 327). Commonly, the state receives policy 
advice from think tanks that operate within the confines of the system, most of which it 
controls directly (Sharma, 2014). In numerous cases, public policy consultations remain simply 
a show. The deputy director of the Zhejiang Provincial Experts Advisory Committee pointed out 
during a media interview that, ‘Government leaders do not pay enough attention to experts’ 
advice, and think tanks only play a limited role in China … Bureaucratic domination of the 
policy process is a latent rule (qianguize 潜规则)’ (Y. Chen, 2014). My interviewees portrayed a 
picture of how the government officials lead and shape policy consultations, exercise and 
reinforce their administrative power, and influence the outcomes. Here I focus on some of the 
most important aspects. 
First, government officials decide on the composition and memberships of expert advisory 
committees (zhuanjia zixunzu 专家咨询组) and consultation meetings (yijian zhengqiuhui 意见
征求会). For instance, in the process of drafting China’s Medium and Long-term Development 
Plan for Science and Technology during 20032006, the State Council conducted consultations 
with various experts and stakeholders. In reality, the government invited very few experts with 
opposing opinions (Liu Li, 2009, p. 26). Officials generally selected university executives and 
academics with whom they already had good connections and knew well. A university 
executive pointed out: 
It would be more rational, scientific and useful if the government conducts genuine 
public consultations with a wider range of stakeholders and impartial experts. However, 
it is more convenient, expedient and comfortable for the officials to discuss with their 
familiar, close contacts for policy decisions and issues—the people they already know 
and trust well, and have developed good guanxi. Hence, it is a common practice to 
include their friends to the consultations and the policy advisory and expert panels.  
Consequently, conflicts of interest abound; such practices favour certain universities and 
disadvantage the others in terms of policy access and influence. University N in Beijing is well 
known for its frequent involvement and strong presence in the advisory committees on certain 
policy matters due to its close ties with the central officials in charge of that policy area. This 
will likely advance N’s interests. Universities J and T have often missed out such opportunities 
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as they have relatively weak links and are geographically distant from the nation’s capital. 
Several other national universities are also known to have successfully influenced state officials 
to include their ‘preferred’ members (their ‘own people’) to various policy expert panels of 
national awards and programs, resulting in winning in the selections and assessments. 
Government officials can also reveal confidential information to their connected institutions 
about the composition of anonymous expert panel members. The universities then lobby these 
members individually for good ratings and votes. Interactions of such nature ‘happen very 
frequently’, especially for the policies related to awards, quotas and allocations of resources. 
Second, government officials maintain leadership over the ad hoc advisory committees, and 
the recommendations and conclusions made by the committees remain subject to the officials’ 
personal interventions and preferences. According to my interviewees who are involved in 
government policy consultations, the officials and committee members generally have a 
superiorsubordinate relationship (shangxiaji guanxi 上下级关系) and an unequal dialogue. 
For university executives and academics, maintaining a good guanxi with officials is imperative 
for their career and funding (Cao et al., 2013, p. 461; Pan, 2007; Y. Shi & Rao, 2010, p. 1128; R. 
Yang et al., 2007, p. 461). When the government officials express their strong advocacy or hint 
personal inclinations, the members on the expert panels typically ‘take the hints’ (xin ling shen 
hui 心领神会) and follow their instructions. In addition, policy advisors and expert committee 
members are often subject to human factors themselves and present the biased, special 
interests of their institutions and friends in policy process. These personal and informal 
conducts and conflicts of interest raise serious integrity and ethical issues. 
Some interviewees expressed their frustrations about the prevalent human factors during the 
consultation process, and suggested that universities have no choice but to network with 
officials and panel members informally for favourable support on a range of national policies. 
When they failed to do so, they were quickly eliminated by the officials and committees, even 
though they were the top performers and highest ranked in the policy process. ‘We feel 
discriminated and bullied by this system,’ one interviewee said. 
Policy execution and supervision 
A similar ratio of formal and informal practices is also at work in the realm of policy execution 
and implementation. Formal rules and principles remain subject to officials’ arbitrary 
interpretations and personal discretions. It is not rare that individual government officials 
manipulate or customise introduced policies and operate near the margin of the written rules 
and regulations to fit their own needs. Government officials, for example, skipped certain 
proceedings, fast-tracked the applications and proposals by favoured universities, and 
disclosed confidential information on competitive funding and selection details. They not only 
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twist or bend the rules themselves, but also tolerate their connected universities to bend the 
rules. Two central organs, for instance, are said to have turned a blind eye when several 
universities failed to abide by some policies and operated on the border of legality. One central 
ministry has also quietly allowed some universities to conduct policy experiments despite the 
lack of formal permissions. This rule-bending culture in the government creates opportunities 
and a space of flexibility for some universities to gain greater resources and autonomy in the 
rigid regulatory environment. 
As an example, University H and University W received some funding for institutional 
development. The government policy stated that the money was strictly for lab equipment 
purchases, but H and W broke the rules and used some of the funding for staff salaries and 
research overheads which were severely underfunded. The government officials decided to 
keep their eyes half-shut. The universities continued doing it for a while. A university vice 
president commented: 
In many other countries where rules and procedures have been well established and 
the system has been formally regulated, people naturally follow the routines and 
standards. Yet, in China, as long as one does not commit crimes, break the law, or have 
anti-social, anti-party behaviour, almost everything is flexible and negotiable! Many 
things will not work out smoothly in China if one only follows the formal rules written 
on paper. 
Explanations 
From the above analysis, we can infer that the Chinese system is imperfectly institutionalised. 
Formal institutions have played a limited role in restraining informal and personal factors. The 
goals of the institutional reforms of higher education administration are far from being 
fulfilled.123 So why have human factors remained influential against all odds and predictions? 
According to Douglass North, institutions, as human-devised constraints that structure human 
interactions, are formed by formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints 
(norms of behaviour, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement 
characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically 
economies (North, 1993). A brief analysis of these three institutional aspects may provide the 
answers to the case of China. 
                                                          
123 As explained earlier in the chapter, the goals are regulating the internal organisational structure and processes, 
and transforming the higher education governance model and governmentuniversity relations. 
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First, formal rules are flawed and inadequate. The goal of deliberate institutionalisation is to 
deal with socio-economic pressures and strengthen its regime, rather than seeking genuine 
improvements of efficiency and transparency. The new institutional rules within the Chinese 
government organisations are mostly internally developed by officials without sufficient public 
supervision and participation. They are driven by self-interest, contain ambiguity and conflicts 
of interest, and are incapable of meeting the needs of social change and of universities’ 
development alike. Many core elements in the system, such as authority relations, power 
concentration and the lack of formal institutions for bottom-up initiatives by non-state actors, 
remain unsolved.  
For instance, during the formal institutionalisation, the fundamental principles of the system 
persistently focus on the central leaders’ paramount authority, concentration of power, and 
their personal directives. The ‘new’ institutions are put in place to legitimise and strengthen, 
not change, the existing power structure and hierarchies. The Central Leading Small Groups 
(CLSGs) is essentially a mechanism to enable the individual central leaders to organise, 
perpetuate and exercise their personal powers and preferences over key political and policy 
agendas (Zheng, 2010, p. 108), but it is disguised as a rational formal institution to ‘improve 
policy coordination’. The state leaders are empowered to manipulate institutions and policies, 
and capitalise universities and their special socio-economic functions (X. Jin, 2009) to serve 
certain interests.124 
Meanwhile, government institutions remain vague in areas including internal coordination and 
the division of interests between agencies, staff incentive mechanisms, rewards and penalty 
standards, as well as the administrative accountability system (X. Liu, 2007, p. 10). For 
example, the distributions of certain resources are not mandated by laws and regulations, 
hence individual offices and personnel are empowered with decision-making authority and 
discretions on such allocations. Consequently, personal influence, manipulation and game 
playing prevail. Furthermore, in an environment where coordination and supervision are not 
                                                          
124 Higher education has long served those individuals in power as a strategic instrument to meet their national 
development objectives (Tsang, 2000). Tu finds that between 1978 and 2006, a large proportion of national higher 
education policies were developed based on the principles and guidelines authorised by the party-state leaders (Tu, 
2006, pp. 63-64). To date, the mandate for policies is still justified by an appeal to the views or thinking of a 
paramount leader as it was decades ago (Lo, 1991; Tsang, 2000). For instance, in 1998, the state formalised the rule 
of ‘university presidents’ accountability system under the party committee’s leadership’ aiming to strengthen the 
political regime through controlling universities. Zhu Rongji’s 1999 policy on decentralisation and expansion of the 
higher education sector was a means to address the social-economic and political consequences of the Asian 
financial crisis (Q. Wang, 2014), and Xi Jinping’s 2014 directive on ‘socialist education’ aims to use universities to 
promote party ideology to new generations and strengthen political stability (S. Tian, 2015). 
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properly institutionalised, it is difficult to restrict personal power abuse (M.-a. Jiang, 2008, pp. 
76-77). In the Chinese government, the roles, functions and resources assigned to various 
public administration departments are dispersed, overlapped and fragmented. Each 
department does things in its own way, and has a separate pattern and template from others 
in staffing, funding and assessment. One specific administrative unit or division often has 
comprehensive control over a particular policy area, including policy consultation, drafting, 
implementation, and supervision. This fragmented operational structure leads to poor 
supervision, cultivates the concentration of power and resources, and allows individuals to 
abuse their administrative authority. These long-standing flaws in the system continue to 
develop and deepen. 
Second, informal constraints, such as new ethical codes of conduct, new norms of behaviour, 
as well as professional and moral standards, have not been well developed or established in 
the government. Officials continuously stick to the existing cultural values and customs, and 
the old moral templates and principles (X. Liu, 2007, pp. 10-11). In particular, higher education 
governance and operation are modelled on the conventions of the central planned economy. 
They have deeply embedded a set of norms and conventions, including top-down central 
intervention and decision-making, personal discretions, and highly hierarchical authority 
relationships (Liao & Zhang, 2006, p. 227; L. Zhang, 2013). These cultural customs continue to 
promote and facilitate informal and personal practices. A large number of university personnel 
I spoke to have referred to the higher education governance as ‘the last, enduring fort of the 
planned economy in the central government’. 
In particular, personal interests motivate informal and personal practices, and remain at the 
centre of the traditional normative values, and cognitive and behavioural conventions, which 
have undermined institutionalisation at a profound level (X. Liu, 2007, p. 10). Smith’s paper 
(Smith, 2010) on township governments in China has captured how the personal interests of 
public servants motivate and drive their informal practices and behaviour in government 
affairs: staff intensively lobby township leaders to be sent down to a ‘good’ village as they 
hope it will lead to promotion to a better remunerated and less taxing post and enhance their 
prospects of career promotion; township leaders routinely interfere in village elections, and 
replacements for ‘failed’ village leaders invariably have a strong backer in the township 
government, usually a well-placed relative; meanwhile, higher levels of government (e.g. 
county) often use political and economic incentives and promises, such as promotion to a good 
county bureau and reaping personal financial rewards, to push township leaders to attract 
investment. It reveals that the common pursuit of self-interests is a key factor for the 
prevalent personal and informal practices within the Chinese governments. 
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Such an entrenched set of principles, norms and culture is also strong in the higher education 
administration. Although government officials mostly manage non-profit public goods and 
generally lack direct financial incentives, they do place much focus on other personal interests, 
such as career promotions, personal influence, and personal relationships (M. Yang, 2003b, p. 
22). Many have prioritised their own interests over the new rules and professional standards. 
For instance, to ensure their career promotion, they obey their superiors and keep their 
mouths shut, even if the superiors’ decisions have broken institutional rules. Universities, on 
the other hand, have economic incentives to exploit the human and informal factors in the 
system. This creates a vicious cycle in the government process and organisational structure, 
further strengthening informal, personal practices in the system. As Tu states, in the process of 
government institutionalisation, all involved parties are actors of interest, including political 
organisations, administrative departments and officials, and policy consultants. They have the 
tendency to pursue and maximise their interests, which likely leads to a ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ in the public education sector (Tu, 2006, p. 65).125 
Third, the rule enforcement and execution processes are highly inconsistent, unstable and 
unpredictable (S. Li, 2004, pp. 39-40; S. Sun, 2002, pp. 1-2). If the new rules affect their 
personal interests, such as power, career, and resources, individual actors are likely to resist or 
bend these new rules and preserve the existing power structure and practices (Zou, 2014, p. 
23). According to Kotter, there is an implicit ‘psychological contract’ between individuals and 
an organisation, which is formed based on personal cognitions, and specifies the mutual 
expectations of gives and returns (reciprocity) in the relationships. Actors adjust their 
behaviour and decisions according to the psychological contract and outcomes (e.g., interest, 
penalty or promotion) (Kotter, 1973, p. 92). Likewise, officials form a psychological contract 
with the government, which specifies their responsibilities as well as predicted rewards or 
punishments. When the government introduces new rules that undermine some officials’ 
existing interests and cause a mismatch between their expected and actual returns, a sense of 
interest deprivation and the resistance of new institutions will arise (Zou, 2014, p. 22). This will 
directly affect officials’ execution and enforcement of the new policies. Officials compromise 
and manipulate the execution of new rules to preserve and reinforce their personal interests in 
the governmental processes (S. Li, 2004, pp. 40-41; X. Liu, 2007, p. 10; S. Sun, 2002, p. 2). 
                                                          
125 Since Garrett Hardin’s article in Science (Hardin, 1968, pp. 1243-1248), the expression ‘the tragedy of the 
commons’ has been used to symbolise the degradation and depletion of common resource to be expected 
whenever many individuals use a scarce resource in common. These individuals, acting independently and rationally 
according to each one’s self-interest, behave contrary to the whole group’s long-term best interests. Also see Elinor 
Ostrum, Governing the Commons (Ostrum, 1990). 
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Implications for universities 
Paradoxically, this imperfectly institutionalised central system has created both challenges and 
opportunities for universities. The top-down, central-planning model of intervention restrains 
universities’ autonomy and hinders their long-term missions and scholarly nature. Policy 
processes and decisions shaped by personal and informal factors are unpredictable and biased, 
undermining the integrity and quality of the policies and causing unfairness, inequity and 
instability in the sector. Institutions feel insecure and have increasingly focused on game 
playing and government affairs to seek competitive advantages, aligning themselves to the 
bureaucratic system to the detriment of academic work (D. He et al., 2013, p. 92).126  
For instance, universities resort to informal, covert means to influence policy decisions and 
seek competitive advantages. They secure and increase resources by currying favour with the 
funding allocation executors. By the same token, many academics pay more attention to 
cultivating ties with influential officials to secure their career development than to producing 
serious scholarship, as the prevalent bureaucratisation has fuelled the desire for official ranks 
among academics (Yeung, 2011). According to Philip Altbach, Chinese scholars have to 
continuously make things fit into ‘appropriate’ structures and bureaucratic ways of thinking. 
He suggests that due to the enduring Chinese academic culture, the fast rising Chinese 
universities will soon reach a ‘glass ceiling’, which may inhibit them from reaching the top of 
the global rankings and achieving their full potential for academic excellence (Altbach, 2016). 
Rui Yang also points out that the traditional, toxic academic culture in China (e.g., guanxi, 
cronyism, and corruption) has ‘devastating effects on its higher education development and 
the entire nation’s modernisation, leading to distortion and inefficiency of institutions and the 
system’ (R. Yang, 2015, pp. 532-533; 2016).  
Yet, informal and personal factors in the system provide opportunities and a space of flexibility 
for universities to intervene and manipulate the governmental processes, given the lack of 
formal institutions in the system for bottom-up initiatives and policy advocacy (Chapter 1). By 
exploiting the informal, personal factors and fissures in the system, universities access 
opportunistic paths to voice views and exert influence to advance their interests. As a 
university executive pointed out, ‘Where there is a will, there is always a way … even though 
on paper it looks impossible to influence some issues.’ For instance, universities take 
                                                          
126 For instance, universities have aligned their internal organisational structure and personnel system with the 
administrative structure and official ranks of government agencies: administrative offices and personnel within 
universities, rather than academics, often hold important decision powers, such as on internal resources allocation. 
This means that even within the universities, academic powers are constrained by administrative forces.  
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advantage of their guanxi with individual officials and policy consultations to influence policy 
outcomes, and to propose ideas and advocate polices that support their interests. 
University strategies for the semi-institutionalised system 
The capacity of universities to adapt and prosper in such a complex bureaucratic setting largely 
depends on their accumulation and deployment of three specific forms of social and cultural 
capital. These are the most significant aspects of the universities’ toolkit and tactics: mobilising 
human factors (e.g., personal connections, alumni networks and intelligence gathering), 
rational persuasion through knowledge (e.g., presenting evidence and third-party 
endorsement), and involvement in local policy experimentation (e.g., policy innovation to force 
a new policy and leading by example). A combination of these tactics is common.  
Mobilising human factors 
For the purpose of this chapter, ‘mobilising human factors’ (dongyong renwei yinsu 动用人为
因素) broadly refers to ‘universities exploiting the personal relationships and attributes of 
individuals involved in the governmental processes to interact with them informally and 
achieve certain policy goals’. According to interviewees, this frequent and expedient strategy 
has a direct impact on officials’ decision-making and policy outcomes. Although the practices 
of ‘mobilising human factors’ are highly contingent, irregular and covert and exist in many 
forms, ‘private, informal interactions’ and ‘personal connections’ (guanxi) remain two core 
elements in most lobbying scenarios. 
To illustrate how universities mobilise human factors, here I focus on three common aspects 
and practices: bottom-up communications, intelligence seeking, and decision shortcuts. 
First, university leaders and personnel raise policy concerns and propose ideas directly to the 
government officials through initiating informal, private communications and organising 
personal, casual social activities, such as meals and drinks. According to university executives, 
an informal, private and relaxing environment eliminates psychological barriers, helps the 
officials understand and absorb the universities’ opinions better, as well as encouraging them 
to sympathise, accept and endorse the proposals. This is especially effective when the officials 
have not formed a definite view or plan on a specific policy issue, so they are more ‘absorbent, 
open-minded and susceptible to universities’ advice and influence’. One university executive 
said, ‘Through socialising and small talks, we have continually and diplomatically implanted our 
ideas and views into the government officials’ minds without any resistance.’ A salient 
component of such interactions is personal relationships. ‘A good guanxi will make many 
things a lot easier,’ as a university president described. A university director shared with me his 
experience: 
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We are very good friends with many chiefs of sections and offices (chuzhang 处长) who 
are directly responsible for drafting and implementing concrete national policies at 
[Ministry X]. We call each other brothers and sisters sometimes. We often reach 
consensus and conclusions when we catch up privately at dinners, where they could 
make swift policy decisions and seal the deal. 
A vice president also pointed out: 
With good guanxi and familiarity, officials are more patient, attentive and willing to 
listen, take you more seriously personally, and provide more opportunities and support. 
Instead of a regular 15-minute meeting, they will give me 50 minutes with full attention. 
All of these little things can make a huge difference in the end. 
Second, universities gather intelligence from government officials through personal 
connections and private interactions.127 Through guanxi, universities often obtain intelligence 
ahead of others, including updates and specifics of draft policies, early knowledge on 
forthcoming policy opportunities and funding, political advice on special access to key 
decision-makers at the central bureaucracy for particular policies, and even confidential 
information, such as national shortlists, quotas, selection criteria, priority fields of funding, 
proposal details from rivalry institutions, and anonymous expert panel members of the 
advisory committees. 
These practices are often near or cross the boundary of legality, and both government officials 
and universities are aware that they go against the formal rules and ethics. Yet, the risks of 
being exposed and negative consequences remain low, and the incentives and rewards are too 
significant to resist. The intelligence provides universities with substantial competitive 
advantages and a strategic position in major national competitive programs, facilitating them 
to effectively intervene the official proceedings and influence the outcomes. Several 
interviewees noted that these practices are ‘a dark, dodgy side of university lobbying’. 
Guanxi plays a key role in such interactions. The ‘prying’ universities that frequently mobilise 
their good guanxi with officials are advantaged. Universities that are less proactive or less well-
                                                          
127 In practice, seeking intelligence from the government contains a few levels and depths of meaning. Level one is 
public news, which is normally accessible from media sources, official announcements and policy documentations. 
Level two is oral, informal messages and advice, which is released from the pre-policy consultations or non-public 
sessions before the central agencies issue their formal policy handbooks. Level three is secretive intelligence, which 
refers to confidential information should not be shared but may be revealed to connected universities by officials. 
The availability and access to level two oral messages/advice and level three special intelligence depend on 
universities’ efforts, proactivity and networks. 
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connected tend to miss out and fall behind. An interviewee gave me an example of his 
University K. A few years ago, the central government released a new national policy which 
would support and fund new research centres in a particular field. The government ran two 
nationwide selections, which involved many formal proceedings such as expert advisory panels 
and public consultations. University K, widely known as the best-performing and top-ranking 
institution in the related research fields, submitted an application with impressive supporting 
materials and convincing evidence, such as quality rankings and research outputs. However, to 
K’s surprise and humiliation, it was quickly eliminated from the first selection round and 
defeated by many other less impressive competitors. K’s university executives immediately 
investigated this case, liaised with the relevant government officials, and discovered their 
biggest mistake. The interviewee explained: 
While other institutions actively mobilised their guanxi, sought intelligence, and 
exerted influence, we did not actively seek information or network with the officials in 
charge of the policy, as we were very confident about our leading position. However, 
we fell out of the government official’s radar! Funding spots were quickly filled up and 
earmarked for other institutions, whilst we got eliminated despite being the number 
one candidate. 
K’s university executives learnt their lesson. The university president soon deployed his own 
guanxi connections, and gathered intelligence privately about the policy details and rivalries 
for the next round of selection. K’s other personnel also acted proactively, networking with the 
decision-makers through informal channels. With the same application materials, they quickly 
received the intelligence that they secured a top spot. 
Third, university leaders privately engage with senior government officials and key decision-
makers (even national leaders) to seek policy decision shortcuts and personal support on 
important issues, such as lifting restrictions and granting special permissions/exemptions, 
overruling earlier unfavourable decisions, and customising new programs to meet their special 
institutional needs.128 According to Dittmer and his associates, when the circumstances are not 
soluble through standard operating procedures, informal politics will permit the existing 
hierarchical monopoly to break down into more open and intense elite networking. Informal 
politics has also been critical for identifying and raising issues, for bringing new information to 
bear on the analysis of problems, and for proposing new policy recommendations. People can 
cut through or go around the bureaucratic organisations and procedures, taking new 
                                                          
128 In Chapter 4, I have already discussed the significant personal authority of these officials in the central 
bureaucracy, and provided tactics and examples of such high-level, private policy interactions. 
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information or policy proposals quickly to the highest levels and sometimes getting immediate 
decisions (Dittmer, Fukui, & Lee, 2000, pp. 162-163). This analysis is also true for 
universitygovernment interactions. 
According to my interviewees, this strategy is a ‘100% guarantee of a successful outcome’. For 
instance, a university vice president told me that his university M recently successfully secured 
over two billion yuan worth of the central government’s investment for its campus 
infrastructure construction. Both the university president and party secretary sought direct 
personal support from a senior official and key decision-maker via informal channels. The 
university leaders I interviewed suggested that they frequently visit senior government officials 
in person for lobbying activities of a similar nature. 
A research department of a leading national university D was once at the edge of closedown 
due to its unsuccessful industrialisation. Its university leader was keen to save this dying 
research department. She came up with a new funding project idea and desperately tried to 
sell it to the government for immediate funding. Instead of going through the lengthy 
bureaucratic procedures and the notorious countersigning system, she mobilised her personal 
connections and arranged a private meeting with the then vice premier in charge of industry 
and manufacture who also led the NDRC. This personal meeting provided a significant 
opportunity for her to profile this department and convince the key decision-maker about the 
importance of this research project. She argued that if it was funded, it would drastically 
reduce China’s dependence on foreign technologies in that industry, because the department 
would be able to design them in China and turn them into homemade products. It would 
increase national pride and independence. The leader nodded and made the decision on the 
spot. This policy proposal was immediately fast-tracked and implemented. The university’s 
strategy revived the research department and attracted a significant investment. 
A dean of undergraduate studies spent a long time lobbying several mid-level government 
officials, with the aim of receiving a special exemption that would lift a restrictive admissions 
policy for his university.129 He initially received rejections. However, the whole situation turned 
around as soon as his university’s vice president phoned a high-ranked government official 
who was his old school friend. The vice president pleaded for his personal help and 
compassion, explaining the hardships that his university experienced and the enormous 
pressure and public complaints that it received from students and parents. The senior official 
                                                          
129 The policy involved rigid regulations on the student numbers, internal selection and admissions for outstanding 
undergraduate students to enter a graduate program of the same university. 
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agreed, offered his support, and exercised his power for an immediate decision to approve this 
university’s proposal as a special policy exemption. 
Good guanxi between university leaders and senior officials is critical in this strategy. So are 
the links between the institutions and senior officials. Alumni relations serve as a significant 
tool for universities to connect with the government elites (I will elaborate further in the 
chapter). A vice university president told me that they connected with a top national leader 
because he was a university alumnus, adding that the national leader had provided support to 
his alma mater. 
Guanxi building: strengthening ability to mobilise human factors 
It becomes apparent that guanxi plays a vital role in universitygovernment interactions, and 
universities with better guanxi networks are more likely to achieve their goals in the 
governmental processes. It helps universities gain face time with officials; it provides direct 
policy advocacy and intelligence-sharing channels; it helps ensure a decision will go in their 
favour; and it offers substantial personal support and endorsement. As Pan observes in the 
case of Tsinghua University, what makes Tsinghua’s strategies workable is the close personal 
relationships between university leadership and government officials (Pan, 2007, p. 138). 
It remains a central, long-term strategy for universities to expand and strengthen their guanxi 
networks formed by allies and personal ties.130 How do they achieve it? In China, relationships 
are typically formed on the basis of commonality and shared attributes, or are initiated 
through an intermediary who has guanxi with both parties. As a norm of social interpersonal 
interactions and ethics of propriety, a sense of obligation (renqing 人情) derives from guanxi 
and is enhanced though the reciprocity of favours and continued interactions (Gao & Tian, 
2006, p. 81; King, 1991; So & Walker, 2006, pp. 8-12; M. M.-h. Yang, 1994). University 
executives form guanxi with officials through common attributes, such as shared work 
experiences (current and former work associates), shared identities and memories in the 
                                                          
130 The importance and emphasis on direct, personal connections are not unique to Chinese universities. University 
lobbyists from the US, for instance, also have such a focus. According to Robert Andrina, the most two important 
factors influencing federal education legislation in the US are ‘personal judgment and values of members of 
Congress and staff ’, and ‘strong views of respected and trusted friends’. In his view, the most effective lobbyist is 
the one who becomes that respected and trusted friend of a relatively small group of key legislators and their staff. 
This can be accomplished by developing a close rapport with members of the Congress and their staff, or a 
university president for government relations may take the lead to connect relevant member of the Congress 
(Andringa, 1976; Wolanin, 1998, pp. 60-61). Browne also suggests that in the US, maintaining positive relationships 
with lobbyees is a critically important goal of lobbying for state higher education lobbyists, often taking precedence 
over successfully advancing the higher education institution's policy position (Browne, 1985). 
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alumni networks (schoolmates), private life connections (kinships and friends of friends), and 
common interests (joint honour, credit and rewards for work performance). As noted in 
Chapter 2, the social and cultural respect for leading universities has facilitated university 
personnel to make friendly connections with officials at various levels with ease. Here I focus 
on the following three aspects of universities’ guanxi building strategies at the individual and 
organisational levels. 
First, university executives develop and strengthen relationships with officials by mixing 
business and personal affairs. For instance, through formal contacts and informal interactions, 
such as socialising at meals and drinks, and participating in party cadre training courses or 
secondment in Beijing, they turn official, formal work relationships into emotional and 
personal connections, so that ‘public affairs’ can be treated as ‘personal affairs’ (ba gongshi 
biancheng sishi, ba sishi nazuo gongshi ban 把公事变成私事, 把私事拿做公事办). According 
to my interviewees, many of their personal friendships with government officials started from 
formal work contacts and business relationships. During an extended period, they met 
regularly to discuss work, offered personal assistance and favours to officials when they were 
in need, and organised work and social activities. Increasingly, personal trust, bond and 
friendships grew, strengthened by the reciprocity of obligations and frequent communication. 
Importantly, such active friendship building often yields significant influence on the officials’ 
attitude and handling of the formal business. An interviewee from University C explained: 
I have become close friends with a number of my current and former work colleagues 
at the departments within [Ministry B, the central sponsoring body of C]. Our mutual 
trust and familiarity have improved our work interactions: they become more inclined 
to share internal information, accept our [C’s] policy suggestions and requests, and 
protect our [C’s] interests. 
Second, universities expand and strengthen their connections and support networks through 
the two-way personnel mobility system between the central government and national 
universities. As illustrated in Chapters 1 and 2, the state controls the appointments and 
mobility of university leadership. Often, university executives of leading national institutions 
have served in the central government at a certain point of their career.131 They not only have 
extensive experience and knowledge of the government’s internal operations, but also have 
personal links and direct access to state officials. The university executives capitalise these 
intangible assets to strengthen the political influence of their institutions, and facilitate two-
way policy interactions. For example, the university president and party secretary of a leading 
                                                          
131 For further explanation and examples, see Footnote 94. 
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research university S are seen as a very effective and influential combo. A vice president from S 
told me: 
Both our party secretary and president served senior positions at some key organs of 
the State Council in Beijing. They know how everything works at the central 
bureaucracy, have great connections and personal access to the government high-level 
officials. They are well informed, and can identify which person(s) we should network 
with on each specific issue. 
Furthermore, under this two-way personnel mobility system, the university executives of 
leading institutions are often sent back to the government to fill important positions. Recent 
examples include the presidents-turned ministers, vice ministers and party secretaries at the 
MoST, MoE and MEP.132 This prospect seems to impact on the attitude and psychology of 
current government officials with whom university executives interact. The government 
officials show a lot of attention and respect to these university leaders who may become their 
superiors in the future. This expedites the guanxi building between universities and officials. 
The following example demonstrates how a leading university T in a southern city took 
advantage of the two-way mobility mechanism and strengthened their institutional links and 
personal guanxi with Beijing, despite having no control over the appointments of university 
leadership. That year, T’s party secretary was about to retire. To ensure T would continue to 
prosper, she mobilised her ties with state officials and lobbied the government on the 
appointment of her successor in the university. Based on the operational ‘rules’ or ‘pattern’ of 
Chinese cadre mobility (ganbu yunzuo guilü 干部运作规律), she pleaded that she wished to 
‘receive a Beijing-based senior cadre to lead T’, preferably one that ‘had worked at powerful, 
resourceful national government bodies’. As a result, the central government appointed a 
senior official from a high-power organ at the State Council to fill the role. The new party 
secretary has since evidently brought political influence and networks to the university, leading 
to increased government funding and favourable policies for T over the recent years. 
Universities also use secondment to build relationships and develop networks between 
university personnel and government officials at various levels. As illustrated in Chapter 1, 
universities, especially those located outside of Beijing, are keen to fill secondment positions 
and send their own people to the central government to gather intelligence and develop 
personal connections. The university staff on secondment often serve as an ambassador, 
                                                          
132 For specific examples, see Footnote 48. 
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messenger and negotiator in the government for their own universities. However, secondment 
opportunities are also subject to the influence of guanxi. A university director observed: 
People are a key factor … Secondment means that you have your own people working 
at the ministry every day, watching every step of the way, and making connections with 
officials. Secondment in theory is a public and fair matter, but again, officials often 
choose their trusted and familiar friends and pick the institutions they have guanxi with 
to fill these roles. 
Meanwhile, this strategy applies in the other direction too. Universities bring in and hire 
people with official links, posts and influence. Since the late 1990s, according to Yeung, top 
Chinese institutions have invested much time and money recruiting famous professors or 
scientists with impressive official titles, such as academicians who are also members of the 
government’s funding bodies or academic assessment panels. This is not just to bolster their 
standing. Such recruitments are often intended to cultivate useful personal ties and facilitate 
future funding (Yeung, 2011). 
Third, universities capitalise their alumni relationships to strengthen personal ties and 
influence with the government.133 Especially, high-ranking universities foster political, 
economic, academic and social leaders in various fields, which provide a powerful support 
base. Alumni links represent a sense of family ties, shared identity, collectiveness, obligations, 
and affections for their schools and universities where they spent their memorable years 
studying and working (W. Huang et al., 2005, pp. 32-33; Wei, 2008, pp. 148-153; Xie, 2010, pp. 
27-29; X. Yan, 2011, p. 312). 
During my fieldwork, numerous interviewees explained how the former graduates of their 
universities, especially the ones that now hold important positions at the central bureaucracy, 
have maintained regular contacts and close interactions with their alma maters, and how 
these connections have provided competitive advantages and expedient favours to the 
universities. A former official from the finance department of a central ministry admitted to 
me in private that it is common amongst his government colleagues to favour their alma 
maters on policies. He had helped his university secure funding resources when he was 
working there. He added, ‘As an alumni member who spent many years of my life working at 
that university, I certainly would provide support when I could.’ According to University R, a 
national leader once dropped a hint privately to its university president, ‘If R [his alma mater] 
requires my support, come and ask before I retire.’ In another university, a director who works 
                                                          
133 In this thesis, alumni networks can be broadly defined as ‘students, graduates and staff from a certain school or 
university’. 
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for the government on national talent programs has observed that one department of a 
central ministry always invites policy consultants from one particular university in Beijing for 
expert advice and selection panels. The university has benefited from its heavy involvement in 
these policy decisions. He explained that it is a well-known story of nepotism: many of the 
ministry’s chiefs come from that university. A number of interviewees also suggested that 
alumni networks have seemed to play an important role in the Project 985: several national 
leaders had helped secure a place for their alma maters despite controversy. 
When a national leader undertook an official inspection visit to Province S and met its 
governor in person, he was unimpressed that the governor did not organise a tour to his old 
university on the trip. He specifically requested it to be included in his itinerary, and hinted 
that this university needed more support from its provincial government. Soon after the visit, 
the governor suddenly announced a special investment in this institution for its development. 
This story was shared by an interviewee who involved in the official visit and witnessed the 
private interactions. 
Universities also actively utilise alumni links to exert influence. For example, according to an 
informant who witnessed the story, a leading university M sent a private petition letter to a 
national leader (a former national premier) who graduated from the university. This letter, 
with the university’s logo and letterhead, was carefully handwritten and personally delivered 
to the national leader by his old teacher. The letter started, ‘Dear Premier, I have a few urgent 
policy matters to report to you …’ The insider who witnessed this event suggested, ‘This 
approach was very emotional and effective, drew immediate personal attention from a 
powerful leader, and saw immediate action by the government.’ 
Universities highly value these alumni links, and deploy strategies and activities to strengthen 
alumni ties and loyalty. Tsinghua, for instance, has fostered their alumni who are occupying 
elite positions in the central government and in various social sectors. The institution 
maintains strong relationships and psychological bonds with its former students and staff 
through active contacts and regular events (S. Kang & Liu, 2005; C. Li, 1994; W. Lin et al., 2005; 
Pan, 2007, p. 130). For example, it invited Zhu Rongji, a then national leader and Tsinghua 
alumnus to be an honorary dean, which later helped Tsinghua receive special government 
support on related policy (Pan, 2007, pp. 135-137). In 2011, Tsinghua invited its alumnus, the 
then national President Hu Jintao, to speak at its centenary anniversary where Hu announced a 
new national funding project, the 2011 Scheme, a policy proposal submitted by Tsinghua. 
Numerous interviewees suggested to me that due to its powerful network and extensive 
support base, Tsinghua is perhaps the most politically influential university in China, and ‘often 
finds it easy to excise an influence and seek the state’s support’. 
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Although alumni links are significant and influential, it remains challenging to prove, trace or 
illustrate the irregular and covert interactions between universities and their alumni in the 
government, especially at the elite level. A vice president pointed out: 
We all are well aware of some famous university alumni, such as the former and current 
presidents and premiers, and how their significant political influence and decision-
making authority have benefited their alma maters. It is widely known and discussed in 
higher education sector that [K, a national university] went to seek personal help from 
its famous alumnus [Q, a national vice president and party leader] in order to be 
selected into a large national funding program and [K] succeeded. We all agree that that 
alumni relationship and nepotism have played an important role in this policy decision, 
but it is difficult to prove or demonstrate their behind-the-scenes interactions. 
Another interviewee also suggested to me: 
I often attend government meetings on national policies in Beijing, and catch up with 
various university colleagues and friends who are alumni from other national 
universities. When we meet and chat in private, many of them always say that 
[University N] has great political influence and policy support due to its alumni links and 
the extensive presence of its graduates at the central government, but they could not 
explain further or give me more details. 
Scientific persuasion 
Sometimes the guanxi networks of a university alone are enough to get its arguments listened 
to and accepted by the government. However, in many other cases, one may need to have its 
argument and position reinforced by ‘scientific persuasion’. Here, ‘scientific persuasion’ 
generally refers to ‘cognitive persuasion and rational negotiation to construct a convincing and 
compelling story to stir the mind with reasonable truth.’ This strategy is typically employed to 
explain and justify rationally policy messages and arguments, and convince officials to 
personally endorse their ideas with full confidence; this is especially true of complex and 
technical issues involving professional knowledge and expertise. Research analysis, for 
instance, is a component of scientific persuasion in educating officials and shaping their views. 
An interviewee shared his experience with me on the importance of scientific persuasion: 
Having good guanxi with decision-makers is very important during lobbying—they will 
listen to your problems and proposals carefully and seriously, and act in your favour. 
But sometimes, good guanxi alone are not sufficient, especially when the matters are 
complex, or when you have a wobbly case on which officials feel hesitant to take a risk 
and decide. One needs to structure sound reasons and flawless arguments, illustrate all 
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the strengths and capabilities of your proposal, organise appropriate paperwork, make 
constructive suggestions, and very importantly, show them the common interests and 
benefits that may flow from their support. This will maximise one’s chances of success. 
To a certain extent, scientific persuasion in the lobbying process seems to reflect and target 
the institutionalised components of governmental procedures. The government faces external 
pressure to increase its accountability, transparency and fairness for its policy decisions, and it 
also has growing needs for universities’ technical and scientific input into the development of 
sensible policies, not only on education. Universities’ scientific persuasion offers officials the 
rationale, legitimacy and justifications for their decisions (despite common personal and 
informal interferences), especially when they may face challenges and scepticism from other 
stakeholders within the sector and society. University executives suggested that scientific 
persuasion in fact benefits both sides of the lobbying game. A vice president said: 
It is increasingly important for the government decision-makers to make accountable 
judgements and use their discretion and authority appropriately. The more decision-
making power one has, the more wary one should be. Ministers, for instance, all fear 
that a bunch of universities contest or accuse them of nepotism or unfairness if their 
decisions are affecting these universities’ interest. Their reputation, authority and 
career will be put on the line. Hence, it really helps and protects both sides if universities 
give the officials good reasons and personal confidence for supporting your proposals 
or favouring you in policy decisions. 
So how do universities persuade officials rationally? Here I focus on the following three aspects 
of universities’ practices. 
Evidence and analysis 
Universities typically deploy a scientific approach, such as presenting data, facts and research 
analysis, to provide rational and credible explanations and construct their arguments. This is 
especially useful when intense rivalry is involved, such as competing for a special funding place 
with other research universities of similar quality, guanxi and influence. As a university 
executive suggested, in such situations, ‘One needs to demonstrate its scientific nature and 
stand out in the crowd as the superior option.’  
Constructing a ‘flawless story’ is imperative to pre-empt, predict and address all the possible 
counterarguments and loopholes that may be raised by officials themselves and by other rival 
universities. An interviewee outlined, ‘The first key step is to convince myself first and make a 
nearly perfect case, with any potential gaps, doubts, contests or weakness having been taken 
into account prior to my meetings with officials.’ In addition, ‘telling a unique, exceptional 
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story’ is also necessary to gain officials’ personal sympathy and understanding. One 
interviewee said that in one case, his university’s circumstances and arguments were so 
exceptional and compelling that the government officials could not reject and other 
universities simply could not imitate or compare. 
PKU successfully sought the government’s permission to run a triple-badged international PhD 
degree program in bio-medical and material fields as the first and only program of this kind in 
China. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the state centralises the accreditation of all academic 
degrees in China and imposes the strict rule of ‘one degree—one stamp’, which does not allow 
jointly badged degrees.134 PKU, on one hand mobilised its guanxi within the government to 
promote their ideas to key decision-makers; on the other, it provided sound supporting 
materials to minimise officials’ concerns on the possible risks, including recommendation 
letters from influential professors and foreign experts, a signed agreement with foreign 
partners on credit recognition and transfers, financial funding assurance from an overseas 
foundation to cover the travel costs of all supervisors and students, as well as the track records 
and testimonials of students and supervisors. The program later received a special exemption 
by the State Council’s Academic Degrees Committee. 
University Q once lobbied its sponsoring central ministry P to offer a special international 
scholarship fund.135 The goal was to improve Q’s international PhD student recruitment. 
University E, another affiliated university of the ministry P, received this intelligence from their 
friends in the ministry and decided to seek a share of the fund from P. Besides mobilising 
human factors and networking informally, E also provided the paperwork to argue that P 
should provide international PhD recruitment funding to E too. The materials included data 
and facts on the capacity of the university, such as history, world rankings, academic 
disciplines and programs, facilities, staff, and the composition of current international 
students. It also contained explanations about why it needed the funding, how the money 
would be spent, and what benefits it would provide to P and E. E explained that as a leading 
national university handpicked by the government leaders in 1999 to ‘build a world-class 
research institution in China’, it needed P’s support to internationalise the institution and meet 
the national goal. The outcomes, such as improvements in academic quality and output, 
                                                          
134 As discussed in Chapter 2, in China, undergraduate and postgraduate academic degrees are centrally regulated, 
authorised and awarded. The conferral of degrees needs the government’s approval or accreditation in order to be 
valid. Each validated Chinese degree certificate only allows a single official stamp by the MoE. Therefore, multi-
badged, combined degrees (i.e., stamps by two or more institutions on a single degree certificate) are not accepted 
or legitimate in the Chinese government’s standards. 
135 This fund provides 50,000 yuan (around USD 10,000) per student admin fee to S annually. 
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diversity of students, education and research, and global reputation, would also promote the 
overall performance and profile of the sponsoring ministry P in the central government. To 
predict and eliminate P’s other concerns, E also proactively submitted a budget of proposed 
funds, estimated expenditures and deliverables. In the end, P could not find a reason to reject 
this proposal but agreed to allocate some of the scholarship funding to E. 
Rhetoric 
Rhetorical language remains a key tactic of persuasion. Universities typically deploy references 
to national leaders’ established plans, commitments, principles, directives and slogans to 
legitimise and frame their claims, and to remind the officials of the top-level commands, their 
obligations, and assigned responsibilities. Their persuasive normative language includes 
‘meeting national and public interests’, ‘delivering the national 12th Five-year Plan’, ‘building a 
knowledge economy’, ‘revitalising Western China’ and ‘developing world-class universities’. 
University L, for example, lobbied its central sponsoring ministry for a new policy on university 
infrastructure investment in international education and student accommodation. As part of 
its rational analysis, L claimed that the development goal listed in the ‘national 12th Five-year 
Plan’ required L to significantly increase its internationalisation and double the number of 
international students over the next five years to 2,500; however its current capacity was only 
1,000. In addition, L must provide new and safe on-campus dormitories for international 
students with good living conditions to promote soft diplomacy and prevent any safety and 
health related incidents. L vigorously argued that such incidents would ‘cause national 
embarrassment, damage national pride and global reputation, and might even strain China’s 
international relationships’. The ministry approved the new policy proposal. 
The C9 group once made coordinated efforts to successfully persuade government officials to 
lift some restrictions for C9 universities through a joint policy reform trial. The goal was to 
increase their autonomy in PhD recruitment numbers and methods. Apart from presenting 
data, facts and policy analysis, the C9 members kept reminding these officials that they had 
the moral support and backing of the top leaders who handpicked them to ‘build Chinese 
world-class universities’ as a national strategic priority. They claimed that the current policy 
restrictions of PhD admissions severely hindered universities’ development and undermined 
their fulfilment of the national goals and missions. They pleaded that it was an obligation and 
responsibility for the central divisions and officials in charge of the policy to support these 
universities’ endeavours, alter the policy parameters, and deliver the leaders’ directives. There 
would be ‘negative consequences’ if the relevant departments did not make the changes soon. 
The officials later modified the policy terms for C9 universities. 
199 
Meanwhile, universities typically disguise their self-interested intentions and motives, and 
frame their claims by highlighting potential win-win outcomes, especially the benefits for the 
government. A university’s party secretary who successfully influenced numerous policies in 
favour of his institution has always maintained a patriotic, nationalistic image in the lobbying 
process and persistently promoted his policy proposals as ‘for the best interests of the 
government and the nation’. 
A leading university’s vice president effectively persuaded the government to increase its 
policy support for a research industry Z (his research area) by manipulating rhetoric. As a 
‘spokesperson’ of both his university and his research field, he seized an interview opportunity 
with some government journalists who wrote articles for ‘Internal reference’ (neican 内参) on 
university research.136 In addition to presenting technical facts and evidence to support his 
case, he told the journalists that ‘national Z industry was facing serious threats and invasions 
by foreign countries’, ‘China-made products would likely encounter deadly crisis’, and ‘China’s 
national interests would be severely damaged if the government does not step up, make a 
timely decision, and set up national standards and funding for Z’. He admitted to me that he 
employed those words purposely to ‘create a strong sense of national crisis and emergency’. 
As he expected, the government journalists were deeply convinced and decided to report on 
this ‘urgent national matter’ immediately. As a result, that neican article on Z received 
attention and reactions by high-level officials on this issue.  
Another university executive explained to me how rhetoric increases a university’s influence in 
government consultations: 
The government will approach you and trust your advice more if you have a big-picture, 
public interest mentality and image, and your advice sounds more objective and 
representing broader interests. When proposing ideas and offering advice, if you always 
give the impression that you only care about your own interests, it will likely 
backfire … Officials say that we [his university] are more impartial, unbiased and less 
self-interested comparing to many other universities, so they often come to us and ask 
for our advice on new policy plans in the first instance. It places us [his university] at an 
advantageous, favourable position. 
                                                          
136 As mentioned earlier, ‘internal reference’ (known as neican 内参 or guonei dongtai qingyang 国内动态清样) is 
an internally circulated newspaper and special government media channel within the government and read by the 
leadership. It is important to note that Chinese universities generally focus more on direct communications with 
government officials, including through neican, rather than engage with the mass media to expose issues and 
influence public views, since it is the government who holds the real power. 
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Collectively, PKU and Tsinghua successfully lobbied a government agency for a special policy 
exemption and greater autonomy, which allowed them both to use the research training 
program funds freely without the spending limits that were applied to all institutions.137 An 
interviewee who was involved in the lobbying process said:  
We repeatedly stressed to the government that it was not for our special interests, this 
was for the national interests, such as retaining top talent and building strong human 
capital for China. Our two institutions wanted to have the discretion to optimise the 
use of the funding, so that we could, for instance, invest more on training and retaining 
our top students in China rather than funding them to study overseas and losing them 
to foreign countries. A brain drain would cause long-term damage to our country … It 
was important to remove the policy restrictions and support our autonomy and 
strategies, for the sake of China. 
Since officials commonly take their personal interests into consideration when making 
decisions, university executives also often highlight the personal rewards and career benefits 
that government officials may potentially gain, so as to convince them that it is in their best 
interest to support them. Such potential rewards and benefits may include praise from their 
upper-level superiors on excellent ideas, performance and outputs, expanded personal and 
professional influence, profile and networks, as well as credits and appreciation from their 
alma maters. 
Third-party endorsement and allies 
A ‘third-party endorsement’ is typically provided by actors other than the lobbyists and 
government officials. For instance, the story about industry Z and neican in this chapter 
displays the importance of the third-party endorsement of journalists as a mouthpiece. Strong 
endorsement and recommendations from foreign experts and international partners also give 
rise to a soft diplomacy effect, and may help persuade the government. 
As the Chinese government strives to strengthen its national competitiveness and power in the 
global settings, it observes and imitates foreign practices as its world-level benchmarks and 
advanced models. In their study of the development of social security policy, for instance, Lin 
and Kangas find that the state elite’s outward learning about the international experiences of 
                                                          
137 Under the existing, rigid policy, each university was only allowed to use 50% of the funding to support Chinese 
students to undertake joint PhD training (i.e., a double degree with two separate certificates issued by a Chinese 
university and a foreign institution); the other 50% had to be spent on sending their students overseas to undertake 
a PhD program solely at a foreign institution. The two elite universities successfully lobbied the government for 
removing the fixed percentages for using such funds. 
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social policy reform has made a great impact on governmental policymaking. The advocates 
from international organisations like the International Labour Organization and the World 
Bank also played a role in influencing the policymaking (K. Lin & Kangas, 2006, p. 72). My 
interviewees observe that government has increased international comparison studies, and 
has even started to invite foreign experts and advisors to its policy consultation processes. 
Chinese universities take advantage of this attitude of the state, and add ‘international 
endorsement’ to their persuasion by involving their foreign partners and supporters. PKU and 
Tsinghua, for example, often mobilise their foreign trained professors and/or returnees to 
organise joint letters to key officials, including national councillors and education ministers, to 
support their universities’ policy proposals and new trials and urge the government to approve 
them. 
The rapid globalisation has heightened the need for transnational collective action (Sandler, 
2004, pp. 43-44). As illustrated in Chapter 3, the C9 group has also used ‘external forces’ to 
‘push things forward’ by inviting higher education experts and foreign universities groups, such 
as Australia’s Group of Eight (Go8),138 to speak at their meetings in front of government 
officials and media outlets and talk about the benefits of establishing university groups and 
their contributions to the nation and sector. Another example is the Hefei Statement on the 
‘ten characteristics of contemporary research universities’.139 In October 2013, by joining the 
Hefei Statement signatory group with other international partners, including Go8, AAU, and 
LERU, the C9 increased their collective voice and jointly promoted a supportive policy 
environment for research-intensive universities in China. 
                                                          
138 As noted in Chapter 2, in October 2008, for instance, the C9 presidents held their annual internal meeting in 
Hangzhou. One meeting agenda for discussion was to formally establish a C9 group and develop a set of group 
principles and operational guidelines. Go8 Executive Director Michael Gallagher was invited to participate in the 
private C9 presidents’ meeting in the presence of the then education vice minister in 2008. He made a presentation 
and shared experience on how the Go8 was established and operated, how it worked with the Australian federal 
government, as well as how valuable and important it was to the development of the nation and higher education 
sector. It was well received by the audience. In the end of that meeting, the group ‘C9’ or ‘Consortium of China Nine 
Research Universities’ (zhongguo jiuxiao xiaozhang lianxi huiyi 中国九校联席会议) was named and privately 
endorsed by the vice minister. 
139 Hefei Statement’s formal title is ‘Hefei Statement on the Ten Characteristics of Contemporary Research 
Universities’ (Go8 et al., 2013). 
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Local policy experiments and pilot trials 
Another important aspect of universities’ lobbying strategy is policy innovation and 
experimentation.140 This strategy is commonly used by universities to seek special privileges 
and exemptions, push the policy boundaries, and increase autonomy in the restrictive, 
contested policy space that I called the ‘contention zone’ (Chapter 2).  
The government exercises tight control over certain higher education policy areas depending 
on the perceived levels of political risks and potential social ‘chaos’ and instability. For 
instance, national university student admissions involve a huge number of citizens.141 With a 
constant fear that ‘if something goes wrong, it may lead to significant, nationwide discontent 
and political and social challenges’, the state has imposed rigid rules to regulate universities’ 
practices and constrain their autonomy in this area. 
Based on this logic and mentality of the state, university executives believe that they may be 
able to seek special considerations and policy exemptions if they can convince the government 
that it is ‘safe and beneficial’ to do so. Therefore, proposing local, small-scale policy 
experiments and conducting new policy trials that ‘affect only a few people’ have become an 
effective strategy for universities to demonstrate the ‘win-win outcomes’ and ‘low risks of 
troubles’. An interviewee said: 
In the vast higher education sector, there should be some principles and standard 
thresholds for everyone, but there should also be special policies for some players. Over 
the last decades, the universities and government officials have formed a consensus 
about this view. The government has agreed to set some ‘special rules and exceptions’ 
and ‘allow specific institutions to try and do it first’, which may expand to other 
institutions later if successful … We universities often refer to our ‘special policy 
exceptions or trials’ as ‘innovative reforms’. 
                                                          
140 Some may see policy experimentation as a means of scientific persuasion. Because successful practice and 
implementation during policy trials may be used as evidence to prove that universities’ policy proposals and ideas 
are feasible, effective and beneficial, and seeing the result, the government may feel assured that it can trust and 
continue such new policy or practice. For example, universities often use PKU and Tsinghua’s successful policy 
experiments as evidence and examples to help their own universities seek similar special policies. However, 
initiating a new policy trial or experimentation is often a lobbying goal and strategy in itself, which facilitates 
universities to gain more autonomy and resources. 
141 The student recruitment policy applies to both the university entrance exams and student admissions quotas 
(see Chapter 2). Due to the large scale of the Chinese higher education system, this policy involves a huge number 
of Chinese citizens. Based on the MoE statistics in December 2014, for example, China had 1,793,953 postgraduate 
students and 24,680,726 undergraduates enrolled at a regular higher education institution in 2013 (MoE, 2014f). 
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Policy experimentation has a long tradition in China. Sebastian Heilmann has observed an 
unorthodox combination of novel policy experimentation with long-term policy prioritisation 
in China over the last few decades in the economy, which is characterised by ‘foresighted 
tinkering’ (Heilmann, 2009). Such an approach is in fact commonly seen and well developed in 
education policies. For the government, policy experiments and trials have become a safe 
means to maintain stability and avoid mishaps, because the ‘small, local experimentation’ 
approach reduces prematurity, affects limited stakeholders, and lowers the risks of accidents 
and predicaments in such a vast, diverse country. If a policy is proved successful by one or a 
few institutions allowed to test it, the state may allow or encourage its broader application 
across other institutions. Some describe this as ‘a good reflection of Deng Xiaoping thinking 
and economic reform strategy in the education policy arena, just like the national special 
economy zones’. Many argue that this approach provides win-win outcomes and common 
interests for both the government and universities. 
A range of interviewees suggested that their universities have been highly proactive and 
persuasive in initiating and proposing new opportunities to government officials. One 
interviewee said: 
We typically plead [to the government] that we really want to contribute and sacrifice 
ourselves to test out this particular policy as ‘guinea pigs’ for our government and 
nation, and that we have all the required conditions and capabilities, and we are 
prepared and enthusiastic to explore the new model. We emphasise [to the 
government] that this will not only help us, but also help the government verify the 
practicality and rationality of the new policy. Let’s test it out and review the possible 
problems. If it does not work, it will only be a local issue with a minimal impact; if it 
works, we can help improve and perfect it, and gradually introduce and promote it to a 
wider scale. This is so-called ‘muddling through’ (mo shitou guohe 摸石头过河). This is 
a win-win for both sides … Our policy experiment proposals are often well received [by 
the government]. 
The C9 members, for instance, pushed for a greater PhD student admission quota by initiating 
and promoting a special policy trial only at the nine universities. In the end, they received 
special permission for a 10% annual increase (a much greater allowance than other 
universities) in exchange for an increased efficiency with non-performing students. This was 
seen as a significant success in a policy area that had long been off limits for any negotiation. 
As an interviewee heavily involved in the policy trial suggested, this special policy trial ‘opened 
the door’ to greater flexibility and incremental reform for the future. Once the government 
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develops a habitual thinking (guanxing siwei 惯性思维), it will lead to a long-term, regular 
increase. He added: 
Our universities will continue to negotiate and push for a larger increase each year—
10% this time and 20% the next. This policy [trial] has helped increase the autonomy in 
this area for other national universities too and ultimately benefited the entire sector. 
Shidian and shiyan 
In the education policy arena, there are two similar types of policy experimentation and trials, 
shidian (试点, experimental point or pilot project), and shiyan (试验, test, experiment or 
trial).142 University interviewees stress that they may need to differentiate these two terms 
when applying for the government’s approval. Universities have been actively involved in both 
types of policy experimentation to obtain a greater autonomy and competitive advantages. 
‘Shidian’ usually refers to a government-led initiative, although the original idea may come 
from either the government or universities, or both.143 The government selects and allows 
several pilot institutions to enjoy a policy exemption or to test a new policy at a local scale. A 
good example is the pilots for the autonomous student selection and admissions reform (zizhu 
xuanba luqu gaige shidian 自主选拔录取改革试点) (MoE, 2013a). The MoE nominated 
several pilot institutions (shidian xianxing 试点先行) to test new gaokao and admissions 
policies to minimise the potential risks and disruptive errors. The government retains its 
control over the pace and process of such pilots. If successful, the government is likely to 
gradually introduce the policy to broader regions in an orderly and prudent manner (MoE, 
2014b; Xinhuanet, 2014c). 
This policymaking methodology resembles what Heilmann has described as ‘proceeding point 
to surface’ (you dian dao mian 由点到面). Heilmann observes that the Chinese point-to-
surface approach entails a policy process that is initiated from individual ‘experimental points’ 
(shidian) and driven by local initiative with the formal or informal backing of higher-level 
policymakers. If judged conducive by the government, the ‘model experiences’ from the initial 
experiments will be disseminated, refined and expanded to more and more regions (Heilmann, 
                                                          
142 Worth noting that shidian and shiyan have a burry line, such that both may co-exist and be present in a single 
trial case and share the same goals and deliverable outcomes. For instance, if the government and a university 
jointly develop a new policy idea and test it out at a local level, it may be labelled as either. In such circumstances, it 
is not important to differentiate or make a choice between the two types. 
143 There are cases where universities developed and raised new ideas to the government informally, and officials 
agreed to adopt them as a pilot project within a defined scope, and to guide and supervise their implementation at 
a local level. In cases like this, they are usually still categorised as a government-led initiative or shidian. 
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2008, pp. 2-4, 29-30). Shidian in the university sector has clearly reflected this point-to-surface 
approach. 
Many new reforms and policy pilots in the ‘contention zone’ have first started at leading 
national universities, largely due to their proactivity in seeking opportunities and proposing 
ideas to the government, their strategic role in national development, as well as their 
reputation, ability and maturity to deliver them. The government also employs shidian to 
legitimatise and justify its favourable support for certain universities. 
Chinese universities compete for participation in shidian. The MoE officials told some of my 
interviewees privately that they are under constant pressure to justify their decisions on issues 
such as the shortlists and finalists of shidian policy participants, and ‘the cut-off line and the 
baseline thresholds’. A vice president stated: 
Nowadays, when introducing a new special policy experimentation, the MoE often 
needs to explain how they determined the scope, selection criteria and pilot institutions 
for this policy. Because defining a scope and limit for a new policy will likely cause 
discontent and resistance from the universities below the threshold or near the margin. 
They often contest and break in by persistent lobbying and complaining. The MoE has 
to anticipate and prepare for these universities’ strong feelings and pressure. 
On the other hand, ‘shiyan’ generally refers to the bottom-up policy trials and new 
experiments proposed, driven and led by universities themselves to push for greater 
autonomy, which may, or may not, have received the government’s endorsement or approval. 
The C9 PhD admissions reform trial mentioned earlier is a good example. Shiyan is also more 
common for elite universities than low-tiered institutions, largely due to the former’s influence 
and capacity for innovation. 
Shiyan in the policy arena has not been well explored in the existing literature. If we say 
shidian is largely promoted by the government, then many shiyan cases are formally, or 
informally, tolerated by the state. The state may intervene and suspend a shiyan if it appears 
risky and troublesome. One interesting aspect of shiyan is how elite universities seek 
government’s endorsement (or tolerance), interpret its attitude, and respond to it. 
As Pan observes, the Chinese central government normally gives three possible responses to a 
policy proposal when there is no fixed state policy: approval, objection, and obscure silence 
(Pan, 2007, p. 136). Approval and objection are relatively straightforward answers. For 
instance, if the government expresses clear disapproval, a university cannot implement a new 
shiyan or continue its shiyan that is already in place. Before a new shiyan, universities typically 
attempt to persuade the government to give a formal consent or a private nod. PKU, for 
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example, successfully sought the MoE’s special approval for China’s first and only joint 
international PhD program (with the US’s Georgia Tech) in the name of a small, local policy 
trial. Fudan University and SJTU proposed a special trial on regional student recruitment and 
received a special permission.  
Interviewees from several universities admitted to me that they had already sought and 
received tacit agreement and permission from the state prior to their public announcement 
and implementation of their self-initiated shiyan, despite there appearing to be a lack of 
consultation with the government. One interviewee involved in several shiyan told me that 
they commonly seek tacit understanding from government officials before taking action, and 
the officials may privately authorise them to try the innovative solutions locally, especially for 
the complex issues that also puzzled the government. 
However, when the government gives an obscure or silent response, it becomes tricky and 
open-ended. Such an attitude may signal no objection (tolerating a university’s practice), or no 
approval (ignoring a university’s proposal). In several cases, universities treated the state 
officials’ ‘ambiguous, silent response’ as ‘no objection’, exploited the vagueness and gaps, and 
tested the government’s tolerance (Pan, 2007, pp. 135-138). University Z, for instance, carried 
out a new shiyan on student admissions policy without receiving the government’s clear 
response. A university executive involved in this trial suggested, ‘The government may not like 
it, but we will keep implementing the policy within our university until we receive a clear 
objection from the government’. 
Meanwhile, to avoid a clear rejection from the state, some universities chose not to publicise 
or report their small, local shiyan to the government. Several interviewees admitted to me that 
they have broken some rules and quietly implemented local policy innovation on student 
admissions and funding matters, even though they believed the government would suspend it 
once it knew about it. An interviewee said: 
My university once took a risk, and quietly conducted a local trial in the highly regulated 
policy area of student admissions, as we knew that the government would not like it. 
The government later learnt about it and was upset, saying it was against the 
government rules, so we had to stop it in the forthcoming semester. However, we had 
already completed the first year’s trial, gained benefits and enjoyed the special policy 
for a period, so ‘the risky test’ was still worth it. 
It is evident that the experimentation strategy, either shidian or shiyan, has opened up 
significant opportunities that lead to more autonomy and support, especially for elite players 
in the sector. A university executive commented: 
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Some strong players will unavoidably perform better, develop cleverer ideas, sell these 
ideas more effectively, and hence gain an advantageous position under the ‘rules of the 
game’ [policy experimentation] … If one [university] is better at playing the game, it will 
get more opportunities and autonomy. 
Successful policy experimentation by leading institutions has to a large extent accelerated the 
development of Chinese higher education policy, despite the isolated, self-interested nature of 
most cases. Some innovative trials and ideas were imitated by other institutions, and adopted 
and promoted by the government widely in the sector. Examples include Tsinghua’s Ziqiang 
Scheme for targeted-area students, PKU’s international student foundation college, USTC’s 
elite youth class, as well as some C9 members’ research recruitment standards, research 
training models and PhD elimination systems, all of which have made broad, long-term impact 
on the development of the university sector. 
Concluding remarks 
Over the last several decades, in response to socio-economic changes, the Chinese 
government has introduced new institutional rules to regulate its operations and 
policymaking. Its strategy has been described as ‘political gradualism’: the adjustment of its 
institutional framework guarantees economic reforms and political stability on one hand, while 
it accommodates social change on the other; the ultimate goal is to maintain the CPC’s 
authority (Zheng, 2010, p. 43). To a certain extent, China’s institutionalisation has made a 
positive impact on the government’s practices, putting increasing formal proceedings and 
consultations in place. Various earlier studies on economic policymaking have reported that 
the Chinese system is more institutionalised, and the importance of guanxi has changed (Deng 
& Kennedy, 2010, p. 124; Gold et al., 2002; Guthrie, 1998, 1999; Kennedy, 2008, p. 109; 2009, 
p. 207; USCBC, 2008). 
My investigation on higher education governance, however, suggests that the central 
institutionalisation has been imperfect and problematic. Informal, personal practices remain 
influential and widespread in government organisations and policy processes, at least in so far 
as the high education sector as concerned. Different from businesses and many other sectors, 
universities operate in an environment where resources have been increasing rather than 
reducing and where the role of the government has remained central. The capacity of 
universities to adapt and prosper in such a complex bureaucratic setting largely depends on 
their accumulation and deployment of three specific forms of social and cultural capital. These 
are the most salient aspects of the universities’ toolkit: mobilising human factors, scientific 
persuasion and policy experimentation. 
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The leading Chinese research national universities are a repository of social, cultural and 
political influence, and scientific knowledge. They also serve a central role in the national 
development strategy. These forms of capital provide them with a great capacity, competitive 
advantage, and leverage in the governmental process, and enable them to effectively exploit 
the fissures in this system. In contrast, the smaller, non-elite institutions have limited 
connections and resources to utilise these lobbying strategies and exploit this semi-
institutionalised system. They have become disadvantaged in the lobbying game and 
competition in the higher education sector. 
The importance of guanxi 
Has the important role of guanxi changed in universitygovernment interactions? In studying 
the lobbying of Chinese business, Kennedy and Deng suggest that with China’s 
institutionalisation, the importance of guanxi in businessgovernment relationships has 
transformed. They outline that guanxi-based interventions are more commonly the purview of 
local governments where firms need approval for their individual business, in which case the 
backing of a single or just a few officials can make all the difference; at the national level, 
where laws go through a complex evaluation process by many offices, guanxi serves more to 
help companies gain face time with officials than to guarantee a decision will go in their 
favour; companies need to rely more on the information they provide and the strategies by 
which they convey their message; and hiring former officials is common among companies and 
associations, but such staffers are more valued for their knowledge of the inner workings of 
the political system than their relationships with specific individuals in office (Deng & Kennedy, 
2010, p. 124; Kennedy, 2009, p. 207). These observations clearly do not fit the 
universitygovernment interactions I illustrated in this chapter. 
Guanxi remains critical and central in universitygovernment interactions. Universities rely on 
guanxi for all nation-level policies, big or small, regardless of the complexity of the evaluation 
process and the number of offices involved. It is true that compared to major national policies, 
guanxi plays a more expedient and explicit role in influencing the decisions on small and 
medium-scale policies, where less process and fewer officials are involved. However, guanxi 
remains powerful in shaping the process and decisions on large national policies. It helps 
universities gain face-to-face time with officials, to seek intelligence and convey their 
advocacy; it also helps universities secure a decision that will go in their favour. For instance, 
guanxi can manipulate and alter the compositions and verdicts of expert evaluation panels, 
overwrite substantial policy deliberations, disclose confidential information, and twist or 
intervene formal procedural rules. Especially, guanxi with senior government officials can fast-
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track and cut through a complex bureaucratic process, result in immediate decisions and 
actions, and overturn previously made decisions by multiple offices.  
Universities do attempt to build their cases and influence policy decisions through persuasion, 
such as shaping officials’ personal views by strengthening their public standing and providing 
information and rhetoric. Yet, they seem to value more, and put more efforts and planning 
into, developing close ties with officials and mobilising human factors. They cultivate and 
deepen bonds with former and current officials through work and private activities, and 
transform them to personal guanxi; they hire people with official links, posts and influence to 
foster personal ties; they take advantage of the two-way personnel mobility system and 
strengthen their alumni connections to develop guanxi networks with the officialdom. 
There is no doubt that scientific persuasion and policy experimentation are important lobbying 
strategies, but they do not decrease or contest guanxi in universitygovernment interactions. 
Rather, they often support and enhance the important role of guanxi. For some, scientific 
persuasion and policy experimentation are the icing on the cake. For example, it is not rare for 
universities to employ these means to help legitimatise and justify the officials’ guanxi-based 
choices and personal discretions. Officials need to respond to the constant pressure and 
demands on accountability and transparency from other universities and society at large, 
despite their lack of a genuine desire to pursue objectivity and formality in the process. As my 
interviewees (including government officials) suggested, even for major public policy issues, if 
the universities on all sides of the issue have excellent scientific persuasion and/or policy 
experimentation proposals, ‘which one has the strongest and broadest guanxi’ would be the 
determining factor for the final outcome and decision. Such a common view lends weight to 
my theory. 
Evidently, the guanxi-based university academic culture has a significant impact on China’s 
higher education system and its development. For instance, Rui Yang argues that under the 
influence of a corrupt academic culture in China, guanxi restrict free movement of staff, 
students and resources. Decision making is not based on academic merit, but personal 
relationships and preferential treatment. Misconduct is common in daily academic and 
administrative affairs. Chinese scholars increasingly pursue administrative standing, rather 
than devoting their time to academic research (R. Yang, 2015, pp. 532-533; 2016). The toxic 
Chinese academic culture impedes meritocratic values, free inquiry, fair competition, which 
may create key structural problems and hinder Chinese universities’ further improvement in 
the international rankings (Altbach, 2016; R. Yang, 2015, pp. 531-533; 2016).  
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The impact of university lobbying on the system 
China’s political and regulatory environment has clearly shaped universities’ lobbying 
strategies and practices significantly. But how does university lobbying in turn impact on the 
government system and its policymaking? 
First, the universities’ mobilisation of human factors promotes covert and self-interested 
transactions, deepens the informality and personal practices, and hinders the transparency 
and fairness of the government processes and in the sector. 
Second, due to the lack of formal institutions and channels in the system for bottom-up 
initiatives and policy advocacy, universities resort to other formal and informal paths to 
intervene in government processes, such as exploiting their policy advisory role to advocate 
policy. When the two roles of policy advisor and policy advocate overlap, integrity is 
compromised, and conflicts of interest and unethical conducts arise. In many cases, policy 
expert committee members were subject to nepotism, seeking special interests for their own 
institutions and colleagues. 
Third, despite their self-interested nature and motives, universities’ tactful personal 
communications, constant scientific persuasion, and innovative ideas not only can stir officials’ 
minds to address their short-term and local issues, but also may gradually change government 
official’s attitude towards policymaking in the long run. As a critical source of knowledge, 
innovation and expertise, universities offer intellectual support, educate officials on all aspects 
of polices, and encourage open-mindedness and creativeness. Incrementally, this may 
facilitate a more inclusive and rational approach and consultative culture in the bureaucracy, 
increasing officials’ appetite for universities’ input on the development of new policies. This 
may gradually transform the way that policy is produced. 
Fourth, the universities have shown a remarkable ability to respond to contingent 
circumstances, adjust strategies based on the matters and people involved, and influence 
individual decisions and outcomes. By shaping individual policies and experimentation in the 
‘contention zone’, universities are able to bring forth changes and improvements, soften tough 
restrictions, and push the policy boundaries, gradually transforming the higher education 
regulatory environment. As an interviewee suggested, policy trials ‘opened the door’ to a 
greater flexibility and incremental reform for the future. Once the thinking of the government 
has some ‘inertia’, it may lead to a long-term transformation. 
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Chapter 6—Discussion and conclusion: lobbying 
authoritarianism and the practices of elite 
universities 
This thesis draws a picture of the contemporary lobbying practices of elite universities in 
China, which has been so far elusive, opaque and underexplored. In its five chapters, I have 
investigated how Chinese research universities interact with a complex government machine 
to influence policymaking and advance particularistic or collective interests. By gaining a 
deeper understanding of their strategies and practices under various conditions, my goal was 
to identify the key factors that shape universities’ lobbying behaviour, as well as to assess to 
what extent they are able to successfully influence decisions of the authoritarian state, the 
limitations of such influence, and the potential implications of their activism for the current 
political structure. 
Constraints amid opportunities: where lobbying begins 
For elite Chinese research universities, lobbying has become a prevalent practice and perhaps 
the most significant part of university–government interactions. Both opportunities and 
constraints have contributed to such a development. 
Over the last several decades, with the goal of building a strong nation, the government has 
injected massive investments into education and science, and assigned a strategic national and 
global role to research universities in driving China’s global competitiveness (Chapter 1). Facing 
these significant economic opportunities and resources, research universities have not only 
successfully strengthened their growth, capabilities, status and internationalisation, but also 
developed their ambitions and their consciousness of long-term values and missions and of the 
scholarly nature of their work, which they also see as crucial to their upswing in global rankings 
(Chapter 2). 
These elite universities perceive themselves as distinctive and influential social, moral and 
political organisations that act in the public interest. They strive to pursue social missions, 
advance knowledge and fulfil national responsibilities for socio-economic development. 
Meanwhile, the government’s increasing need for scientific expertise to support more rational 
policymaking has also provided new opportunities for universities to participate in the policy 
processes as expert advisors. This is especially true of a small number of elite research 
institutions which have demonstrated a growing involvement in the government’s policy 
consultations. 
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Nevertheless, these opportunities and developments are accompanied by numerous 
constraints (Chapter 2). Chinese national research universities remain financially dependent on 
the state and are increasingly vulnerable and sensitive to the volatility of government funding. 
On one hand, they have to attract and secure the government’s commitment to funding 
national higher education appropriately; on the other, they compete fiercely with peer 
institutions for finite resources to fulfil their own development plans, often resorting to 
manipulation and back channels to influence the funding distribution, largely decided by 
specific government divisions and individual officials. 
Government funding comes with strings attached. It guides and confines universities to deliver 
on the government’s specific nation-building priorities and meet its short-term plans. The 
state’s structural and regulatory constraints, ranging from the central accreditation of 
academic degrees, to student recruitment, to government audits of academic programs, to the 
restricted use of government funds, have also significantly hindered their academic and 
operational activities. In light of their rapid growth and internationalisation, all these policy 
restraints undermine universities’ development and long-term missions, and their credibility as 
scholarly organisations. 
Universities envisage that to fulfil their roles and advance their values, they need a supportive 
policy environment that provides both autonomous operational space and sustainable funding 
resources, which guarantees them proper rights and entitlements, allows them to decide on 
their academic activities and institutional priorities, and supports their endeavours in areas 
that may rely on long-term investment rather than short-term priorities. To achieve this result, 
universities require proactive engagement with the government and deeper involvement in 
policy processes. 
However, despite a trend towards procedural and scientific attitudes, education policymaking 
remains inefficient and dysfunctional (Chapter 1): formal channels of policy communications 
are typically top-down and led by the government; and there is a lack of legitimate spaces and 
formal institutions through which universities can act as policy advocates and lobbyists. This 
contradiction reflects to a large extent a dilemma for the government: it wants to appear more 
consultative on public policy, but it also fears the political consequences of consultation 
(Kennedy, 2009, p. 213) and has ‘an aversion to bottom-up initiatives’ (Zheng, 2010, p. 143). 
So for universities, intervening in the governmental processes through an array of informal 
lobbying activities and by exploiting their role as policy advisors has become imperative to 
advocate agendas and shape decisions. 
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Strategies and flexibility amid rigidity: the practices of university 
lobbying 
Central to their actions is the universities’ understanding of the key policy constraints and how 
much autonomy they can seek in the current policy framework. I have identified three ‘policy 
zones’ characterised by different levels of autonomy (Chapter 2). 
In a non-negotiable ‘no-go zone’ (issues where the power of the government is 
unchallengeable, for instance, party leadership and central appointment and removal of 
university leaders), universities bury their scepticism, avoid any forms of challenge or contest, 
and comply with (or even take advantage of) the rules to pursue their interests. In the 
localised, low-risk ‘autonomous zone’ (issues that universities can manage with reasonable 
autonomy, such as local research training), universities become increasingly innovative, and 
may even challenge government policies. 
Nevertheless, it is in the ‘contention zone’ (academic and operational issues that are centrally 
controlled, including student admissions, the allocation and use of government funding, and 
academic programs and degrees) that leading research universities feel their survival, priorities 
and long-term undertakings are most threatened. Universities are motivated and willing to 
seek solutions and pursue their rights and competitive advantages by undertaking certain risks 
and cautiously contesting and negotiating these policies by the state. 
It also becomes apparent that the rules that apply in each ‘policy zone’ are a consequence of 
the nature of the ideology and legitimacy of the political system. Certain issues have allowed 
for more autonomy and universities’ intervention than others, depending on the presumed 
levels of risk of political and social instability. This seems to resonate with what both Mertha 
and Balla have suggested: the state accepts public participation in the policy areas where no 
high-stakes confrontations are posed, and when neither democratisation nor legitimacy is an 
immediate, salient concern (Balla, 2012, pp. 656-657; Mertha, 2008, p. 151). 
Leaders of elite universities have developed strategies that adapt to policies in the different 
zones, and their interactions with the government and choices of strategy are shaped by a 
clear perception of what is allowed and what is not, as well as by the level of urgency or issues 
at stake. 
The perception of risks affects not only their strategies but also their organisational forms of 
action, in particular, whether and how universities act individually or in a coordinated fashion 
vis-à-vis state actors. The significant lobby group the C9 (Chapter 3) sheds light on how 
collective lobbying works in the university sector and on the limitations it faces in the Chinese 
context. 
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The state’s suspicion, the lack of formalisation and leadership within the group, decreasing 
urgency for policy collaboration, together with the members’ competition and dependence on 
the state, have all contributed over time to the weakening of the C9 group and its lobbying 
activities. However, if we look deeply, the powerful overarching political environment is the 
most salient factor that drives the decline and retreat of the C9 coalition. 
In many other countries, such as the US, the UK and Australia, it is common for similar 
universities to align interests and formalise coalitions despite their fierce competition, conflicts 
of interest and dependence on government funding. For example, in Australia, the vice-
chancellors of eight leading research universities established a group called ‘Group of Eight 
(Go8)’, which was self-initiated in 1995 and formally incorporated in 1999 with its permanent 
secretariat based in Canberra (Go8, 2015). The eight members have been long-term rivals in 
nearly every area, including government funding, student recruitment, and academic 
performance and international rankings. Despite their different, conflicting views on some 
policy matters, their pursuit of self-interests, as well as their heavy reliance on the government 
funding, the leaders of the eight member universities convene regular meetings (five times a 
year) to discuss common issues and sustain a solid, active lobby alliance with a strong public 
profile. Their formal grouping has maximised the potential for collaboration in a competitive 
environment, adding value for member universities through jointly influencing public policy, 
financing and regulation of higher education and university research in Australia (Go8, 2015, 
2016a, 2016b).   
However, in China, the significant difference is the political system that inhibits and punishes 
the formalisation of advocacy coalitions. In this system, the alignment of interests around 
collective organisations in the university sector is subject to political restrictions and scrutiny. 
This is similar to the political restrictions and central control over social groups and advocacy 
organisations in other sectors of China (Cheng, 2006, pp. 47-48; Kennedy, 2009, pp. 213-214; 
Unger & Chan, 2008, pp. 66-68). Furthermore, the state controls universities by controlling the 
universities’ leaders and their careers. University leaders need to act discreetly for the 
interests of their university and themselves. It is in general difficult for universities, even the 
most powerful ones, to form coalitions and produce change jointly. ‘Collective action’ remains 
controversial as a modus operandi for universities. 
The C9’s significant experience and influence may appear to some as suggesting a structural 
change in governmentuniversity relations. Yet, the C9 members’ swift return to the normality 
of individual action and the MoE’s tightening grip over universities to maintain order in the 
sector (despite initial support for the creation of the C9 when the interests of the universities 
and ministry were aligned) have shown the continuing difficulties of open and collective 
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lobbying efforts. It is still possible that university actors may seize or produce another 
significant opportunity and align their interests on specific issues, but the lobbying experience 
of the C9 casts a pessimistic shadow on the possibility of this becoming the ‘new normal’.144 
The prevalent practices of university lobbying remain fragmented, self-focused and issue-
based. Direct lobbying by universities remains the main course of action over a broad range of 
issues, including on important matters of collective interest which would suggest a cooperative 
and joint approach. For instance, the lifting of excessive restrictions on university student 
admissions, an increase of the government’s average education expenditure for each student, 
or reductions to the central control and audits of academic programs and degrees should be 
issues that unite universities but in practice fail to elicit a collective reaction. Why?  
As mentioned earlier, interest alignment and joint action are rare in the university sector 
largely because the state is wary of a collective voice and restricts united policy initiatives that 
may lead to threats to its political authority or greater social activism. The opportunity cost of 
collective actions is potentially very high. This situation is also due to conflicting priorities, 
divided focus and serious competition amongst universities. The fear of government reprisals 
seems predominant, because university leaders have made serious attempts to lobby 
collectively on some policy issues but have had to pull back due to concerns about the political 
sensitivity of the issues they were addressing and the potential consequences of doing so. 
Interestingly, although formal coalitions remain impractical, universities have developed an 
alternative solution to pull resources together. My evidence indicates that they at times 
purposely ‘coordinate’ lobbying efforts by acting simultaneously but separately on important 
matters of common interest and consensus. This may mean talking to the same office at a 
similar time on the same issue with the same goal, rather than taking a concrete, joint action. 
Such a strategy reduces ‘political risks’ and circumvents the political constraints against formal 
organisations that represent aligned interests vis-à-vis the state. Although it may help achieve 
their goals, such a form of ‘coordinated’ lobbying is weak and unlikely to evolve into powerful 
formal alliances. It again highlights that despite their various strategies and activities, 
universities still remain cautious not to push certain sensitive buttons of the government and 
mostly act within the perceived rules and pre-defined political boundaries.  
Such a discreet and restrained approach is also displayed in universities’ non-confrontational 
language and subservient tone during lobbying, and in how they desensitise and legitimise 
lobbying practices through adopting less-threatening expressions of intra-institutional 
                                                          
144 The development of C9 may require continuous monitoring in future research. 
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communication and highlighting their reverence to the state and the potential win-win 
outcomes (Chapters 4 and 5). 
Youshui, the Chinese word for ‘lobbying’, remains politically and socially sensitive and bears 
negative connotations that often inhibit the formalisation of its practices (Cheng, 2006; Cheng 
et al., 2003; S. He, 2009), despite lobbying being a de facto reality informally accommodated 
by the state. On one side, the government needs input and feedback from universities, and is 
subject to influence; on the other, it does not wish to be subject to influence or to appear 
vulnerable. Consequently, university executives whose careers are directly controlled by the 
state generally adopt a more covert, cautious and low-key approach when dealing with 
officials, adjust their language and camouflage their intentions accordingly. They hardly ever 
label their lobbying behaviour as ‘an attempt to influence the government’. They tend to use 
more familiar, neutral expressions to policy practitioners instead, such as ‘bottom-up 
reporting’ and ‘providing policy feedback’, as these suggest acceptable bureaucratic practices 
and legitimise interactions. 
In a fragmented, hierarchical and opaque political environment, universities’ capacity to 
successfully produce opportunities and exercise influence often largely depends on how well 
they understand the system and are able to exploit its fissures and circumvent its rules. 
Universities carefully track policy trends and are keen observers of any changes in the balance 
of powers to identify and seize opportunities in the system. 
Fragmentation, rivalry and hierarchy amongst central organs, and the supreme power of the 
top leaders are some of the most important features of the central bureaucracy that 
universities try to use to their advantage. Based on their knowledge and intelligence, they are 
able to identify the crucial central decision-makers (various state actors) within the system and 
adjust their strategies accordingly. For instance, they access the top leadership to cut through 
the limitation of the bureaucratic structure and receive policy shortcuts due to the supreme 
power of the national leaders (as shown by the cases of PKU and Tsinghua in Chapters 3 and 4 
and Universities D and M in Chapter 5). They also go over the head of their supervisory MoE 
and influence other central bodies to improve the standing of education or help the MoE 
overcome its weakness in the power hierarchy (see examples of SJTU and Tsinghua in Chapter 
4). 
In addition, the capacity of universities to adapt and prosper in such a complex bureaucratic 
setting also depends on their accumulation and deployment of three specific forms of social 
and cultural capital (Chapter 5). These are the most significant aspects of the universities’ 
toolkit and tactics: mobilising human factors (e.g., personal connections, alumni networks and 
intelligence gathering), rational persuasion through knowledge (e.g., presenting evidence and 
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third-party endorsement), and involvement in local policy experimentation (e.g., policy 
innovation to force a new policy and leading by example (Heilmann, 2008, pp. 2-4, 29-30) 
namely shidian and shiyan).145 
The idea promoted by some scholars that the system is becoming more institutionalised and the 
importance of guanxi is changing in direct governmentbusiness interactions (Deng & Kennedy, 
2010, p. 124; Gold et al., 2002; Guthrie, 1998, 1999; Kennedy, 2008, p. 109; 2009, p. 207; USCBC, 
2008) is challenged by the enduring centrality of personal and informal factors in the higher 
education sector, and the persistent importance of guanxi in universitygovernment 
interactions.146 
The universities rely on guanxi for all nation‐level policies, big or small, regardless of the 
complexity of the evaluation process and the number of offices involved. It helps universities 
gain face time with officials, seek intelligence and convey their advocacy; it also helps 
universities secure a decision that will go in their favour. 
As a result, the universities highly value guanxi, and put a lot of effort and planning into 
developing close ties with officials and into mobilising human factors. They cultivate personal 
guanxi through professional connections; they hire people with official links and posts; they 
take advantage of the two‐way personnel mobility system, and strengthen their alumni ties to 
advance political influence. 
As a repository of social and political influence, personal connections, and scientific knowledge 
and innovation, national research universities utilise and combine their social, cultural and 
intellectual assets, and adjust their lobbying strategies according to contingent circumstances, 
issues or the people involved. These resources, together with their position in the national 
developmental strategy, seem to provide universities with significant influence and leverage 
vis-à-vis the government. 
The rules of the game: key factors shaping lobbying practices 
The above lobbying experiences have demonstrated how universities tactfully choose what 
language to use, and decide strategically on what matters and officials to influence, what form 
                                                          
145 Description about shidian (试点) and shiyan (试验) has been provided in Chapter 5. Also see Glossary of Chinese 
terms. 
146 In Footnote 24 (see Introduction), I have provided a summary of these scholars’ discussions on guanxi. Their 
observations clearly do not fit the central policy process and universitygovernment interactions I illustrated in 
Chapter 5. Informal, personal practices remain influential and widespread in the government organisations and 
policy processes. Guanxi remains critical and central in universitygovernment interactions. 
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their agency should take, how they overcome difficulties within the perceived rules, as well as 
what social and cultural capital they deploy. 
Importantly, they have also revealed how much universities’ lobbying strategies, behaviour 
and even outcomes depend on two salient factors that define the ‘rules of game’ framing the 
interactions between universities and the state. They are: the need and capacity to monitor, 
navigate and penetrate an opaque central power structure within the state bureaucracy and 
the normative and regulatory environment of the higher education sector; and the 
contingencies that create strategic opportunities and/or major crises. When the central power 
structure and regulatory environment are rigid, taking advantage of or reacting to the 
contingencies becomes necessary for any effective action. 
As I elaborated earlier, fragmentation, rivalry, formal and informal hierarchies, as well as 
informality and human factors prevail amongst all levels of officials and throughout the central 
organs and their sub-divisions. The complex central environment and the constantly changing 
balance of power require active monitoring by universities. The universities continuously 
mobilise their contacts within the bureaucracy to keep their intelligence up to date, devote a 
great deal of resources to cultivating guanxi with power brokers and decision-makers, and 
often depend on personal relationships and informal interactions to penetrate the system and 
achieve their objectives. 
For instance, the central power structure maps the ‘internal politics’ and mechanics within the 
bureaucracy and decides which central units or individuals control significant resources and 
discretionary powers. The universities’ understanding of this structure determines their 
lobbying target(s) for specific policy agendas (from special funding to project approvals), and 
shapes their tactics in dealing with various central players and in exploiting the fissures within 
the system. 
In cases described in Chapter 4, Universities C and H interacted with multiple agencies 
simultaneously to maximise resources and policy support by taking advantage of the divisions 
and rivalry between the state actors. Moreover, when the universities face ‘dead-end 
situations’, they take advantage of their private access to national leaders to overrule lower-
level decisions, or obtain shortcuts and special exemptions. In addition, the universities 
generally place greater lobbying efforts on influential organs in the power structure that are 
well placed to allocate resources, such as National Development Reform Commission (NDRC), 
the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST), and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). 
Besides, when changes in the central power structure take place, universities are capable of 
reacting quickly. For example, when the MoE started to become a stronger player and 
obtained greater financial independence, universities increased their lobbying of the MoE; 
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once they discovered that a low-profile branch of the MoE was going to lead several new well-
funded university science education programs that involved billions of yuan, the universities 
quickly deployed resources and vigorously networked with its officials for a slice of the cake. 
Monitoring the quicksand of a multi-dimensional central government environment is critical 
for universities’ success. 
Contingencies also create lobbying opportunities and shape universities’ decisions and actions 
on specific issues. For instance, universities seized opportunities on the occasions of important 
events (e.g., the centenary celebrations at PKU in 1998 that originated Project 985 and at 
Tsinghua in 2011 that initiated the 2011 Scheme) and special occasions (e.g., private meeting 
sessions with national leaders and ministers, and senior officials’ visits to campus) to advance 
proposals to key decision-makers who are attending. When the MoE planned a new pilot 
policy trial (shidian) on student admissions at selected institutions, universities took advantage 
of the ‘open window’ to propose new ideas and plead for participation so that they could 
obtain greater autonomy and legitimately break with rules in that policy area. 
In addition, the occurrence of major incidents or political transitions, such as urgent threats to 
funding streams, changes in key decision-makers, and the government’s new priorities or 
directives, often makes universities react with enthusiasm or desperation, behave more 
decisively and promptly, and even become willing to take certain risks. 
For instance, as I illustrated in Chapter 3, when a newly arrived national leader suddenly posed 
a threat to the university funding policy Project 985 promised by the previous government, C9 
universities had to act proactively by all means (e.g., engaging national media, hosting high-
profile conferences, and submitting special reports) to change his mind and protect their 
positions and interests. As part of these desperate efforts, Shanghai Jiao Tong University 
(SJTU), one of the C9 members, unveiled the ‘Academic Ranking of World Universities’ (ARWU) 
at their joint meeting in 2003, aiming to show the disadvantaged positions of Chinese 
universities in the global index and lobby the government for continued funding support for 
Project 985 universities to catch up with the rest of the world. Notably, C9 members 
maximised their collective lobbying efforts and influence every time they faced possible 
Project 985 funding cuts, but pulled back quickly when a crisis eased. Besides, as shown in 
Chapters 35, PKU and Tsinghua compete fiercely with each other but often had to put their 
conflicts aside and lobby the state collaboratively (e.g., signing joint petition letters) when 
critical urgent matters were at stake that would affect them both badly. 
These two key factors not only reveal specific patterns and a set of ‘rules of the game’ for 
universitygovernment interactions, but also suggest that the political and regulatory 
characteristics of the Chinese political system do impact on the choices of Chinese universities. 
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Essentially, universities’ lobbying is both enabled and restrained by this situation. While the 
complexity and cracks of the system allow the most resourceful universities to operate beyond 
their institutional remit, exploit opportunities, and obtain competitive advantages, these 
universities are also largely restrained and framed by the system—they have to adjust 
themselves to fit into the system and apply suitable strategies in order to make their plans 
work.  
Interestingly, the lobbying practices of Chinese elite research universities to a certain degree 
resemble the tactics of businesses, NGOs, and even individual rightful resisters and collective 
social movements, although they operate in different contexts and pursue varied goals. For 
example, businesses generally adopt non-confrontational approaches to avoid challenging the 
government’s authority: deference to the state and aiming at potential win-win outcomes is 
the most common strategy; and they mainly interact directly with the state on policy without 
relying on trade associations (Kennedy, 2008, p. 164). Many NGOs, media and individual 
activists have shaped policy decisions by exploiting the cracks within the fragmented 
government and building alliances with like-minded officials (Mertha, 2008, pp. 151, 157-158; 
Zheng, 2010, p. 130). The university sector is not an outlier. 
Furthermore, this also reminds me of the ordinary citizens involved in rightful resistance and 
protests:147 they commonly work near the border of authorised channels and official norms to 
address issues;148 employ the rhetoric, commitments and directives of the powerful and use 
                                                          
147 In reform-era China, ordinary citizens, such as migrants, workers, farmers and pensioners, have made rights 
claims in various forms to address their political contentions and conflicts with authorities, which spurred unrest 
and disruptive activities such as petitions, protests, demonstrations, and riots (Saich, 2004, pp. 203-206). For 
instance, pensioners claim the ‘sacred right not to have to labour’ (Hurst & O'Brien, 2002, p. 351); migrant workers 
claim the right to organise unions (F. Chen, 2007, pp. 67-69); and farmers assert a right to elect village leaders 
(O'Brien, 2001, pp. 407-435). According to O’Brien and Li, the main common attributes of vibrant, popular rightful 
resistance by these individuals include: ‘operating near the boundary of authorised channels, employing the 
rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb the exercise of power, hinging on locating and exploiting 
divisions within the state, and relying on mobilising support from the community’ (O'Brien, 2013, pp. 1051-1052; 
O'Brien & Li, 2006, p. 2). 
148 Due to the lack of formal institutions for bottom-up initiatives as earlier mentioned, universities explore 
alternative, nonstandard forms and opportunistic paths to intervene policymaking and influence decisions. For 
instance, they submit special petitions and jointly signed letters directly to the government leaders; they quietly 
‘coordinate’ lobbying in an environment that restricts collective actions; they play an informal policy advocacy role 
with a hidden agenda while serving as formal policy advisors in the governmental process; they gather confidential 
intelligence on funding and awards, and manipulate formal governmental procedures through covert, private 
interactions; they bend existing rules (such as restrictions over the spending of funds) in a way that is near the 
margin of ‘legality’; and in particular, they experiment with new rules without telling the government or before 
receiving its permission in order to test the tolerance of the state and push the policy boundaries. 
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persuasive normative language to legitimise and frame their claims;149 rely on locating and 
exploiting the fragmentation and divisions within the state; and mobilise support from allies 
(O'Brien, 2013, pp. 1051-1052; O'Brien & Li, 2006, p. 2).150 These patterns can also be largely 
used to describe university contention and activism with the obvious caveat that universities 
mobilise different types of allies (e.g., alumni within the officialdom and international partners 
versus local communities) and operate in a very different context.  
The unexpected shared attributes between these practices and actions, including the more 
disguised, discreet attempts behind the public scene and the more open, vibrant resistance in 
public view, or high within the system and low at the bottom of society, may suggest that 
interactions with the government in China by diverse actors with various motives are regulated 
by a similar set of written and unwritten rules that explain and frame the attempts, behaviour 
and strategies to negotiate and influence authoritarianism. 
Lobbying authoritarianism: limitations, influence and implications 
So how should we understand universities’ claims, tactics and patterns of interaction with the 
authoritarian state, their extent of influence on government decisions, as well as their 
limitations and potential to make structural modifications to the current system? Is their 
activism strategic and contingent? Or can it lead to long-term, structural change to the existing 
institutions of the system? 
Universities are a unique type of agent: being repositories of knowledge, they are significant 
and influential organisations with a special set of social, cultural, economic and political 
attributes and functions; they are operated by highly skilled academics and professionals; they 
                                                          
149 To attract sustainable funding to the sector, expand institutional autonomy, or secure approval of special 
proposals, universities often deploy national leaders’ established plans, commitments, principles and slogans as 
rhetoric to legitimise their claims and remind officials of the top-level commands and their due obligations. They 
include language such as ’delivering the national 12th Five-year Plan’, ‘building a knowledge economy’, ‘revitalising 
Western China’ and ‘developing world-class universities’. C9 universities, for example, often used Deng’s slogan 
‘concentrating energy on the targeted areas (key stakeholders) to accomplish large undertakings’ (jizhong liliang 
ban dashi 集中力量办大事) to argue for privileged, prioritised funding and greater autonomy to be given to a small 
number of elite institutions. 
150 Unlike farmers and workers who typically organise and assemble community, universities rely on mobilising 
support and assistance from different types of allies, such as international partners and experts. Universities devote 
particular attention and extensive efforts to building alliances with congenial officials and deploy connected 
personnel within the officialdom to seek intelligence, gain assistance, access powers and decision shortcuts. It is 
worth noting that despite their root in the community and significant social support bases, Chinese universities 
mostly avoid involving community members such as students and parents during their activities and interactions 
with the government, largely due to strict political constraints and possible negative consequences. 
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are not only embedded in the political system and led by government-appointed executives, 
but also deeply rooted in Chinese society as providers of highly sought-after education and 
skills, and increasingly inserting themselves in the global imaginary about research and 
education. As a result, they have developed mixed perceptions of their identity, roles and 
rightful claims: one defined and driven by their academic work, the public interest of 
education, and international partnerships; the other shaped and framed by their organic 
relationship with the government, on which they remain dependent. Their actions are guided 
both by righteous motives and sincere belief, and by a rule-based mentality and strategic 
calculations. 
Universities have developed a consciousness of their roles, rights and duties such that their 
lobbying of the state is framed by their position in a modern society. As operators and 
members of a community of higher learning, they perceive their activities, including 
knowledge exploration, promotion of education, and the advancement and application of 
technology, as the provision of public goods, in the service of the public interest, and as long-
term contributions to society. University leaders, despite being appointed by the government, 
generally maintain principled views of the rights and moral entitlements of modern research 
institutions, empowered by sufficient institutional autonomy and abundant public funding. 
Universities’ rights awareness, expectations and claims become more intense as they engage 
in significant internationalisation and witness the autonomy and rights enjoyed by their foreign 
peers, partners and competitors. In this situation, universities often explicitly express their 
deep concerns, frustration, disappointment and scepticism at the government and central 
leaders, as rule-makers place their own interests and priorities over those of universities and 
education, and rule-enforcement authorities and individuals also often abuse rules. 
Participating in policymaking is therefore also a way for universities to protect and strengthen 
their core interests. 
On the other hand, this consciousness of a rightful position has developed in the cultural and 
political context of the authoritarian state and does not translate into contestation of the 
institutional order: universities tend to separate their local affairs and interests from their 
general feelings about the political system as a whole; and their motivations for pressing 
institutional and political changes, and their potential capacity to produce institutional 
innovation in their own right are severely limited by their organic role within the system and 
by financial dependency. They frame their claims within state-defined roles and state-
endowed rights, which is not only part of their strategic rhetoric and persuasion to legitimise 
their entitlements, but also reflects the national and international roles that the government 
has defined and assigned to them. They also act upon their claims within the bureaucratic 
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structure and play by the existing written and unwritten ‘rules of the game’ to their own 
advantage. For example, instead of attempting to contest policies in the ‘no-go zone’ (such as 
the right to elect their own university presidents), Chinese research universities accept and 
abide by these ‘principles’, only to purposely manipulate them to advance their institutional 
interests and competitive advantages. 
Essentially, their development objectives and reformist agenda require the preservation and 
thriving of their status, the availability of resources and competitive advantages, adherence to 
values that underpin the provision of public goods, and a more supportive regulatory and 
funding environment, all of which cannot be achieved without the support of the state. 
Universities believe that their capacity depends on a constant adaptation to the central 
government's bureaucratic system, exploiting the existing loopholes, bending the rules in the 
system, and negotiating with an authoritarian regime to obtain concessions, not on changing 
the system (for all its flaws). As Scott Kennedy has observed about the behaviour of 
businesses, some may believe democratising the regime is in their best interests, but ‘those 
with relatively significant influence under the current political circumstances may not see a 
need for much further modification’ (Kennedy, 2008, p. 180). Even though universities may 
want to change certain things in the system, they cannot bite the hand that feeds them. 
Given the longevity of the regime, the perceived high risks of strategic suicide or failing a 
challenge, and the political and financial security they have so far obtained, they need to 
consider how to play safely and exert influence effectively in the resilient and powerful system 
without risking too much of their existing advantages and interests (which are largely provided 
by the current system). In such a position, universities’ interactions with the state are unlikely 
to lead, singlehandedly, to any significant structural changes. 
Yet one should not overlook what these institutions have achieved so far within such a 
confined space, and the extent and potential of their influence. Through lobbying, they have 
pushed policy boundaries and engineered incremental modifications to the system. Despite 
the political limitations mentioned above, they have shown a remarkable capacity to produce 
specific opportunities and influence individual governmental decisions, such as loosening up 
certain regulatory constraints or attracting additional resources to the sector. 
C9 universities, for instance, successfully pushed the permitted limits on PhD student 
admissions policies through coordinated lobbying activities with substantial overall outcomes. 
Their actions eventually resulted in new rules for all national universities, and an incremental 
improvement for Chinese students’ access to research training and the quality of domestic PhD 
programs. They also played a significant role in persuading the state’s leaders to extend 
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Project 985 after its initial three years, which prolonged special national investments for the 
development of Chinese research institutions. 
In particular, as I mentioned earlier, C9 member SJTU unveiled a new world academic ranking 
system, ARWU, in 2003 as a strategic component of their lobbying efforts in persuading the 
state leaders to extend Project 985 funding for Chinese research universities. As a result, 
ARWU not only offered C9 universities a compelling, evidence-based lobbying tool at that 
time, but has also become one of the most influential international rankings in the world, 
raising the profile of Chinese institutions and producing far-reaching impact on the global 
university community. 
The C9 members have also individually initiated numerous policy proposals and pilots in other 
areas such as the accreditation of academic degrees, admissions of undergraduate and 
postgraduate students, talent training models and the authorisation and management of new 
degree programs. Through lobbying, they have innovated and improved national education 
practices and expanded institutional and academic autonomy. 
Policy boundaries of what is allowed, that were established by the authoritarian state, are 
continuously and strategically contested and redefined to accommodate new practices, 
facilitate growth and ease tensions. In the long run, these small steps are able to gradually 
soften and shrink the area of the ‘contention zone’, expand the ‘autonomous zone’, and 
transform certain elements and conventions in the regulatory space. The result altogether may 
well be a more open and vibrant education sector. 
Yet, one should also recognise that university lobbying is sometimes a zero-sum game. 
Competition and inequity do exist between the C9 and other universities. Elite institutions in 
general have much more political access, leverage and resources in policy process than less 
prestigious institutions; this central system also channels more advantages and opportunities 
to the former. Consequently, the interests of the latter may not be well presented in the policy 
debates, hence these non-elite universities tend to lose competitions for education resources. 
For instance, some policies that C9 universities have collectively lobbied for, such as the 
concentration of funding on a few top players and privileged student admissions, would 
advantage themselves but perhaps damage the less prestigious universities. A different study 
may be needed to probe the ongoing contention between elite and non-elite institutions, 
compare their lobbying practices, and assess how their relationships and strategies shape 
China’s policymaking and the development of the tertiary education sector. 
Formal and informal practices of university lobbying can have a positive, enduring impact on 
public policies and decisions. Providing a critical concentration of knowledge, innovation and 
expertise, universities in general are proactive, persuasive and enthusiastic when they offer 
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policy ideas and intellectual support to the government. Their relentless use of ‘scientific 
persuasion’, tactful personal and informal communications, and policy innovations can not 
only stir the minds of officials to address short-term local issues of self-interests and influence 
the national policy agenda, but can also gradually change officials’ general attitude towards 
policy and decision-making. 
It remains true that many government officials are still not inclined to pursue objective and 
formal processes, and ‘scientific persuasion’ often becomes a tool for them to justify and 
legitimise personal decisions and preferences, especially when they face growing pressure and 
questions from universities and society at large. However, universities frequently educate 
officials on the professional and technical aspects of policies, present alternative perspectives 
and viable options, and encourage officials to become more open-minded and analytical. This 
may increase officials’ appetite, reliance and acceptance of universities’ opinions, bottom-up 
initiatives and inputs, facilitate a more inclusive and rational approach and consultative culture 
in the bureaucracy, and transform the way policy is produced. Ultimately, this may lead to an 
evolution of the system and a more open society. Structural changes do not happen in leaps 
but through small, intermediate steps involving a lot of breaking-in. 
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List of abbreviations 
AAU American Association of Universities 
ACGS Association of Chinese Graduate Schools 
ACRU Association of Chinese Research Universities 
ARWU Academic Ranking of World Universities 
C9 Consortium of China Nine Research Universities  
CAS Chinese Academy of Sciences 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
CDGDC         China Academic Degrees and Graduate Education Development Center 
CLSG Central Leading Small Group 
CNR China National Radio 
CPC Communist Party of China 
CPCCC Communist Party of China Central Committee 
CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
CSADGE        Chinese Society of Academic Degrees and Graduate Education 
CSC China Scholarship Council 
FA Fragmented Authoritarianism 
Fudan Fudan University 
Go8 Group of Eight Australia 
HEIs Higher Education Institutions 
HIT Harbin Institute of Technology 
KIP Knowledge Innovation Project 
LERU League of European Research Universities 
LSGSTE         Leading Small Group on Science, Technology and Education 
MEP              Ministry of Environmental Protection 
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MIIT Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
MoE Ministry of Education 
MoF               Ministry of Finance 
MoST             Ministry of Science and Technology 
NBS                National Bureau of Statistics 
NCEDR National Centre for Education Development Research 
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission 
NGO Non-government organisation 
NJU Nanjing University 
NPC National People’s Congress 
NSFC Natural Science Foundation of China 
ODCPCCC Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PKU Peking University 
R&D Research and Development 
RCSTEP          Research Centre for Science, Technology and Education Policy 
S&T Science and Technology 
SDPC State Development Planning Commission 
SJTU Shanghai Jiao Tong University 
SOE                State Owned Enterprise 
TEIs Tertiary Education Institutions 
Tsinghua Tsinghua University 
UKPAC United Kingdom Public Affairs Council 
USTC University of Science and Technology of China 
XJTU Xi’an Jiaotong University 
ZJU Zhejiang University 
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Glossary of Chinese terms 
This glossary provides a general reference of the key Chinese terms I have used repeatedly in 
this thesis. 
Gaokao (高考) The national university entrance examination system, mandated by the 
Chinese Ministry of Education 
Guanxi (关系) Relationships and connections 
Jiediao (借调)         Secondment of staff 
Neican (内参)         An internally circulated newspaper within the Chinese government that is 
read by high-ranking officials 
Shidian (试点) Government-led experimental points or pilot projects 
Shiyan (试验) Bottom-up policy trials and new experiments 
Youshui (游说) Lobbying 
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Appendices 
Appendix A—Interviews 
I interviewed the following people:  
 university leaders and executives, including party secretaries, university presidents, vice 
presidents and provosts; 
 key university personnel of various administrative and policy areas, including directors 
of party and government relations office (dangzhengban 党政办), directors for policy 
and planning, directors of student admissions, directors of teaching affairs, deans of 
undergraduate studies, international directors, directors of president’s office, and 
deans of graduate studies; 
 scholars and researchers on higher education policy and government administration; 
and 
 former and present government officials from various central organs. 
At the beginning of the semi-structured interviews, I made it clear to interviewees that my 
interest was in the universitygovernment interaction on education and research policies and 
university lobbying practices. I assured them that their names and identifying features would 
remain protected and anonymous. The anonymity encouraged frank, open discussions. 
I then started to ask general questions, such as their perceptions on research universities’ roles 
and autonomy; university–government relations; understanding of the regulatory and 
bureaucratic system; current higher education policy issues; individual versus collective action 
in lobbying practices; and their tactics, strategies and experiences to interact with officials and 
influence the government. I then requested specific examples and stories. My interviewees 
tended to begin with broad generalisations, but would invariably end up providing detailed 
examples and explanations of the lobbying process and their interactions with the government 
for various policy issues.  
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Appendix B—Internal departments of the MoE 
There are a range of departments and divisions within the MoE with which national 
universities regularly interact for various policies. 
The MoE Department of Development and Planning (fazhan guihua si 发展规划司) collects 
and analyses national education data, draws up national university policies and regulations, 
and supervises universities’ implementation of the rules. Especially, it sets up university 
operational standards and national student recruitment quotas, and has the approval 
authority for infrastructure management and building construction at the MoE-affiliated 
universities (zhishu yuanxiao 直属院校). 
The MoE Department of College Student Affairs (gaoxiao xuesheng si 高校学生司) allocates 
student admissions quota for each university, based on the national recruitment plan that has 
been confirmed by the MoE Department of Development and Planning. It also manages 
university entrance examinations, academic credentials and the records of student 
enrolments. 
The MoE Department of Higher Education (gaodeng jiaoyu si 高等教育司) formulates and 
implements higher education policies on education quality. It conducts regular academic 
assessments and evaluations, teaching and learning reforms, and university curriculum 
development. In particular, it administers several major education reform programs, including 
the well-funded ‘Midwest higher education revitalisation scheme (20122020)’ (zhongxibu 
gaodeng jiaoyu zhenxing jihua 中西部高等教育振兴计划), and the ‘Undergraduate education 
quality project’ (benke jiaoyu zhiliang gongcheng xiangmu 本科教学质量工程项目). 
The MoE Department of Postgraduate Education (doubles the Office of the State Council 
Academic Degrees Committee) (xuewei guanli yu yanjiusheng jiaoyu si jian guowuyuan xuewei 
weiyuanhui bangongshi 学位管理与研究生教育司兼国务院学位委员会办公室) is jointly led 
by the State Council and the MoE. It manages national academic degrees and postgraduate 
programs, and implements and coordinates Project 211 and Project 985 in collaboration with 
the NDRC and MoF. 
The MoE Department of Science and Technology (kexue jishu si 科学技术司) leads university 
research development in the fields of natural science and technology. It often coordinates and 
collaborates with other ministries on key national science and research schemes, such as the 
MoST and MIIT. It facilities and organises universities to participate in the national innovation 
system and undertake key research projects, as well as supervises universities to develop key 
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laboratories and research centres. It currently manages various special programs (zhuanxiang 
专项) including the 2011 Scheme. 
The MoE Department of Social Sciences (shehui kexue si 社会科学司) develops university 
research in humanities and social sciences. It also controls the political studies and party 
education at universities, and strengthens the development and leadership of the party 
committees within universities. 
The MoE Department of International Cooperation and Exchanges (guoji hezuo yu jiaoliu si 国
际合作与交流司) formulates policies on international education programs, including the 
conferral system and mutual recognition for international academic degrees. 
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Appendix C—Project 211 universities (112 members) 
(MoE, 2010)  
Beijing University of Technology, Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing Forestry University, 
Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 
Sport University, Beihang University (formerly known as Beijing University of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics), Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Beijing University of Chinese 
Medicine, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Central China Normal 
University, Central Conservatory of Music, Central South University, Central University of 
Finance and Economics, Chang'an University, China Agricultural University, China 
Pharmaceutical University, China University of Geosciences (Beijing), China University of 
Geosciences (Wuhan), China University of Mining and Technology (Beijing), China University of 
Mining and Technology, China University of Petroleum (Beijing), China University of Petroleum 
(Huadong), China University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing University, 
Communication University of China, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian University of 
Technology, Donghua University, East China Normal University, East China University of 
Science and Technology, Fourth Military Medical University, Fudan University, Fuzhou 
University, Anhui University, Guangxi University, Guizhou University, Hainan University, Harbin 
Engineering University, Harbin Institute of Technology, Hebei University of Technology, Hefei 
University of Technology, Hohai University, Huazhong Agricultural University, Huazhong 
University of Science and Technology, Hunan Normal University, Hunan University, Inner 
Mongolia University, Jinan University, Jiangnan University, Jilin University, Lanzhou University, 
Liaoning University, Minzu University of China (formerly known as the Central University for 
Nationalities), Nanchang University, Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing Normal University, 
Nanjing University, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing University of 
Science and Technology, Nankai University, Ningxia University, National University of Defense 
Technology, North China Electric Power University, North China Electric Power University 
(Baoding), Northeast Agricultural University, Northeast Forestry University, Northeast Normal 
University, Northeastern University, Northwest A&F University, Northwest University, 
Northwestern Polytechnical University, Ocean University of China, Peking University, Qinghai 
University, Renmin University of China, Second Military Medical University, Shaanxi Normal 
University, Shandong University, Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University, Shanghai University, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shihezi 
University, Sichuan Agricultural University, Sichuan University, South China Normal University, 
South China University of Technology, Southeast University, Southwest University, Southwest 
Jiaotong University, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Sun Yat-sen 
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University, Soochow University, Taiyuan University of Technology, Tianjin Medical University, 
Tianjin University, Tibet University, Tongji University, Tsinghua University, University of 
Electronic Science and Technology of China, Beijing University of International Business and 
Economics, University of Science and Technology Beijing, University of Science and Technology 
of China, Wuhan University, Wuhan University of Technology, Xiamen University, Xi'an 
Jiaotong University, Xidian University, Xinjiang University, Yanbian University, Yunnan 
University, Zhejiang University, Zhengzhou University, Zhongnan University of Economics and 
Law. 
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Appendix D—Project 985 universities (39 members)  
(MoE, 2011b) 
Peking University, Tsinghua University, Fudan University, Harbin Institute of Technology, 
Nanjing University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, University of Science and Technology of 
China, Xi'an Jiao Tong University, Zhejiang University, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 
Normal University, Beihang University, Central South University, Minzu University of China, 
Renmin University of China, China Agricultural University, Chongqing University, Dalian 
University of Technology, East China Normal University, Huazhong University of Science and 
Technology, Hunan University, Jilin University, Lanzhou University, Nankai University, 
Northwestern Polytechnical University, Northeastern University, Northwest Agriculture and 
Forestry University, Ocean University of China, Southeast University, Shandong University, 
Sichuan University, South China University of Technology, Sun Yat-sen University, Tianjin 
University, Tongji University, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Wuhan 
University, Xiamen University, National University of Defense Technology. 
 
  
253 
 
 
 
This page is intentionally left blank 
